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Abstract 
Differences in the toughness of competition are likely to be one of the major determinants 
of the large dispersion in productivity, costs and output prices across firms even within 
narrowly defined sectors and geographical markets. This dissertation examines how 
increase in the intensity of international competition affects productivity and other 
performance measures: at the firm, industry, and geographical market levels. The 
dissertation combines three empirical studies of three distinct types of changes in the 
competition environment.  
The first empirical study investigates the effects of the changes in foreign competition in 
the form of entry of multinational firms on the total factor productivity growth, 
innovation and the ways of knowledge-sourcing by incumbent firms.  The analysis is 
based on firm-level panel data from Estonia. I use an instrumental variables approach to 
identify the effects.  Notably, I find no significant short-term effects on productivity 
growth of incumbents. However, I find that the entry of multinational firms is associated 
with increase in innovation activities of incumbents and knowledge sourcing from other 
firms.  
The second empirical study investigates the effects of entry and market structure on 
output price distribution across firms within spatially differentiated markets.  Recent 
heterogeneous-producer models of competition and trade outline new effects how tougher 
competition affects across-firm price, productivity and cost distributions in the same 
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sector and market. This chapter tests the implications of these models based on a case 
study of the European airline sector and a unique airfare dataset. I find some confirmation 
to the prediction that in more competitive environments, there will be less output price 
dispersion across firms.  
The third essay studies the effects of liberalisation and changes in entry costs on 
performance of the aviation sector. I use an event study of the enlargement of the 
European Union (EU) and the Single European Aviation Market in 2004 and employ 
difference-in-differences and synthetic control methods to study their effects on volume 
of airline passengers.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
It is well known by now that there are large differences in productivity, other 
performance indicators, and output prices across firms even within narrowly defined 
sectors and markets. For example, already Griliches and Mairesse (1995) and Bartelsman 
and Doms (2000) show evidence of large persistent productivity dispersion across firms 
within detailed single sectors. Roberts and Supina (1997), Sorensen (2000) and Baye et 
al. (2004) show similarly large output price dispersion even for rather homogeneous 
goods. During recent years, and largely due to better accessibility of detailed micro 
datasets, there has been an increasing interest to explain these variations.
1
A number of explanatory factors to these performance differences have been proposed 
and studied. These include, among others: differences in quality or vintage of inputs, 
technology, R&D and IT investments, skills, ownership, management practices, 
organisation of the firms, and barriers to local and international competition. Bartelsman 
and Doms (2000) and Syverson (2010) provide excellent overviews of related empirical 
literature.  

1 For example: in Prescott (1997), Syverson (2004a), Schmitz (2005), Syverson (2007).  
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This dissertation examines how changes and differences in the intensity of international 
competition affect productivity, other performance measures, and output prices at the firm 
and geographical market levels. Differences in the toughness of competition are likely to 
be among major determinants of variation in performance characteristics across 
production units, industries, markets and countries (e.g. Arrow 1962, Leibenstein 1966, 
Vickers 1995, Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). There is long-standing interest about the 
effects of competition, including among others the seminal studies by Hicks (1935), 
Schumpeter (1943), Arrow (1962), Leibenstein (1966) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). 
Also, economists share a general belief that competition is mostly good for national 
productivity.  
However, empirically identifying the impact of local and foreign competition is difficult. 
Only a small share of empirical papers can study the causal effects (e.g. Aghion et al. 
2009, Syverson 2004a). Largely, because it is difficult to find out how the affected units 
(firms, industries, geographical markets or countries) would have evolved in the absence 
of changes in the competition environment. The ideal research framework in the form of a 
true natural experiment, with exogenous changes in competition rarely becomes 
available. 
My dissertation combines three different empirical studies, based on rich panel datasets, 
that contribute to the empirical literature on industrial organisation and foreign direct 
investments (FDI). These studies complement each other by investigating different events 
of changes in the competition environment. Following Vickers (1995), more 
competition can have different commonly used meanings. It can mean: i) increased 
freedom of rivals to enter an industry (e.g. following a deregulation of entry or removal of 
barriers to trade); ii) an increase in the number of competitors (or a change towards less 
15
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concentrated market structure); iii) move away from collusive behaviour to rivalry; and 
iv) a situation where the potential reward for obtaining the aim that rivals are all striving 
for is increased.  Studies in this PhD dissertation concentrate on the analysis of the first 
two of these ways of increasing competition. 
To be more specific, my three empirical contributions investigate: a) the effects of entry 
of technologically superior foreign-owned firms on productivity, knowledge sourcing and 
innovation of incumbent firms (Chapter 2); b) the effect of entry of rival airlines and 
changes in market structure on across-firm distribution of airfares on different city-pair 
markets in Europe (Chapter 3); and c) the effect of market liberalisation in the form of the 
enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the Single European Aviation Market 
(SEAM) in 2004 on the volume of physical output in passenger aviation sector (Chapter 
4). The level of analysis is firm-level in Chapter 2, geographical market (city-pair) level 
in Chapter 3, and aggregate country-pair level in Chapter 4.    
This dissertation adds to the empirical literature about competition by studying the 
different specific channels of the effects of competition. These channels include the 
selection effects across firms and the within-firm effects through changes in innovation 
incentives and knowledge sourcing by incumbent firms. In examining these issues I 
endeavour to control for the endogeneity of measures of competition by using 
instrumental variables and an extension to the difference-in-differences, the synthetic 
control method.  
Before outlining the contributions in separate chapters in more detail, it is worth to 
discuss briefly how competition, through selection and within-firm effects, can affect 
productive efficiency at firm and aggregate level. 
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1.2 Effects of competition on productive efficiency 
The large and persistent productivity and price differences across production 
establishments and markets are only possible under one condition: there need to be 
barriers that enable inefficient and high-price producers to operate without being forced 
out of the market by other more efficient ones. The productivity differences can persist in 
different markets, firms, regions or industries if there are differences in strength of 
resistance to the adoption of new technologies and to the efficient use of existing 
technologies (Prescott 1997). Economic historians place a significant role to the strength 
of resistance to the use of better technologies in explaining differences in economic 
development.  For example, Mokyr (1990) argues that this resistance explains why 
modern economic growth began initially in the West and not in China.
2
 Also, following 
the view of Prescott (1997), the variation in resistance to change is potentially the key 
driver behind total factor productivity (TFP) differences across regions, industries or 
individual firms. 
Differences in the toughness of competition and in product substitutability between 
producers in general are likely to be major determinants of the willingness to improve 
efficiency. That way, competition plays a key role also in the large differences in 
productivity, costs, and output prices across firms. 
The first main way how tougher competition can improve productivity and performance 
at the firm, the industry and the country levels is by inducing changes within the firms.
3
 

2 Also, Landes (1969) has claimed that the relative industrial decline of the United Kingdom at the 
beginning of twentieth century was partly due to the persistent prevalence of generation-after-generation of 
family management, if compared to the US and German increasing willingness to employ professional 
managers of firms.  
3 In principle, competition can affect firms productivity through its effects on a wide host of within-firm 
determinants of productivity growth. These determinants include: management and work practices at 
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Competition can improve the incentives of managers and employees at the firm to avoid 
slack and to try harder (Vickers 1995, Leibenstein 1966). This can be manifested in 
more efficient use of technologies already existing at the firm and in adoption of new 
technology and work practices.  Competition may also improve incentives to innovate 
(e.g. Hicks 1935, Leibenstein 1966, Arrow 1962, Aghion et al. 2009).  In addition, the 
entry of technologically superior competitors may trigger knowledge spillovers to the 
incumbent firms in the same sector or in downstream or upstream sectors (e.g. Javorcik 
2004). 
The within-firm effects may depend on the characteristics of the incumbents, for example 
as predicted by Glass and Saggi (1998) or the Schumpeterian competition models in 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Aghion and Griffith (2005). These models predict that an 
increase in entry of technologically advanced firms (e.g. multinational enterprises) raises 
incumbents performance, innovation incentives and innovation activities if the 
incumbents are sufficiently close to the productivity frontier. According to Aghion et al. 
(2009) there may be positive effects on innovation of the high-productivity firms because 
they can escape adverse entry effects by innovating. It could be also expected that if 
incumbents are far from the productivity frontier then entry of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) will reduce their incentives to innovate. Hence, it would have negative effect on 
their productivity growth. Increasing frontier entry could reduce incumbents innovation 
incentives if they are far from the technology frontier, as they have little hope of 
surviving the entry. 

production units (as studied in Ichniovsky et al. 1997, Bloom and van Reenen 2007), information 
technology (IT) and R&D investments (Bartel et al. 2007, van Ark et al. 2008), innovation (e.g. Crépon et 
al. 1998, Griffith et al. 2006), organization of the firm (incl. decentralisation, as in Bloom et al. 2007). 
18
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The second main way how competition can improve productivity and performance is 
through selection effects across firms. The selection effects can affect the productivity 
distribution of the whole industry, region, and countryeven if there are no within-firm 
productivity changes at all. Competition can force the inefficient producers to lose their 
market share to the more efficient ones, and finally to exit from the market. This selection 
process raises the aggregate industry productivity, as predicted in Syverson (2004a) and 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). It can also have effects on output prices, as shown in 
Syverson (2007) based on the US ready-mixed concrete sector. The Syverson (2004a) and 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) models predict that tougher competition not only results in 
an effect on average productivity and prices on a market, but also in effects on other 
moments of the productivity and output price distributions. Tougher competition raises 
the lower bound (survival cut-off) of the productivity distribution and suppresses the 
upper-bound prices in a market. Thereby tougher competition will also result in lower 
dispersion of both productivity and output prices across firms. 
 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
To allow for specific study of different aspects of effects of international competition, this 
dissertation has been structured into three empirical chapters, each investigating a 
different type of change in competition environment; each chapter also contains a review 
of related literature. 
Chapter 2 focuses on an issue of considerable policy importance. It studies the effects of 
entry of MNEs on productivity growth, innovation and knowledge-sourcing by incumbent 
firms in the host economy. Research in this chapter is motivated by the earlier largely 
19
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inconclusive empirical evidence about the spillover effects of FDI. Although FDI has a 
potential to be a catalyst of economic development, the empirical findings about its 
effects on domestic firms in the host country are mixed, at best. Notably, only a small 
number of empirical papers are able to account for the endogeneity of MNE entry. Also, 
vast majority of studies concentrate on the effects on productivity. There is only little 
research that investigates the various channels how MNE entry can increase productivity 
of incumbents (e.g. Crespi et al. 2008, Aghion et al. 2009).  
The analysis in Chapter 2, based on firm level data from the manufacturing industry in 
Estonia, provides new empirical evidence about different channels how MNE entry can 
affect firms in the host economy. In addition to productivity growth, Chapter 2 
investigates whether the MNE entry is associated with an increase in incumbents 
innovation and innovation-related co-operation with other firms. It studies whether the 
MNE entry results in an increase in direct measures of knowledge flows from 
competitors, suppliers and clients of the incumbent firm.  It also tests whether the effects 
on productivity and innovation are heterogeneous and depend on incumbents distance to 
the productivity frontier (as outlined in Section 1.2).  
Chapter 2 builds to significant extent upon the empirical approach in a recent study by 
Aghion et al. (2009), which used firm level data from UK. The empirical analysis of data 
from Estonia starts, first, with estimation of production function and TFP. Next, I regress 
the TFP growth, the labour productivity growth, or measures of innovation and 
knowledge flows on the MNE entry rate in the sector, distance to the local technology 
frontier, and several other controls. In estimating these effects, I endeavour to control for 
the endogeneity of MNE entry. For that, I use instrumental variables that predict the 
20
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MNE entry in Estonia, but are (otherwise) unlikely to affect the outcome variables of 
incumbent firms. 
I check whether the predictions and findings in Aghion et al. (2009) about the role of 
distance to the technology frontier in effects of MNE entry hold also in a transition 
economy, characteristic to Estonia of 1995-2004. However, my study goes into greater 
detail with investigation of the various ways how MNE entry affects incumbents than 
Aghion et al. (2009) and other related papers. Estonia is a good case for investigating the 
impact of FDI as its transitional economy has ranked ahead of most other Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries in terms of per capita FDI inflows. Moreover, I use 
Estonias firm-level survey data on knowledge flows and innovation that is linked to 
firm-level data on productivity growth. Based on Estonias data I can test directly 
whether the MNE entry results in knowledge spillovers. That is, whether entry of FDI is 
associated with an increase in the direct measures of knowledge flows to incumbents.  
Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the effects of entry and market structure on the output price 
distribution across firms within spatially differentiated markets.  Recent heterogeneous-
producer models from industrial organisation (Syverson 2004a) and new-new trade 
theory (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) outline new effects how tougher competition affects 
across-firm price, productivity and cost distributions in a market. This chapter contributes 
to the empirical literature of industrial organisation by testing some implications of these 
models based on a case study of the European airline sector and a unique airfare dataset. I 
test the predictions that tougher competition (in the form of increased entry, larger 
number of competitors, or lower value of the Herfindahl index) is associated with a fall in 
maxima and dispersion of the price distribution across firms in a market. Before, similar 
effects on output price distribution have been investigated in Syverson (2007) based on 
21

US data of ready-mixed concrete producers.  To the best of my knowledge, there are so 
far no other papers that test these predictions based on data from a services sector.  
Focusing on this single sector has significant advantages as the European short-haul 
passenger aviation sector provides suitable material for a case study of the effects of 
competition.  Passenger aviation sector consists of separate city-pair markets, the 
technology is relatively similar across firms, the products (economy class flights) are 
relatively easily substitutable across different airlines on the same short-haul route, and 
the sector has faced significant entry and exit of airlines on different routes. The primary 
advantage of such industry case study is that it helps to control, to an extent, for the 
influence of technology differences and product heterogeneity, helping to focus on the 
impacts of interest. Many studies use panel data of firms from rather heterogeneous 
sectors to study the effects of competition (e.g. Nickell 1996, Aghion et al. 2009, Chapter 
2 of this dissertation).  These studies benefit from a broader focus. At the same time, they 
find it more difficult to isolate the effect of differences in competition from the effects of 
differences in product and technology that may also drive the dispersion in the outcome 
variables.   
The UK-Ireland, UK-Netherlands and UK-Belgium country-pairs that I investigate have 
faced changes in competition and entry and exit of airlines during the period studied 
(2003-2005). A clear advantage of Chapter 3 over most other studies of competition in 
the aviation sector is the detailed dataset used. I can employ unique primary data of 
economy class airfares, collected by Claudio Piga from Loughborough University using a 
web spider computer programme. These data allow me to study the pricing decisions of 
airlines with greater precision than any other airfare dataset. The empirical analysis of 
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this dataset tries to control for endogeneity of the measures of competition. For that, I 
employ the system-GMM approach by Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Chapter 4 provides an event study of the effects of market liberalisation on output growth 
of the passenger aviation sector. It focuses on the 2004 enlargement of the EU and the 
Single European Aviation Market (SEAM), and their impact on physical output (i.e. 
passenger traffic) of the passenger aviation sector.  
The standard problem in studies about the effects of a liberalisation event ishow to 
construct a suitable proxy for the counterfactual case if no deregulation took place? The 
simple descriptive statistics show that around the time of enlargement in 2004 there was a 
large unprecedented increase in international air passenger traffic to the new member 
countries. However, this need not show the effect of liberalisation. To find out the effects 
of enlargement on the volume of airline passengers, Chapter 4 uses difference-in-
differences and synthetic control methods, combined with variation in the membership 
coverage of both the Single Aviation Market and the EU. 
Chapter 4 provides a more aggregate analysis about the effects of competition than the 
previous chapters. Unlike Chapter 2 and 3 it does not focus directly on the effects of 
entry, but on a significant one-time event that increased freedom of rivals to enter the 
market.  This, consequently, resulted in a large-scale entry of low-cost carriers on the 
routes to the new member countries of the EU. 
Finally, Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions from the three empirical studies. It 
includes a brief discussion of the limitations and potential extensions.
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Chapter 2 
Does FDI Spur Productivity, 
Innovation and Knowledge Sourcing 
of Incumbent Firms? Evidence from 
Manufacturing Industry in Estonia 
2.1 Introduction 
The existing empirical evidence base on the effects of foreign direct investments (FDI) on 
domestic firms is, at best, limited. There are many papers attempting to study the effects 
of entry of foreign owned firms on local incumbents, i.e. the spillovers of FDI. However, 
this type of study is difficult. The researcher needs to account for likely econometric 
problems of reverse causality, endogeneity of FDI, endogeneity of inputs in estimation of 
the production function, heterogeneity of effects, lack of good instruments or natural 
experiments for identification of causal relationships. Only very few papers can account 
for these issues. Reflecting these problems and the resulting likely biases in estimated 
effects, the findings in different papers and different countries can vary a lot. 
Insignificant, and sometimes also positive or even negative spillovers have been found.
4
  

4 See, for example, Görg and Strobl (2001), Görg and Greenaway (2004), or Barba Navaretti and Venables 
(2004) for literature reviews about effects of FDI on incumbent firms. 
24

This study adds to the literature by studying the channels of the effects of entry of foreign 
owned firms on domestic firms in the host economy of FDI. Using instrumental variable 
(IV) regression approach to identify the effects, I investigate the association of FDI entry 
in Estonia with incumbents total factor productivity (TFP) and labour productivity 
growth. However, I provide also evidence concerning the association between FDI entry 
and subsequent domestic firms innovation activities; and indicators of importance of 
knowledge flows from suppliers, clients and competitors of the firm.  I also check for 
heterogeneity of these effects, whether they depend on local incumbents distance to the 
technology frontier, as suggested by Aghion et al. (2009). 
Most of the earlier literature investigates the correlation between FDI presence in a host 
economy and productivity of domestic-owned firms, not the causal effects.  Among the 
exceptions that endeavour to address the effects, by IV regression approach, are studies 
by Aghion et al. (2009) and Haskel et al. (2007). Also, for example Barrios et al. (2009), 
Crespo et al. (2009) or Halpern and Muraközy (2007) employ the GMM estimator to try 
to account for the endogeneity of FDI. 
Most papers are also firmly rooted in the estimation of the production function of firms or 
plants. All that FDI entry is expected to do is to shift TFP. The current inconclusive 
evidence about spillovers, however, suggests that we should look more in detail into the 
different channels of effects.  
The effects of FDI entry on within-firm productivity growth of domestic firms can 
function through technology transfer and through an increase in toughness of 
competition. This paper employs detailed firm level data from Estonia, covering all 
manufacturing firms during 1995-2004. Estonia is a good case study for the effects of 
FDI, as it is a transition economy that has attracted a lot of FDI per capita. In terms of per 
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capita stock of FDI, it has ranked ahead of most other locations among the Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) transition countries (UNCTAD 2009). Moreover, the Estonian 
data include indicators of innovation and knowledge sourcing from other enterprises. This 
means that, unlike other related studies (except only Crespi et al. 2008), I can test 
whether entry of FDI results indeed in spillovers to domestic firmswhether entry of 
FDI is positively associated with an increase in direct measures of knowledge flows to 
incumbents.  
By using instrumental variables I can go beyond the standard analysis of correlations. To 
identify the impact of FDI entry on performance of incumbents, one needs an instrument 
that predicts changes in the FDI entry, but is unrelated to changes in incumbent 
productivity in Estonia (after controlling for other relevant factors). I employ the FDI 
entry rates in 3-digit level NACE sectors of other CEE countries as instruments for FDI 
entry rates in the corresponding industries in Estonia. These instrumental variables 
predict the FDI entry in Estonia. At the same time they are not likely to directly affect the 
performance characteristics of incumbent firms in Estonia.  Previously, Haskel et al. 
(2007) have used similar instruments. They instrument FDI share in each sector in UK 
with FDI share in the same industry in the US. 
The estimated main regressions of interest relate the change in TFP (estimated with the 
Levinsohn-Petrin method to account for endogeneity of inputs in the production 
function), labour productivity (value added per employee) or different measures of 
innovativeness, or knowledge sourcing of incumbent firms in a sector to lagged change in 
the share of foreign owned firms in a sector or a region and other firm and industry level 
controls.  In some specifications these other controls include incumbents distance to the 
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local productivity frontier and an interaction term between distance to productivity 
frontier and FDI entry. 
Based on Schumpeterian competition models outlined in Acemoglu et al. (2006) or 
Aghion et al. (2009) one could expect that an increase in entry of technologically 
advanced firms (e.g. multinational enterprises) has positive effects on incumbents 
performance, innovation incentives and innovation activities if the incumbents are 
sufficiently close to the productivity frontier.
5
 It could be also expected that if incumbents 
are far from the productivity frontier of the sector then entry of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) will reduce innovation incentives of these firms and thereby have negative effect 
on their productivity growth.
6
  
However, I find no support for these predictions. There is no significant effect of lagged 
entry of foreign owned firms on TFP or labour productivity growth of incumbent firms, 
regardless of their distance to the productivity frontier or geographical proximity to 
MNEs. 
There are some positive correlations in the case of innovation activities. I find a positive 
association between the FDI entry rate in an industry and incumbents probability of 
engaging in process innovation. A 10 percentage points higher entry rate of foreign 
owned firms is associated with 4 percentage points increase in incumbents probability of 
engaging in process innovation. There is no such significant correlation of FDI entry with 
product innovation or innovation-related co-operation. Also, these correlations do not 
appear to depend on the distance of domestic firms from the productivity frontier.   

5 According to Aghion et al. (2009) there may be positive effects on innovation of these high-productivity 
firms as they can escape adverse entry effects by innovating.
6
 Increasing frontier entry could reduce incumbents innovation incentives if they are far from the 
technology frontier, as they have little hope of surviving the entry. 
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One important question is whether these results can be seen as spillover effects?  Analysis 
of probit and ordered probit models based on Estonian CIS
7
 innovation surveys (CIS3 and 
CIS4) shows that the entry of FDI in 3-digit level sectors is indeed correlated with direct 
measures of spillovers. This gives support to the interpretation that FDI entry results in 
spillovers to domestic firms.  So far only Crespi et al. (2008) have used similar data (from 
UK) to find out whether the indirect and direct measures of spillovers are correlated.  
A notable result is that domestic firms that are further behind the technology frontier tend 
to grow faster than others. So, there seems to be some firm level productivity 
convergence taking place within Estonia.  This result is similar to a recent study about 
UK by Bartelsman et al. (2008). 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of theoretical 
background. Section 2.3 describes shortly related empirical literature. Section 2.4 
explains the empirical approach and the identification of the effects. Section 2.5 describes 
data. Section 2.6 gives the empirical results. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Theoretical background: effects of MNE entry on 
domestic firms 
The spillovers of FDI on domestic owned firms productivity and other performance 
characteristics can work through technology transfer and changes in competition.  
Detailed overviews of the theoretical background of these effects are provided, for 
example, in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) or Görg and Greenaway (2004).  

7 CIS - Community Innovation Survey.
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The main prediction from theoretical literature is that the net impact on local firms in a 
host economy is ambiguous and may depend a lot on the characteristics of the host 
country and local firms (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004).  There can be negative 
effects of MNE entry due to changes in market shares of local firms, positive effects due 
to changes in incentives of incumbents to effort and to innovate, and positive effects due 
to technology transfer.  
The competition related effects of entry of MNEs on productivity in the host economy 
can work in two general ways.   One is by toughening the selection process among 
heterogeneous firms in a sector. This selection effect could increase the average industry 
productivity by shrinking the market share of low-productivity firms and forcing some of 
them to exit (Syverson 2004a, Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). Note, that although this 
selection effect can improve the average productivity in the host economy, it has a 
negative effect on some local incumbents, on the ones that have low productivity, are 
therefore unable to compete with MNEs and lose their market share.  
Negative effects on average costs and productivity of these local firms are possible due to 
the existence of fixed costs (Aitken and Harrison 1999). If imperfectly competitive firms 
face fixed costs of production, a foreign firm with lower marginal costs will have an 
incentive to increase production relative to its domestic competitors. In this environment, 
entering foreign enterprises producing for the local market can draw the sales and the 
demand away from some domestic firms, thus making them cut production. The 
productivity of domestic firms could, as shown by Aitken and Harrison (1999), fall as 
they spread their fixed costs over a smaller market, forcing them back up their (downward 
sloping) average cost curves.  
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Stronger competition due to entry of MNEs, can also have significant positive effects on 
local firms that may outweigh the potential loss of their market shares.  Increased 
competition may improve incentives of employees and managers of the incumbent firm to 
effort and to innovate (Aghion et al. 2009). At the same time, the presence of a MNE in a 
host country can lead to technology transfer to domestic firms (e.g. Aitken and Harrison 
1999, Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004). These effects can result in improvement of 
performance and productivity of incumbents. If foreign firms introduce new products, 
production processes and work practices in their affiliates, domestic firms may benefit 
from accelerated diffusion of this knowledge in the host country.  
Spillovers can take place as MNEs cannot reap all the benefits of their activities in a 
foreign location. This is because of the public good characteristics of their firm-specific 
assets (incl. knowledge, technology) as these assets are, at least to a certain extent, non-
excludable and nonrival goods (Caves 1996).  
The spillovers from inward foreign investment can be either horizontal or vertical (i.e. 
inter-industry). Horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers take place between companies in the 
same industry, vertical spillovers originate from suppliers and customers of the firm. See 
Javorcik (2004) for a thorough analysis of vertical spillover effects. 
Based on Caves (1974), Blomström and Kokko (1996), Javorcik (2004), Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) we can distinguish between the 
following main channels for spillovers: demonstration (or imitation), worker mobility, 
supplier upgrading, competition and exporting.  
Demonstration effect works by imitation of production technologies and work practices 
of the MNEs by local firms.  Also, diffusion of new technology and know-how may take 
place through labour turnover, as employees at the MNE plants move to work in domestic 
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owned firms, and take their experience and knowledge with them. Additional source of 
productivity gain may be through export spillovers (Blomström and Kokko 1996; Görg 
and Greenaway 2004). Domestic firms often learn from multinationals how to export 
(Greenaway et al. 2004).  
The strength of spillover and competition effects may also depend on characteristics of 
domestic-owned firms. These characteristics may include incumbents absorptive 
capacity, export or domestic market orientation, geographical proximity to foreign owned 
firms and firms distance to the technology frontier (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, 
Castellani and Zanfei 2006, Findlay 1978, Glass and Saggi 1998, Aghion et al. 2009).   
This chapter concentrates on the role of distance to technology frontier and geographical 
proximity. Naturally, spillovers are more likely to materialise in the case of incumbents 
that are located close to the foreign owned firms. The role of distance to the technology 
frontier for spillover effects may be similar to the effect of geographical distance, as 
suggested by some recent papers (Aghion et al. 2009). However, the predictions from 
theoretical literature about the role of distance to technology frontier have been mixed.  
Findlay (1978) argues that the relative backwardness of the host economy may in fact 
mean more scope for spillover effects from FDI. The larger is the difference in 
development between the home and host country of FDI, the greater is the pressure and 
need to adopt new technology. The view of Glass and Saggi (1998) is different. They 
argue that technology gap between domestic firms and foreign owned ones is related to 
the absorptive capacity of firmsthe ability to adopt new technologies. The larger is the 
technology gap of domestic firms the lower is the possibility of spillovers.  Also, more 
recent Schumpeterian competition models support this conclusion (see e.g. Aghion and 
Griffith 2005 for a thorough review of such theoretical studies). 
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I follow the approach similar to Aghion et al. (2009) to check whether and how the 
effects of MNE entry on productivity and innovation of incumbent firms depend on each 
firms distance to the technology frontier.  Based on Aghion et al. (2009) and Acemoglu 
et al. (2006) we would expect that an increase in entry of technologically advanced firms 
(e.g. MNEs) has positive effects on incumbents performance, innovation incentives and 
innovation activities if the incumbents are sufficiently close to the technology frontier. 
There are positive effects on innovation of these high-productivity firms as they can 
escape adverse entry effects by innovating. 
However, we would also expect, based on the same models, that if incumbents are far 
from the technology frontier of the sector then the entry of MNEs will reduce innovation 
incentives of these firms, as they have little hope of surviving the tougher competition. 
Thereby, it will have negative effect on their productivity growth.  
 
2.3 Review of empirical literature 
Evidence about spillovers from MNEs to domestic firms is, despite the large number of 
studies, still ambiguous.  The literature struggles with providing evidence that could be 
interpreted as causal effects.  In the ideal case, one would like to use a natural experiment, 
a case of exogenous change in FDI inflows that affects some of the domestic firms but 
not others, to identify the effects of FDI on local firms. However, changes in FDI inflows 
to a host country are almost never exogenously determined. Therefore empirical study of 
spillover effects is difficult. 
The first empirical research of FDI spillovers is by MacDougall (1960), who investigates 
the welfare effects of FDI. Other early studies include Caves (1974), Globerman (1979) 
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and Blomström (1986), based on data of Australia, Canada and Mexico.   These studies 
used cross-sectional industry level data and found usually positive spillovers of FDI. 
By now, the number of empirical papers in the field has grown larger than 70. The focus 
of research has shifted since 1990s from industry and country level towards firm or plant 
level studies, and from cross-section to panel data. The pioneering study, that had the 
novelty of using panel data, was by Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco. They used 
enterprise level panel data with 11,700 observations and found negative spillover of FDI. 
For comparison, the industry level study by Caves (1974) had only 49 observations 
(sectors). Panel data allow us to account for firm-specific time-invariant characteristics 
that might otherwise bias the findings if only the cross-section information were used.  
There are a several good literature surveys available by now.  These include papers by 
Blomström and Kokko (1996), Görg and Strobl (2001), Görg and Greenaway (2004), 
Lipsey (2002, 2006), and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). In general, the main 
lesson from the firm-level studies of panel data is that the results are very mixed.  There 
is no strong and conclusive evidence about the existence of positive productivity 
spillovers. Also, most of the papers study correlation between FDI share in a sector and 
productivity of domestic firms, not the causal effects. Studies that are based on firm or 
plant level panel data are less likely to find positive significant spillovers than earlier 
studies that rely on cross-section and industry-level data.  In transition economies often 
insignificant or even negative horizontal spillovers are found (Damijan et al. 2003). 
Researchers tend to find positive spillovers somewhat more often in the case of developed 
countries (e.g. Haskel et al. 2007 for UK). 
The framework of analysis is usually based on estimation of the production function. A 
few exceptions to this approach include survey based evidence, e.g. by Spatareanu and 
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Javorcik (2005). A standard approach has been to estimate an augmented production 
function with proxies for FDI presence in a sector included among other inputs (e.g. 
Aitken and Harrison study of Venezuela, 1999).  Papers that look at vertical spillovers 
add an additional term to the estimated equationthe FDI share in each sector multiplied 
by coefficients from the input/output tables of the host country.
8
 This way, they 
endeavour to capture the effects of presence of FDI in the downstream and upstream 
sectors of the domestic firm. 
As an alternative, often the TFP is estimated separately in the 1
st
 stage. Then, in the 2
nd
 
stage the TFP is regressed on a number of control variables, including the FDI share in a 
sector.   More recent papers are able to account for endogeneity of capital or labour inputs 
in the 1
st
 stage, for example by using semiparametric estimation procedures of TFP by 
Olley and Pakes (1996) or Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  A good and probably the most 
well known example of such study is by Javorcik (2004). She investigates the horizontal 
and vertical spillovers of FDI on domestic firms in Lithuania. She finds some evidence 
that she interprets as positive vertical spillovers to domestic firms, but does not find any 
horizontal effects. Indeed, based on other later papers, there seems to be some indication 
that there may be more positive spillovers through vertical linkages than horizontal 
spillovers (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004, Damijan et al. 2003, Görg and 
Greenaway 2004).  
Neither these 1-step or 2-step estimation approaches are usually able to account for the 
endogeneity of the spillover variable. FDI is likely to flow to sectors and firms that would 
have higher productivity and higher productivity growth than others even without FDI 
inflow. Therefore FDI spillover variable needs to be treated as an endogenous one in the 

8 This approach was first introduced in Schoors and Van der Tol (2002), followed by Javorcik (2004). 
34

estimation of its effects on TFP or other variables.  Standard panel fixed effects (FE) 
model is likely to provide inconsistent estimates.
9
  
A solution is to use instrumental variables approach instead. For that the researcher needs 
to find instrumental variable(s) that help to predict the FDI spillover variable, but are 
otherwise not affecting the (productivity of) domestic firms in the host economy (after 
controlling for other relevant factors). This way one can induce exogenous variation in 
the FDI spillover variable, needed for estimating the effects. This is the approach taken in 
this paper. 
Another problem with most of the empirical literature is treating the link between FDI 
and productivity of domestic firms as a black box. Usually, researchers do not attempt 
to address the channels through which these effects take place.  In order to understand 
how the spillovers of FDI work, a detailed analysis about the channels of these effects is 
needed: like effects on innovation, work practices, and knowledge flows to domestic 
firms.  So far, very few studies have studied the FDI spillovers on innovation activities of 
domestic firms. These include Bertschek (1995), Blind and Jungmittag (2006) and Girma 
et al. (2009). Bertschek (1995) and Blind and Jungmittag (2006) use German data and 
find that the market share of foreign-owned firms is positively associated with innovation 
propensity of domestic firms in the same industry.  However, they do not account for the 
likely endogeneity of the FDI spillover variable. Girma et al. (2009) study the FDI 
spillovers to innovativeness of Chinese state-owned enterpriseson average, they find a 
negative association with the FDI presence in a sector and state-owned firms innovation 
activities.  

9 The FE approach is based on a very restrictive assumption that the part of the error term that is correlated 
with endogenous right-hand side regressor(s) can be seen as fixed over the time period studied.   
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Two main related papers that endeavour to estimate the effects of FDI on domestic firms 
using IV models with external instruments are by Aghion et al. (2009) and Haskel et al. 
(2007), both based on UK data. Both find positive effects of FDI presence and FDI entry 
in a sector.  
Aghion et al. (2009) investigate in detail the heterogeneity of the effects of FDI. They 
find that entry of FDI has positive effects on innovation and growth of TFP or labour 
productivity only for these incumbent firms within the same sector that are not very far 
from the productivity frontier.  Similarly, Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) finds, using a 
small 2-year panel from different transition economies, that spillovers vary with the 
firms absorptive capacity, that the firms distance from the productivity frontier tends 
to dampen horizontal spillovers. Unlike Aghion et al. (2009) paper, they are not able to 
identify the causal effects. 
There is an increase in number of papers that try to use dynamic panel data methods like 
system-GMM approach to investigate the productivity spillovers of FDI. For example, by 
Barrios et al. (2009), Crespo et al. (2009), Suyanto et al. (2009), Halpern and Muraközy 
(2005) and Muraközy (2007). However, Roodman (2009a, 2009b) points out that GMM 
can easily produce results that are in fact not depleted of endogeneity. Also, the results 
may vary a lot depending on which lags and differences are used as internal instruments 
for the explanatory variables. Differently from these papers, I rely here on external 
instrumentssimilarly to Aghion et al. (2009).  
Some previous studies have investigated FDI spillovers in Estonia. These include papers 
by Sinani and Meyer (2004), Damijan and Knell (2005), Vahter and Masso (2007). All of 
these look at the correlation between FDI share in a sector and the productivity of local 
firms.  None of them is able to investigate the causality and account for the endogeneity 
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of FDI spillover variable, or look into the channels though which the productivity 
spillovers work. With the exception of Sinani and Meyer (2004), no significant 
correlations between FDI share in a sector and TFP of domestic firms has been found in 
these papers. Sinani and Meyer (2004) and Damijan and Knell (2005) use small sample of 
Estonian firms, that is significantly biased towards large firms and foreign owned firms. 
They do not correct their estimated effects for this sample selection bias and calculate the 
FDI share in each sector (the FDI spillover variable) also based on the biased sample. 
Sinani and Meyer (2004) paper suffers from serious attrition problem as the number of 
firms in their sample falls over the studied period falls from 490 to 290. Many of the 
problems of earlier studies on FDI spillovers in Estonia are avoided in this one by using a 
dataset that includes all manufacturing firms. 
 
2.4 Empirical modelling of the effects of MNE entry 
The estimated empirical model in Equation (2.1) follows closely the regression model 
from the empirical study of UK data in Aghion et al. (2009). The dependent variable        
( ijtY ) in Equation (2.1) is depending on specification, either the change in TFP, labour 
productivity (value added per employee) or different measures of innovativeness at the 
incumbent firm level. Subscript i indexes incumbent firms, j indexes industries, t indexes 
years.  
'
The estimated main regressions relate these different dependent variables to lagged entry 
of foreign owned firms ( ), distance of incumbents to the local productivity frontier   1jtE
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( 1ijt ), interaction term between these two variables, and some other firm and industry 
level controls ( ijtX ), firm fixed effects ( i
D
P ), year effects ( tW ) and an error term ( ijtH ): 
ijtjtijtijt XDEDEY
 
ijttiijtjt HWPMGJED c '  1111 .   (2.1) 1
The entry of foreign owned firms is measured as the change in the share of foreign owned 
firms by their number of employees in each 3-digit NACE sector. The distance to local 
productivity frontier is defined here as difference between the highest productivity decile 
(the 90
th
 percentile) of each 3-digit industry and each incumbent firms productivity level 
in the sector. Its interaction term with FDI entry enables us to look at how effects of entry 
depend on distance to the frontier. Other controls include lagged sector-level import 
penetration and Herfindahl index, and log of size of the firm. We would expect that firms 
that are more exposed to foreign or local competition have higher productivity growth 
and engage more in innovation. Therefore we expect the increase in import penetration 
rate (a very broad proxy for foreign competition) to be positively associated with 
productivity growth and innovativeness of firms. Also, we would expect that higher 
Herfindahl index (i.e. less competition) is negatively related to the productivity growth 
and innovativeness of local firms.  Firm size is included as an additional control, as larger 
firms may be more innovative, increase in firm size may make it easier for the firm to 
find funds to invest in innovation activitiesand consequently, this may also result in 
higher growth rate of its productivity.  The idea that large firms (with market power) 
innovate more goes back to Joseph Schumpeter (e.g. 1943) and is often named as 
Schumpeterian hypothesis. The well-documented result from the recent innovation 
literature has indeed been that larger firms tend to be more innovative: for example a lot 
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of evidence for that has been obtained in applications of the Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse 
(CDM, 1998) structural model of innovation (e.g. Griffith et al. 2006). Cohen and 
Klepper (1996) summarise the findings of the earlier literature on the relationship 
between firm size and R&D.  According to them, the likelihood of a firm reporting 
positive R&D as well as the amount of R&D increases with firm size.  
In order to account for the endogeneity of FDI entry
10
 I need to instrument this term and 
its interaction with the distance to the productivity frontier. I need instrumental 
variables(s) that predict changes in the FDI entry rate, but are (otherwise) unrelated to 
changes in the dependent variable ijtY' . There are few variables that satisfy these 
conditions.  
However, suitable instrumental variables that I can use here are the FDI entry rates (at 3
digit sector level) in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) transition economies.
-
n countries like Slovakia or Lithuania does not result in spillover 

11
 
The entry rates in different 3-digit industries are likely to be correlated across different 
CEE countries as the determinants of FDI inflow for several of the CEE countries are 
relatively similar. However, it is not likely that the FDI entry rates inside, for example, 
Slovakia or Lithuania affect directly the productivity growth rate of incumbent firms in 
Estonia.  Here I need to assume that there are few knowledge flows from multinational 
firms that are geographically far from the incumbent Estonian firms. That is, I assume 
that entry of FDI i
effects in Estonia.   
10 Due to data availability, I define the foreign owned firms as these with at least 50 per cent foreign 
ownership and define the FDI entry rate also based on these firms only.
11 I use FDI entry data from Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania.
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In order to account for potential endogeneity of the distance to the productivity frontier 
( 1ijtD ) variable I try instrumenting it with the 3-digit industry level capital-labour ratio 
and intangible assets per employee in Sweden and Finland. Data of Sweden and Finland 
are chosen because they are the main donors of FDI in Estonia. About 55 per cent of FDI 
in Estonia comes from these two countries. Also, many industries in both of these 
countries are on the global technology frontier (Bartelsman et al. 2008). Similar 
variables
12
 from the USA are used in the Aghion et al. (2009) study as instruments for the 
UK incumbent firms distance to the technology frontier. The instruments could be 
expected to be related to the productivity of Finnish and Swedish firms and their affiliates 
in Estonia. That way they could affect also the productivity frontier in each 3-digit sector 
rs). Based on 
mestic firms.   

in Estonia, and each domestic firms distance to the productivity frontier. Also, these 
variables are not likely to have direct effect on productivity growth of Estonias domestic-
owned firms.   
A related question to the effects of FDI entry on productivity and innovation is whether 
the entry results in knowledge spillovers to the incumbent firms? The standard approach 
is to use the FDI share or FDI entry rate in a sector as an indirect proxy for the FDI 
spillovers (e.g. Aitken and Harrison 1999, Javorcik 2004, and many othe
data from the EU innovation surveys (CIS3 and CIS4 surveys) we can test whether there 
is any significant correlation between these indirect measures of spillovers and the 
importance of knowledge flows from other firms for the do
12 I use the ratio of intangible assets per employee as an instrument instead of the skill intensity measure 
used in Aghion et al. (2009) because the skill-intensity data of Sweden and Finland is not available at 3-
digit NACE sector level. Intangible assets per employee is likely to be correlated with the R&D intensity of 
the firm, which is an important determinant of productivity of firms, and therefore, potentially, an important 
determinant of the distance to the productivity frontier variable.
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The main question asked from each firm about its knowledge flows in the EU CIS 
innovation survey is: Indicate the sources of knowledge and information used in your 
technological innovation activities, and their importance.   
The answer choices are: importance of the source is i) high, ii) medium, iii) low, iv) not 
 an ordered variable is created, as the 
pe of innovation co-operation: co-operation with 
medium 
portance for the firm, 0 otherwise.  
T irect measures of FDI spillovers and direct 
 I
used.  Knowledge sources listed in the questionnaire are the following: from within the 
enterprise; from suppliers; from customers; from competitors; (a number of other sources 
have been listed as well, but are seldom indicated as important by Estonian firms). 
Based on the answers of domestic-owned firms, a set of indicator variables has been 
created, a dummy variable for each knowledge source. These variables are equal to 1, if 
the corresponding source of knowledge is of high importance for the firm, 0 otherwise.  
Also, for each of the 4 types of information sources
4 possible answer choices have a natural ordering. This ordered variable takes value 0 for 
answer not used, 1 for low importance, 2 for medium importance and 3 for high 
importance of the particular source of knowledge. 
Similar question to the one above is also asked about the presence of innovation-related 
co-operation with firms competitors, suppliers, and clients.  Again, a set of indicator 
variables has been created, for each ty
competitors, co-operation with suppliers, co-operation with clients. These dummy 
variables are equal to 1, if the corresponding type of co-operation is of high or 
im
o test the correlation between the ind
measures of knowledge flows between firms  estimate the following regression: 
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ijtti
m
ijtjt
mm
ijt ZEI ZWPME c  11 .    (2.2) 
The dependent variable in Equation (2.2), 
mI , is either a dummy variable or an ordered ijt
variable (with values 0, 1, 2, 3) indicating the importance of the mth knowledge source. 
These include importance of knowledge flows from: i) competitors, ii) suppliers, iii) 
clients, and iv) within the same corporation. In another specification,  is a dummy 
 suppliers, or clients of the firm. 
ilar to the Equation (2.1). Again, the main regressor of 
interest is the FDI entry variable. The estimation of Equation (2.2) is performed based on 
 CIS3 (years 1998-2000) and the CIS4 innovation survey (years 2002-
2.5 Data  
 country that has attracted a lot of inward 
productivity in Estonia and the cost level is higher than in nearby Latvia or Lithuania, the 
m
ijt
variable indicating the importance of innovation related co-operation with either the 
competitors,
I
Explanatory variables are sim
the panel of the
2004).  
 
Estonia is a small Central and Eastern European
FDI per capita. Until 2008 and the global economic crisis it had also very rapid economic 
growth. In 2007, the ratio of Estonias stock of inward FDI to its GDP peaked at 81 per 
cent (UNCTAD 2009). This figure is much higher than in the world, in the EU, or among 
the CEE countries on average.    
One of the main attractive features for FDI in Estonia has been its relatively close cultural 
and geographic proximity to Finland and Sweden. These two countries make up about 55 
per cent of FDI in Estonia. Although, the rapid growth of wages has outrun the growth of 
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costs of production are still significantly lower than in Western Europe. The costs of 
production inputs and entry to local market have been the main motivating factors of FDI 
t of stock of 
h firm has foreign (majority) 
in Estonia.  Since 2000, an attractive feature has been its tax regime with allows 
postponement of taxation moment of the corporate income tax in the case of reinvested 
earnings. 
By the end of 3
rd
 quarter of 2008 the cumulative stock of FDI in Estonia amounted to 17 
billion USD. Most of the FDI has gone to financial services sector (31 per cen
FDI) and real estate and business services (29 per cent). Manufacturing industry accounts 
for 14 per cent of the FDI stock. The main target sectors of foreign investors inside 
manufacturing have been electronics, food processing and wood processing.  
My econometric analysis is based on firm-level data of the Estonian manufacturing 
industry (i.e. sectors with NACE two-digit code between 15 and 37). I employ several 
different sources of data. For productivity analysis, I use yearly balance sheet and income 
statement information of the whole population of Estonian firms from the Business 
Register of Estonia.  The period covered is 19952004. The unit of observation is the 
firm. The original dataset includes up to 5,400 domestic owned manufacturing firms per 
year.  It includes information indicating whether eac
ownership or not and it allows to assess the effects of FDI entry on total factor 
productivity of domestic (majority) owned firms.  The descriptive statistics of this 
database are given in Annex 2.1 in Table A2.1 and A2.2. 
For analysis of effects on innovation and knowledge sourcing I employ a sample of 
Estonias firms covered by the CIS3 and CIS4 innovation surveys.  CIS is a regular 
survey in EU countries. CIS3 covers period 1998-2000 and CIS4 2002-2004. In the two 
surveys there are, respectively, 1,185 and 1,264 Estonias domestic-owned manufacturing 
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firms. There is a large overlap between the surveys in terms of firms covered. The 
Estonian surveys have been conducted by the Statistical Office of Estonia and the 
ing the CIS data with additional firm level 
variables that are used to identify the effects of FDI on 
 capital formation 

response rate is rather high. It is 74 per cent in CIS3 and 78 per cent in CIS4, whereas the 
EU average is 55 per cent (Terk et al. 2007).  The main descriptive statistics of 
innovation surveys are given in Table A2.3 in Annex 2.1.  
One of the advantages of this study is that it can combine the information from innovation 
surveys with the firms financial data from the Estonian Business Registers database. For 
example, in Western European countries, merg
databases is more difficult due to the more stringent administrative restrictions by the 
national Statistical Offices.  Also, it has been possible to merge CIS3 and CIS4 data of 
Estonias firms into a short two-period panel. 
The sector level instrumental 
domestic owned firms are calculated based on the Amadeus dataset from the Bureau van 
Dijk, and datasets of Hungarian and Finnish manufacturing firms of the Hungarian and 
Finnish Statistical Offices.
13
   
I measure capital as the book value of firms capital stock and labour as average number 
of employees at the firm in a given year. Output, value added and intermediate inputs are 
deflated by respective deflators of the system of national accounts provided by the 
Statistical Office of Estonia. The deflators are available for 16 sectors (that corresponds 
to the top level in ISIC Rev. 3.1). Capital is deflated using the gross
price index (available only for the total economy). For more information about the 
13 I owe thanks for help with calculation of these sector level variables to Claudia Hochgatterer from 
Vienna University of Economics, Balazs Muraközy from Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and Markku 
Pankasalo from Statistics Finland.
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deflators, see also the National Accounts of Estonia (2003). The region level FDI entry 
variable is calculated separately for each of the 15 counties in Estonia. 
An important problem in estimating the production function and TFP is the endogeneity 
bias resulting from the correlation between the unobservable productivity shock and the 
input choices of each firm. In order to account for this endogeneity bias, I have used the 
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) approach to estimate the TFP. It is a semi-parametric estimation 
procedure for estimating the production function that extends the earlier Olley and Pakes 
(1996) approach. Both are by now fairly standard methods to estimate TFP at firm level. 
Therefore, a detailed description of these methods is omitted form here. In order to allow 
n Estonia, and entry and exit account for about 50 per cent of the 
for heterogeneity of the production technology in different sectors, I allow the coefficient 
of each production input (capital and labour) to be different for each 2-digit NACE 
industry. The dependent variable in the estimated production functions is deflated value 
added. 
As evident from Table A2.1 in Annex 2.1, the average share of FDI in a 3-digit sector is 
18 per cent. This variable varies a lot across sectors and grows over time within sectors. 
The share of FDI in employment grows from 16 per cent in 1995 to 32 per cent in 2004. 
The number of domestic owned firms in the panel varies between 2,761 in 1995 and 
5,370 in 2003. As shown in Masso et al. (2004) there is a lot of entry and exit going on 
among firms i
productivity growth in Estonia. Vahter and Masso (2007) find that the multinational firms 
in Estonia have higher TFP, labour productivity, and wages than the domestic firms.  In 
addition, foreign owned firms are much more capital intensive than domestic firms (Ibid. 
2007, p. 174). 
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Previous studies have shown that large firms, foreign owned firms, or firms that belong to 
a larger corporate group have more innovative activities than the rest (for evidence in 
Estonia, see Terk et al. 2007). During 1998-2000, on average 26 per cent of domestic 
firms in the manufacturing sector engaged in product innovation and 22 per cent in 
process innovation (see Table A2.3 in Annex 2.1). During 2002-2004, the corresponding 
figures were 21 and 19 per cent. These figures are smaller than the ones for the whole 
CIS sample, that included also the foreign owned and services sector firms. During 1998-
004 there was significant growth in knowledge flows to domestic firms and innovation-
related co-operation with their suppliers and customers.  A more detailed overview of the 
, sample and questionnaire of the innovation surveys can be found 
ts of estimating Equation (2.1) and (2.2). The main 
P and labour productivity growth are summarized in 
Tables 2.12.4.  The effects on innovation and knowledge sourcing of incumbent firms in 
Estonia are shown in Table 2.52.7 and in Annex 2.2. The methods used here include 
2
descriptive statistics
from Terk et al. (2007). A more detailed description of the dataset of the Estonian 
Business Register can be found from Masso et al. (2004). 
 
2.6 Results 
This section presents the resul
conclusion is that there are no significant effects of MNE entry on TFP or productivity 
growth of incumbents, regardless of the distance to productivity frontier or geographical 
proximity of domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms. However, there are significant 
positive effects on knowledge sourcing activities and positive correlation with process 
innovation of incumbent firms.  
The effects of MNE entry on TF
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OLS, probit, ordered probit and instrumental variable techniques (2-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach and the IV version of ordered probit
14
).   
Effects on Productivity Growth 
The key identification problem in this study is the endogeneity of FDI entry.  The first 
stage of the 2SLSwith FDI entry rates in Hungary, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Slovakia used as instruments for FDI entry rates in Estoniais given in Table 
2.1. It appears that the FDI entry rates in Hungary (Column 1 and 2) and in other CEE 
correlated with the 
least as large as 10. Then we can 

countries (Columns 3 and 4) are significantly and positively correlated, at 1 per cent 
significance level, with the FDI entry rates in the corresponding 3-digit industries in 
Estonia.    
A standard problem in the IV approach can be weak identification (Murray 2006). It 
arises when the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor(s), but only 
weakly.  Estimators can perform poorly in this case. As pointed out by Bound, Jaeger and 
Baker (1995)if the excluded instruments are only weakly 
endogenous variables then the cure can be worse than the disease. With weak 
instruments, the IV estimates are biased and may be not consistent, the tests of 
significance have incorrect size and confidence intervals are wrong. 
A commonly used diagnostic of weak instruments is the F-statistic of significance of 
instruments in the 1
st
 stage of the 2SLS (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Stock, Wright and 
Yogo (2002) suggest that this statistic should be at 
usually (but not always) reject the H0 that the instruments are weak.  Indeed, the F-
14 A recently developed command cmp in Stata (developed by David Roodman) enables to estimate the IV 
version of the ordered probit model.
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nd
 stage of the 2SLS and describe the effect of FDI 
h s 1 and estima the 
s mns vour to  the en y of FD
t ith firm-level fixed effects included.
15
 
Table 2.1. First stage of the 2SLS approach 
FE m  FE m  F  
statistics in Table 2.1 of the significance of instruments are above 10, and above the 
critical values calculated in Stock and Yogo (2005).   
Next, in Table 2.2 and 2.3 I show the 2
e try on TFP and labour prod rowtn uctivity g . Column  2 show tes from 
tandard FE model.  Colu 3-5 endea  address dogeneit I and report 
he 2SLS results, w
 odel odel FE model E model
Dep var: FDI tryjt FDI entryjt F F
at 3-
l) 
0.10 ** 
(0.0 9) 
0.12 ** 
(0.0 1) 
en DI entryjt
0  
DI entryjt
FDI entryjt in Hungary (
digit NACE sector leve
3*
3
*
4
.091**
(0.043) 
0.089*** 
(0.044) 
FDI entryjt in Czech 
Republic 
  0
(0
0  
(0
0.0  
(0 ) 
0.0  
(0 ) 
0.  
(
 
0.07 * 
(0.027) 
0.09 ** 
(0.027) 
0.00) 
.0 * 66**
.017) 
.0 *76**
.017) 
FDI entryjt in Latvia   37***
.008
42***
.009
FDI entryjt in Lithuania    0361***
 0.009)
FDI entryjt in Poland   0.038** 
(0.0 9) 1
*
0.0312 
(0.0 9) 1
2*FDI entryjt in Slovakia   
Year dummies 
Firm fixed effects 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Distance to frontier, import, 
and competition effects 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Number of observations  
F-test of instrumental 
10366 10
26.5 
366 10
27.6 
366 10
28.1 
366 
33.0 
variables (p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=
Weak identification test    
critical values (from Stock 
and Yogo 2005): 
 
Maximal  5 % allowed IV 
bias 
16.38 16.38 18.37 18.37 
Maximal 10 % allowed IV 
bias 
8.96 8.96 10.83 10.83 
Maximal 20 % allowed IV 
bias 
6.66 6.66 6.77 6.77 
Period: 1995-2004.  FE- fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 

15 I have tested between the fixed effects and random effects specification. The value of the corresponding 
Hausman test statistic is 405.07 (p=0.000). This indicates that the FE model should be preferred.   All 
regressions in Table 2.2 and 2.3 include year dummies and firm fixed effects. There are no sector or region 
dummies included, as these are already absorbed by the firm level fixed effects. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses and are heteroscedasticity robust.
  
 
Table 2.2. Effects of FDI entry on TFP growth: FE and the second stage of the IV (2SLS) approach 
     Domestic firms only: (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
Method:   FE FE 2-SLS, 2-SLS 
IV IV 
2-SLS 
IV 
Dep. var:  ǻlnTFPijt ǻlnTFPijt ǻlnTFPijt ǻlnTFPijt ǻlnTFPijt 
FDI entryjt-1(E) -0.062 
(0.057) 
0.117 
(0.093) 
-0.107 
(0.875) 
-0.03 
(0.414) 
-0.253 
(0.346) 
Firm’s distance to the 
productivity frontierijt-1 (D) 
0.738*** 
(0.019) 
0.741*** 
(0.019) 
0.743*** 
(0.02) 
0.745*** 
(0.02) 
0.772*** 
(0.02) 
FDI entryjt-1*Distanceijt-1 
(E*D) 
 
 
-0.164** 
(0.082) 
  
      
      
       
     
  
-0.218
(0.324) 
 
Sizeijt-1  0.068*** 
(0.021) 
0.068*** 
(0.021) 
0.072*** 
(0.021) 
0.065*** 
(0.23) 
0.065*** 
(0.022) 
Herfindahl-indexjt-1 -0.042 
(0.046) 
-0.036 
(0.065) 
-0.05 
(0.068) 
-0.059 
(0.075) 
-0.059 
(0.076) 
Importjt-1 -0.194*** 
(0.072) 
-0.197*** 
(0.072) 
-0.158* 
(0.079) 
-0.143* 
(0.079) 
-0.145* 
(0.079) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented terms 
 
No No E E, E*D E 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of instruments - - FDI entryjt-1 in 
Hungary 
FDI entryjt-1 in 5 
CEE countries 
FDI entryjt-1 in 5 
CEE countries  
Number of obs. 10975 10975 10366 10366 10366
R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34
Hansen Ȥ2 test of 
overidentifying restrictions 
 - 1.249 
(p=0.87) 
1.855 
(p=0.76) 
 Note: FE- fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Methods: FE, 2SLS-IV. TFP is estimated with the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method in 
order to account for the endogeneity of inputs, allowing the coefficients of inputs to differ in each 2-digit sector. Period: 1995-2004. FDI entry and the 
productivity frontier are calculated at 3-digit NACE sector level. Population of domestic-owned firms, Estonias manufacturing industry. The test 
statistic of Hansen J test, a test of overidentifying restrictions, has value 1.249 in Column 4 and 1.855 in Column 5. This means that, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
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Table 2.3. Effects of FDI entry on labour productivity growth: FE and the second stage of the IV (2SLS) approach 
      Domestic firms only: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method:   FE FE 2-SLS, 2-SLS, 
IV IV 
2-SLS, 
IV 
FDI entryjt-1(E) -0.077 
(0.051) 
0.12 
(0.091) 
-0.579 
(0.521) 
-0.681 
(0.437) 
-0.387 
(0.311) 
Firm’s distance to the 
productivity frontierijt-1 (D) 
0.743*** 
(0.021) 
0.746*** 
(0.021) 
0.752*** 
(0.021) 
0.764*** 
(0.024) 
0.768*** 
(0.024) 
FDI entryjt-1*Distanceijt-1 
(E*D) 
    
      
      
       
     
  
-0.171**
(0.073) 
0.278
(0.311) 
 
Sizeijt-1  0.141*** 
(0.028) 
0.141*** 
(0.028) 
0.138*** 
(0.029) 
0.11*** 
(0.031) 
0.11*** 
(0.031) 
Herfindahl-indexjt-1 -0.207*** 
(0.054) 
-0.204*** 
(0.054) 
-0.193*** 
(0.057) 
-0.257*** 
(0.062) 
-0.257*** 
(0.062) 
Importjt-1 -0.107 
(0.068) 
-0.114* 
(0.067) 
-0.101 
(0.071) 
 
-0.134* 
(0.076) 
-0.131* 
(0.076) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented terms 
 
No No E E, E*D E 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of instruments   FDI entryjt-1 in 
Hungary 
FDI entryjt-1 in  5 
CEE countries 
FDI entryjt-1 in  5 
CEE countries 
Number of obs. 9080 9080 9080 9080 9080
R2 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38
Hansen Ȥ2 test of 
overidentifying restrictions 
 - 1.66 
(p=0.434) 
0.314 
(p=0.575) 
 Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.  Methods: FE, 2SLS-IV. Period 1995-2004. FDI entry and the productivity frontier are calculated at 3-digit 
NACE sector level. Population of domestic-owned firms in Estonias manufacturing industry. 
As evident from the FE model (Column 1 in Table 2.2 and 2.3), the average effect of 
FDI entry on productivity growth is not significantly different from zero. Accounting 
for endogeneity of FDI entry (see Columns 3 and 5 in Table 2.2 and 2.3) does not 
change this main conclusion.  Also, exclusion of the size of the firm as an explanatory 
variable did not change the findings.  Column 3 in Table 2.2 and 2.3 shows the just-
identified case, if only FDI entry rate in Hungary is used as an instrumental variable. 
Column 4 and 5 report the results if instrumental variables from 5 CEE countries are 
used.  
In Table 2.2, the coefficient of FDI entry variable from the standard FE model is -
0.062. In the IV model it is -0.107 or -0.253, depending on the number of instruments 
used (see Columns 3 and 5). However, these estimates are not statistically 
significant.
16
  
The standard errors of the IV model in Table 2.2 and 2.3 are much larger than in the 
OLS case.  The econometrics literature has shown that the IV estimator has higher 
variance than the OLS. Therefore, if the explanatory variables were fully exogenous, 
then the OLS would be preferred because of its efficiency.  This is not the case here.
17
  
So far I have assumed in the regression models that FDI entry affects all domestic-
owned firms similarly. This is a very strong assumption.  Next, I check the prediction 
from Aghion et al. (2009) that the effect of FDI entry on incumbents productivity 
growth may depend on the incumbents distance to productivity frontier. For that I 
add an interaction term between FDI entry and distance to frontier to the set of 
explanatory variables.  

16 Despite the significant differences in estimated coefficients, the IV estimates are not more than one 
standard error from each other.
17 The endogeneity of the FDI entry variable has been tested here with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
This test rejects the H0 that OLS is consistent (value of test statistic is 176.4 (p=0.00). Therefore 2SLS 
is the preferred approach over OLS.  
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Based on the augmented FE model (Column 2 in Table 2.2 and 2.3), there appears to 
be a negative correlation between FDI entry and productivity growth of incumbents 
that are far from the local productivity frontier. However, this result is not confirmed 
once we try  to account for the endogeneity of FDI entry (in Column 4).  
The finding of no short-term effects on productivity growth, regardless of the distance 
of incumbents to the productivity frontier, does not confirm the theoretical predictions 
from the FDI spillover literature and from the endogenous growth model by Aghion et 
al. (2009). Theoretical literature underscores the expected role of absorptive capacity 
and distance to technology frontier in these effects (e.g. based on Glass and Saggi 
1998). However, the finding of no horizontal spillovers is consistent with some earlier 
papers from CEE transition economies. Often, no significant correlation between FDI 
presence in a sector and productivity of domestic-owned firms is found in these 
papers. For example, Damijan et al. (2003), Lipsey (2006), or Görg and Greenaway 
(2004) provide overviews of findings in transition economies.  
The coefficients of other controls in Equation (1) deserve attention as well. Similarly 
to Bartelsman et al. (2008), we find also in Estonia that the firms that are below the 
local productivity frontier tend to grow faster than others. This is an important result 
which deserves more detailed future study.  It shows that there is productivity 
convergence taking place within Estonia towards the local productivity frontier. 
However, the convergence to a local productivity frontier need not imply convergence 
to the world productivity frontier.
18
  
Another firm level control, size of the firm (as measured by log of number of 
employees) is positively correlated with the growth rate of productivity. This size 
effect is stronger on labour productivity growth than on TFP growth.  In addition, the 

18 This has been recently demonstrated based on UK establishment level data in Bartelsman et al. 
(2008).
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higher Herfindahl index (i.e. higher concentration and weaker competition) and 
import orientation of the sector are negatively associated with incumbent firms 
productivity growth.  The finding concerning the effects of local competition is 
similar to Nickell (1996), who uses UK data and finds positive correlation between 
competition and productivity growth of firms. 
A standard prediction from theory is that FDI spillovers are stronger if the foreign 
owned firms are geographically close to the domestic enterprises (e.g. Jaffe et al. 
1993).  But, as evident from Table 2.4, there appears to be no significant correlation 
between the FDI entry within the local geographical region and TFP or labour 
productivity growth of incumbents of the same region in Estonia. This is similar to 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) findings based on data from Venezuela. They find no 
evidence of horizontal spillovers, regardless of the geographical proximity between 
firms. Because FDI entry rate in Table 2.4 has been calculated separately for different 
regions within Estonia we cannot use the same instrumental variables as before. 
Therefore the results concerning the region level effects are likely to be biased. They 
rely on a restrictive assumption that the part of error term in Equation (1) that is 
correlated with the FDI entry variable can be seen as fixed over the time period 
studied.  Only then would the FE specification account for the potential endogeneity 
bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 

Table 2.4. FDI entry in the same region and industry of the incumbent, correlation 
with incumbents productivity 
Domestic firms only: (1) (2) 
Method: FE FE 
Dep. var.:  ǻlnTFPijt ǻlnLABPRODijt
Region level (15 regions) FDI entry in each 3-digit 
sector jrt-1
0.04 
(0.068) 
0.094 
(0.074) 
Distance to the productivity frontierijt-1 0.743*** 
(0.02) 
0.745*** 
(0.022) 
FDI entryjrt-1*Distanceijt-1 -0.027 
(0.052) 
-0.066 
(0.056) 
Sizeijt-1  0.07*** 
(0.021) 
0.141*** 
(0.029) 
Herfindahl-indexjt-1  -0.041 
(0.067) 
-0.203*** 
(0.058) 
Importjt-1 -0.202** 
(0.072) 
-0.114* 
(0.068) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 10380 9080 
R2 0.34 0.38 
 Note: domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. FE - fixed effects model. LABPROD - 
labour productivity (value added per employee). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Period: 1995-
2004. FDI entry is calculated at 3-digit NACE sector level and within each of the 15 counties. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5. Correlation between FDI entry and innovation  
Domestic firms only, 
panel of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method:  Bivariate 
probit 
 Bivariate probit  Bivariate probit  Bivariate probit 
Dep. var.:  Pr(product 
innovationijt
=1) 
Pr(process 
innovationijt=1) 
Pr(product 
innovationijt=1) 
Pr(process 
innovationijt=1) 
FDI entryjt-1 0.169 
(0.107) 
0.318*** 
(0.108) 
0.211  
(0.172)  
0.406**  
(0.163)  
Distance to the 
productivity frontierijt-1
-0.05** 
(0.023) 
-0.06** 
(0.022) 
-0.048*  
(0.022)  
-0.056**  
(0.022)  
FDI entryjt-1*Distanceijt-1   -0.038  
(0.118)  
-0.09  
(0.111)  
Size of the firmijt-1 0.079*** 
(0.014) 
0.094*** 
(0.014) 
0.079***  
(0.015)  
0.094***  
(0.014)  
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy  
(CIS3 or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Log likelihood -920.5 -920.5 -529.7 -529.7 
Note: domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. Estimation by bivariate probit, marginal 
effects reported (at sample means).  All specifications include lagged import intensity of each 3-digit 
sector and Herfindahl index. Two innovation surveys (CIS3 and CIS4) are included, i.e. panel of two 
time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is used in this estimation.  Dependent variable in the bivariate 
probit model is equal to 1 if the firm engages in i) product or ii) process innovation. Stata command 
inteff (developed by Ai and Norton 2003) is used in order to calculate the marginal effect of the 
interaction term.  
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 Table 2.6. Correlation between FDI entry and organizational innovation  
Domestic firms only:  
Method: Probit (CIS3 only) 
Dep. var.:  Pr(Organization innovation=1) 
FDI entryjt-1 -0.149 
(0.327) 
Distance to the productivity 
frontierijt-1
-0.035 
(0.029) 
FDI entryjt-1*Distanceijt-1 0.278 
(0.29) 
Size of the firmijt-1 0.065*** 
(0.02) 
Sector dummies Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Number of obs. 519 
Log likelihood -265.2 
Note: domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. Estimation by probit, marginal effects 
reported (at sample means).  Lagged import intensity and Herfindahl index of each 3-digit sector are 
included as controls.  Dependent variable in the probit model is equal to 1 if the firm engages in 
organizational innovation. Stata command inteff (developed by Ai and Norton 2003) is used in order to 
calculate the marginal effect of the interaction term.  
 
 
 
Table 2.7. Correlation between FDI entry and direct indicators of knowledge flows to 
the domestic firms 
Domestic firms 
only, panel of 
CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method:  Probit  Probit Probit Probit 
Dep.var.: Knowledge 
sourcing from 
Competitors 
Knowledge 
sourcing from 
Suppliers 
Knowledge 
sourcing from 
Clients 
Knowledge 
sourcing from 
within own 
corporation 
FDI entryjt-1 0.017 
(0.034) 
0.171*** 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.064) 
0.227*** 
(0.07) 
Distance to the 
frontierijt-1
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.06*** 
(0.013) 
-0.032** 
(0.014) 
-0.043** 
(0.016) 
Sizeijt-1 0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.022** 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.009) 
0.042*** 
(0.01) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave 
dummy (CIS3 or 
CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 907 907 907 907 
Log likelihood -145 -261.5 -258.5 -322.4 
Note:  domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. Estimation by probit, marginal effects 
reported (at sample means). Two innovation surveys are included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. panel of two 
time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is used in this estimation. The dependent variable is equal to 
1, if the corresponding type of knowledge sourcing is of high importance for the firm. 
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Table 2.8. Correlation between FDI entry and indicators of innovation related co-
operation with competitors, suppliers and clients  
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) 
Method:  Probit Probit  Probit 
Dep.var.: Innovation related co-
operation with 
Competitors 
Innovation related co-
operation with 
Suppliers 
Innovation related co-
operation with 
Clients 
FDI entryjt-1 0.073 
(0.05) 
0.012 
(0.046) 
0.086 
(0.078) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 -0.01 
(0.1) 
-0.02* 
(0.011) 
-0.017 
(0.012) 
Size ijt-1 0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy  
(CIS3 or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 907 907 907 
Log likelihood -163.7 -207.2 -216.3 
Note:  domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. Estimation by probit, marginal effects 
reported (at sample means).  The dependent variable is equal to 1, if the corresponding type of 
innovation-related co-operation is of medium or high importance for the firm.  
 
As a robustness test I have tried some additional instrumental variablesin order to 
allow for potential endogeneity of the distance to the productivity frontier. 
Unfortunately, the instruments triedthe Finnish and Swedish 3-digit NACE level 
capital-labour ratio and immaterial assets per employee are only weakly correlated 
with distance to productivity frontier in Estonia. These turn out to be weak 
instruments, and explain only a very small part of variation of distance to 
productivity frontier.   
One way how FDI can affect local firms is by intensifying the entry-exit and selection 
process among them. This can have effects of aggregate productivity of sectors, even 
if there are no within-firm changes in performance. Based on the heterogeneous 
producer competition model in Syverson (2004a) or the new-new trade theory model 
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) one could expect a more compressed spread of 
productivity across firms in sectors and markets that are more competitive. For 
example, in sectors with high FDI entry rates. I do not go into detail here with study of 
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these effects.  But if I regress the 3-digit NACE industry level TFP dispersion (e.g. 
ratio of the 90th productivity percentile to the 10th) on lagged FDI entry rate, year 
dummies and industry fixed effects, then I find no significant effects. This need not 
mean that there are no selection effects of FDI.  It is likely that these results depend a 
lot on the level of aggregation of sectors used. The more detailed investigation of 
selection effects of FDI entry on the productivity distribution of firms is one potential 
extension of this study. 
The fact that effects of FDI do not show up easily in productivity of incumbent firms 
in transition countries like Estonia, that have attracted a lot of FDI and (until 2008) 
have had very high output growth rates, is puzzling. It suggests that we should look 
more into the channels of these effects. The lack of significant association between 
productivity growth and lagged FDI entry need not mean that there are no spillover 
effects of FDI at all. The effects on productivity may simply need more time to occur. 
At first, the FDI may affect other variables like investments in R&D and assets, 
innovation, capital intensity, and survival of domestic owned firms.  
Aghion et al. (2009) finds, using a similar empirical specification, that there are 
positive short term effects of FDI entry on productivity of incumbents in UK. But 
there appear to be no such effects in Estonia. This difference may have to do with the 
country-level difference in the absorptive capacity of incumbent firms. In UK the 
incumbent firms are not as different from the foreign owned firms as the incumbents 
in Estonia and other transition economies. Based on existing empirical literature we 
can conclude that gap between productivity and technology of foreign owned firms 
and domestic owned firms is much larger in transition economies than in Western 
European economies (see e.g. Bellak 2004, Damijan et al. 2003). Therefore, learning 
from FDIs may be easier and take less time for domestic firms in Western Europe.  
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However, this does not explain why the (lack of) effects on productivity of 
incumbents in Estonia do not depend on firms distance to the local technology 
frontier. Here the explanation could be that distance to the local productivity frontier 
may not be the best proxy for absorptive capacity of firms. What might matter more 
are the actual interactions of domestic firms with foreign owned firms: supplying 
goods and buying inputs from them; personal contacts through trade organizations, or 
even through local Rotary clubs, etc. It is difficult to measure these interactions. For 
that, survey data may be a useful alternative to the standard firm-level datasets.   
Often input-output tables are used in examining the spillovers through vertical 
interactions with suppliers and buyers. Unfortunately, the input-output tables may not 
be always suitable for study of these buyer-supplier interactions in transition 
economies. In these countries often the input-output tables are available only at 
relative aggregate sector levels. Most of vertical interactions between firms take place 
at less aggregated levels (e.g. between sectors defined at 4-digit NACE level).  
Also, only few input-output tables are available for the whole period studied. Hence, 
one has to assume that input-output relationships do not change over time. This 
assumption is plausible in Western European countries, but is less plausible in 
transition countries, where the changes in buyer-supplier relations are more frequent.  
Another potential explanation why it is difficult to find evidence of spillovers of FDI 
is the potential mismeasurement of real outputs and inputs in the standard firm level 
panel datasets (Griliches and Mairesse 1995, Diewert 2001). For example, Keane 
(2005) has called it the Price*Quantity problem. The problem is that in standard firm 
level panel datasets we almost never (except e.g. in Roberts and Supina 1997, 
Syverson 2004a) observe the firm or plant level price indices for output or the 
physical output. Therefore the standard approach is to use the value of sales or value 
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added instead as the dependent variable in estimating the production function or in 
calculating the labour productivity. The sales figure is typically deflated by the 
industry level price index. This price index, however, could be very different from the 
unobserved firm level price index. Therefore, the estimated effect of FDI on such 
sales-based measures of productivity is actually a combination of the effect of FDI on 
physical productivity and the effect on price(s) of output(s). Still, this is a general 
problem in the literature and it does not explain why there are often positive spillover 
effects of FDI found in developed countries and less significant effects in transition 
countries. 
However, this Price*Quantity problem might not necessarily be as big problem as it 
may seem.
19
 If the researcher were using the physical quantity instead of the sales or 
value added, he would, for example, miss the price effect from FDI entry due to 
increase in quality. Also, in general, production function is better estimated in 
countries like Estonia compared to the UK, as the importance of intangible assets  
could be less important in the production process in transition and developing 
countries than in advanced countries. 
FDI Entry and Innovation 
It pays to look into the potential channels of productivity spillovers. If we turn our 
attention to the relationship between FDI entry and innovation, then indeed there are 
some significant correlations. There is positive significant correlation of lagged FDI 
entry with process innovation activities of incumbents (see Table 2.5).  This result can 
be both due to the competition effects of FDI on innovation incentives and knowledge 
transfer to domestic firms.  

19I owe thanks to Fabrice Defever for pointing this out. 
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According to Table 2.5, an increase in FDI share in a sector by 10 percentage points 
increases the propensity of an incumbent firm in the same sector to engage in process 
innovation by 3-4 per cent. At the same time, there is no evidence of significant 
effects on product innovation, or organizational innovation (see Table 2.6).   
A potential explanation for the difference between the results concerning process and 
product innovation can be that knowledge that helps a firm to improve its production 
process can spill over from foreign owned firms to incumbents more easily than 
product-specific knowledge. Information that helps to improve the production process 
can be used and combined with local knowledge even in firms that are very different 
from the foreign owned firms and produce substantially different products.   
Also, this difference is consistent with a similar prediction of a theoretical IO paper by 
Boone (2000). In his model a rise in competitive pressure does not raise both product 
and process innovation. Under tougher competition, the payoff from process 
innovation may be greater than from product innovation. One can argue that in a more 
competitive environment, previous product innovations may still generate some 
monopoly profits due to product differentiation. However, process innovation is more 
likely to render the earlier process innovations of competitors obsolete and thereby 
decrease the earlier monopoly profit of competitor(s). Therefore, increase in 
competition could more likely spur process innovation than product innovation. 
Notably, the effect of FDI entry on incumbents innovation activities does not depend 
on incumbents distance to the technology frontier. This is different from the 
predictions and findings of Aghion et al. (2009) based on the UK data. This is also 
different from the view of Glass and Saggi (1998) that FDI spillovers depend on the 
absorptive capacity of local firms, as measured by firms distance to the productivity 
frontier.   
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FDI Entry and Knowledge Sourcing  
Next, I show based on the CIS innovation survey data that FDI entry is likely to be 
resulting in knowledge spillovers to the incumbent firms. I explore the association 
between FDI entry and knowledge flows to incumbent firms and estimate Equation 
(2.2) by probit and ordered probit model.  
As we can see from probit model in Table 2.7 there is significant and positive 
association of FDI entry with importance of knowledge sourcing by incumbent firms 
in the following years after FDI entry. The dependent variable in Table 2.7 is either 
equal to 1 or 0: it is equal to 1 if the corresponding source of knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge sourcing from suppliers) is of high importance for the firm, it is 0 
otherwise. However, the CIS questionnaire provides significantly more detailed 
answer choices. There are 4 different ordered answer choices about the importance of 
each type of knowledge flows. Therefore, in order to use the variation in data in more 
detail, also an ordered probit model is estimated.  
The marginal effects from an IV version of the ordered probit model are reported 
separately for each of the 4 possible answer choices in Annex 2.2. There the  
dependent variable in the ordered probit model is equal to 0, if the particular type of 
knowledge sourcing (from suppliers, clients, or competitors) is not used, it is 1 if it 
is of low importance, 2 if it is of medium importance, 3 if it is of high importance for 
the incumbent firm.  
Due to the nature of the CIS data, there is a sample selection problem in estimating the 
effects of FDI on knowledge flows. The respondents to the questionnaire may say that 
they do not use a particular knowledge source in their existing innovation process (i.e. 
their answer choice is 0), but they may also choose the same answer choice simply 
because they do not engage in innovation at all. The analysis would need to 
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distinguish between firms that engage in innovation (and thus choose their knowledge 
sources in innovation process), and firms that do not engage in innovation at all. A 
way to account for this problem by using a selection model has been outlined by Piga 
and Vivarelli (2004).  Not accounting for this issue may result in biased estimates of 
the FDI spillovers.  The results of a selection model that adjusts the findings for the 
presence of sample selection bias are presented in Annex 2.3. 
In Annex 2.3 the results from the 2-stage sample selection model are presented. The 
1
st
 stage of the model estimates the probability that the firm engages in innovation 
activities. The second stage estimates ordered probit model, using data of only these 
firms that engage in innovation, and using the inverse of Mills ratio from the 1
st
 stage 
as an additional control to account for selection bias. The size and significance of the 
estimated effects is affected by use of the sample selection model and smaller sample 
of only innovative firms. The sample selection model yields smaller estimates of the 
effects of FDI, yet these are broadly similar results to the standard IV model in Annex 
2.2.  
The marginal effects in Tables in Annex 2.2 and 2.3 show that there is positive 
association of FDI entry with the intensity of knowledge sourcing in the following 
periods. We find statistically significant positive association in the case of knowledge 
flows from suppliers and from within the firm itself.  
Notably, the significance of the FDI effect on knowledge flows from clients 
disappears once the instrumental variables version of the ordered probit is used.  The 
significance of the effects on knowledge sourcing from competitors disappears once 
the sample selection issue is taken into account. Based on the  results of the ordered 
probit models in Annex 2.2 and 2.3 we can calculate that an increase in FDI share in 
the employment of a sector by, for example, 50 percentage points results in about 13 - 
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24 percent subsequent increase in the likelihood that knowledge flows from 
incumbents suppliers are  highly important for its innovation activities.   
I also find that higher FDI entry in a sector lowers the probability that knowledge 
sourcing from suppliers and from within own corporation is not used in the 
innovation process of the incumbent firm. The entry of FDI has been instrumented 
here with entry rates elsewhere in the CEE.
20
   
My findings about the importance of knowledge flows are related to a study by Crespi 
et al. (2008) based on UK data. They find that FDI share in a sector is positively 
correlated with knowledge sourcing of UK local firms from their competitors, but they 
do not find significant association in the case of learning from other sources.   
In addition to innovation and learning from other firms, the FDI entry might also 
affect innovation related formal co-operation between firms. Still, this is not the case 
in Estonia (see Table 2.8). FDI entry is not significantly correlated with indicators of 
incumbents innovation-related co-operation arrangements with other firms. This is 
not very surprising. Informal knowledge flows are likely to work faster in spreading 
the knowledge from foreign owned firms to local incumbents in CEE countries.  To be 
considered for innovation related co-operation by MNEs, the incumbents need high 
levels of expertise and significant own innovation activities. All these have been of 
short supply among the domestic-owned firms in transition economies. 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
Much has been written about the effects of FDI on incumbent firms in its host 
economy. However, the literature still struggles to provide empirical evidence that 

20 The estimation is performed in Stata with the command cmp. It is developed by David Roodman 
(2009a) and it enables to estimate also an IV version of the ordered probit model.
63 

could be interpreted as causal effects. This paper estimates the effects of FDI entry on 
TFP and labour productivity growth of incumbent firms, their innovation activities 
and knowledge sourcing from other firms. I endeavour to address the problem of the 
endogeneity of FDI inflows and I check whether the effects are heterogeneous 
depending on incumbents distance to the technology frontier or geographical 
proximity to foreign owned firms.  
The main contribution of this paper compared to most of the earlier ones is studying 
the various channels of spillover effects of FDIthrough effects of FDI on innovation 
and direct measures of knowledge transfer.  For that, I can combine rich firm level 
dataset from the Business Register of Estonia with survey-based information about 
firms innovation activities and knowledge flows. Also, this study tries to account for 
the endogeneity of FDI spillovers.  
I find that the FDI entry in the local industry or region has no short-term effect on 
local incumbents TFP and labour productivity growth. However, there is a positive 
spillover on process innovation. A 10 percentage points higher entry rate of foreign 
owned firms is associated with 4 percentage points increase in incumbents 
probability of engaging in process innovation. Also, FDI inflow to a sector intensifies 
knowledge sourcing activities from other firms and from within the incumbent itself.  
The empirical evidence presented here shows that FDI entry is associated with 
knowledge flows (spillovers) to incumbent firms. But these spillovers are not reflected 
in short-term in the productivity growth of incumbents. Effects on productivity may 
take longer to materialise than implicitly assumed in the standard empirical approach 
of the literature.  
A notable additional result is that domestic firms that are further behind the 
technology frontier tend to grow faster than others. So, there seems to be some firm 
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level productivity convergence taking place within Estonia.  This result is similar to a 
recent study about UK by Bartelsman et al. (2008). 
In future, survey evidence about spillovers (e.g. like Spatareanu and Javorcik 2005, 
Javorcik 2008) can shed more light into the longer-term effects. Also, even if there are 
no productivity enhancing spillovers, the short-term effect of FDI on productivity in 
the host economy is still likely to be positive. This is, partly, due to the compositional 
change in the structure of industries, where more productive foreign owned firms 
increase their share in employment and sales compared to the domestic firms. Also, 
FDI entry can toughen the selection process among incumbent firms, driving low 
productivity incumbents out of the market and reallocating market shares and 
resources towards more productive firms. This selection effect could increase the 
average productivity of local industries in the host economy, even if there are no 
positive spillovers on productivity growth within incumbent firms.  
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 Annex 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A2.1. Descriptive statistics: domestic firms in Estonias manufacturing industry 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
ǻLn(TFP) 0.049 0.652 
ǻLn(Value added per employee) 0.08 0.664 
Ln(TFP) 9.108 1.385 
Ln(Value added per employee) 10.962 1.019 
Ln(Capital) 11.794 2.274 
Distance to TFP frontier (in log) 1.107 0.885 
Distance to labour productivity frontier (in log) 1.149 0.881 
Import orientation (3-digit) 0.409 0.303 
Ln (Size) 2.288 1.377 
Herfindahl index (3-digit) 0.124 0.152 
MNE entryjt-1 in Estonia(3-digit) 0.014 0.135 
MNE entryjt-1 in Hungary (3-digit) 0.002 0.075 
MNE entryjt-1 in Czech Republic (3-digit) 0.053 0.138 
MNE entryjt-1 in Latvia (3-digit) 0.021 0.208 
MNE entryjt-1 in Poland (3-digit) 0.025 0.123 
MNE entryjt-1 in Slovakia (3-digit) 0.005 0.092 
FDI sharejt-1 in employment in Estonia (3-digit) 0.182 0.165 
FDI sharejt-1 in employment in Hungary (3-digit) 0.296 0.163 
FDI sharejt-1 in employment in  Czech Republic (3-digit) 0.278 0.224 
FDI sharejt-1 in employment in Latvia (3-digit) 0.179 0.233 
FDI sharejt-1 in employment in Poland (3-digit) 0.216 0.164 
FDI sharejt-1 in employment in Slovakia (3-digit) 0.04 0.126 
Period: 1995-2004. Data sources: Business Register data of all manufacturing firms in Estonia; 
Amadeus database of Bureau van Dijk. 
 
Table A2.2. Basic facts about manufacturing firms in the Business Registers dataset 
Year 
Number of domestic-owned 
firms 
Share of foreign-owned firms in 
employment 
1995 2,761 0.16 
1996 3,396 0.1 
1997 3,883 0.13 
1998 4,419 0.19 
1999 4,526 0.26 
2000 4,768 0.28 
2001 5,060 0.31 
2002 5,251 0.32 
2003 5,370 0.29 
2004 4,885 0.32 
Note: FDI share is calculated based on firms with majority foreign ownership.   
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Table A2.3. CIS3 and CIS4 innovation surveys: summary statistics 
CIS3 CIS4 Variable name Variable definition 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Innovation/knowledge variables     
Product innovation Dummy, 1 if firm reports having 
introduced new or significantly 
improved product 
0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 
Process innovation Dummy, 1 if firm reports having 
introduced new or significantly 
improved production process 
0.22 0.41 0.19 0.4 
ln(Value 
added/employees) 
Value added per employees 
11.09 0.81 11.31 0.79 
Knowledge flow variables     
Sources of innovation 
related knowledge 
within the firm or other 
firms within the group 
Dummy, 1 if information from 
internal sources within the firm or 
group was of high importance 
0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 
From Competitors Dummy, 1 if information from 
competitors and other firms from the 
same industry was of high 
importance 
0.03 0.18 0.05 0.2 
From Customers Dummy, 1 if information from clients 
or customers was of high importance 
0.08 0.27 0.14 0.35 
From Supplier Dummy, 1 if information from 
suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components or software was of high 
importance 
0.08 0.28 0.14 0.34 
Innovation cooperation     
Other enterprises within 
the group 
Dummy, 1 if firm had any 
cooperation arrangements on 
innovation activities with other 
enterprises within the corporation  
0.04 0.19 0.04 0.2 
Suppliers Dummy, 1 if firm had any 
cooperation arrangements on 
innovation activities with suppliers of 
equipment, materials, components or 
software was of high importance 
0.08 0.28 0.12 0.33 
Customers Dummy, 1 if firm had any 
cooperation arrangements on 
innovation activities with clients or 
customers 
0.08 0.28 0.11 0.32 
Competitors Dummy, 1 if firm had any 
cooperation arrangements on 
innovation activities with competitors
0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 
Note: domestic-owned firms from manufacturing industry only. The number of domestic-owned 
manufacturing firms is 1,185 in CIS3 and 1,264 in CIS4 survey.   
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Annex 2.2: IV version of the ordered probit model 
 
Table A2.4. Knowledge sourcing from competitors: marginal effects for different 
answer choices 
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.92*** 
(0.395) 
0.151*** 
(0.045) 
0.566*** 
(0.182) 
0.353** 
(0.167) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 
(D) 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.032** 
(0.012) 
-0.02*** 
(0.008) 
Sizeijt-1 -0.048*** 
(0.016) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 
or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 915    
Log likelihood -374    
Note: Estimation by ordered probit, marginal effects reported. Instrumented terms: E. Instrumental 
variables used: FDI entryjt-1 in 5 CEE countries. Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. 
panel of two time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is used.  
 
 
 
Table A2.5. Knowledge sourcing from suppliers: marginal effects for different answer 
choices 
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.717** 
(0.306) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.309** 
(0.13) 
0.392** 
(0.175) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 
(D) 
0.123*** 
(0.025) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.067*** 
(0.014) 
Sizeijt-1 -0.056*** 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 
or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 915    
Log likelihood -336    
Note: Estimation by ordered probit, marginal effects reported. Instrumented terms: E. Instrumental 
variables used: FDI entryjt-1 in 5 CEE countries.  Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. 
panel of two time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is used. 
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Table A2.6. Knowledge sourcing from clients: marginal effects for different answer 
choices 
Domestic firms only, panel of 
CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.344 
(0.284) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
0.131 
(0.109) 
0.2 
(0.165) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 (D) 0.103*** 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.039*** 
(0.01) 
-0.059*** 
(0.014) 
Sizeijt-1 -0.053*** 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.009*** 
(0.012) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 or 
CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 915    
Log likelihood -291    
Note: Estimation by ordered probit, marginal effects reported. Instrumented terms: E. Instrumental 
variables used: FDI entryjt-1 in 5 CEE countries.  Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. 
panel of two time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is used. 
 
 
 
Table A2.7. Knowledge sourcing from within the same corporation: marginal effects 
for different answer choices 
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.606** 
(0.307) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.227** 
(0.114) 
0.373** 
(0.192) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 
(D) 
0.101*** 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.038*** 
(0.01) 
-0.062*** 
(0.015) 
Sizeijt-1 -0.055** 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.01) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 
or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 915    
Log likelihood -304    
Note: Estimation by ordered probit, marginal effects reported. Instrumented terms: E. Instrumental 
variables used: FDI entryjt-1 in 5 CEE countries.  Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. 
panel of two time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is used. 
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Annex 2.3: Selection model: FDI and knowledge 
sourcing   
 
Table A2.8. First stage of the 2-stage selection model 
Domestic firms only, panel of 
CIS3 and CIS4: 
 
Method: Probit  
Dep. var.:  Pr(Innovator=1) 
FDI entryjt-1 0.244** 
(0.122) 
Distance to the productivity 
frontierijt-1
-0.078*** 
(0.027) 
Size of the firmijt-1 0.108*** 
(0.018) 
Sector dummies Yes 
Region dummies Yes 
Number of obs. 1000 
Log likelihood -553.2 
Note: domestic-owned firms in the manufacturing industry. All domestic firms, not only the ones that 
engage in innovation. Estimation by probit, marginal effects reported (at sample means).  Lagged 
import intensity and Herfindahl index of each 3-digit sector are included as controls. Two innovation 
surveys (CIS3 and CIS4) are included, i.e. panel of two time periods (1998-2000 and 2002-2004) is 
used in this estimation.  Dependent variable in the probit model is equal to 1 if the firm engages in 
(product or process) innovation. 
 
 
 
Table A2.9. Selection model: knowledge sourcing from competitors, marginal effects 
for different answer choices 
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.122 
(0.146) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
0.078 
(0.093) 
0.058 
(0.07) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 
(D) 
0.036 
(0.036) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 
or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse of Mills ratio 0.093 0.01 -0.059 -0.044 
 (0.117) (0.013) (0.074) (0.055) 
Number of obs. 357    
Log likelihood -447    
Note: Only these domestic firms that engage in innovation. Estimation by ordered probit, marginal 
effects reported. Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. panel of two time periods (1998-
2000 and 2002-2004) is used.  
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Table A2.10. Selection model: knowledge sourcing from suppliers, marginal effects 
for different answer choices 
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.222** 
(0.13) 
-0.051 
(0.031) 
0.05 
(0.033) 
0.225* 
(0.131) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 
(D) 
0.093*** 
(0.034) 
0.021 
(0.009) 
-0.021** 
(0.01) 
-0.093*** 
(0.034) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 
or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse of Mills ratio 0.033 
(0.024) 
0.144 
(0.101) 
-0.032 
(0.025) 
-0.145 
(0.102) 
Number of obs. 357    
Log likelihood -447    
Note: Only these domestic firms that engage in innovation. Estimation by ordered probit, marginal 
effects reported. Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. panel of two time periods (1998-
2000 and 2002-2004) is used. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.11. Selection model: knowledge sourcing from clients, marginal effects for 
different answer choices 
Domestic firms only, panel of 
CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.142 
(0.128) 
-0.035 
(0.033) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.142 
(0.128) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 (D) 0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.018* 
(0.01) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 or 
CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse of Mills ratio -0.023 -0.006 -0.006 0.023 
 (0.101) (0.026) (0.026) (0.101) 
Number of obs. 357    
Log likelihood -471    
Note: Only these domestic firms that engage in innovation. Estimation by ordered probit, marginal 
effects reported.  Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. panel of two time periods (1998-
2000 and 2002-2004) is used. 
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Table A2.12. Selection model: knowledge sourcing from within the same corporation, 
marginal effects for different answer choices 
Domestic firms only, panel 
of CIS3 and CIS4: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Method: IV-ordered probit     
Answer choice: Not used 
 
Low 
importance 
Medium 
importance 
High 
importance 
FDI entryjt-1 (E) -0.229* 
(0.121) 
-0.053 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.28* 
(0.148) 
Distance to the frontierijt-1 
(D) 
0.072** 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.088*** 
(0.034) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey wave dummy (CIS3 
or CIS4) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse of Mills ratio 0.014 0.059 -0.001 -0.073 
 (0.019) (0.084) (0.005) (0.102) 
Number of obs. 357    
Log likelihood -438    
Note: Only these domestic firms that engage in innovation. Estimation by ordered probit, marginal 
effects reported. Two survey waves included (CIS3 and CIS4), i.e. panel of two time periods (1998-
2000 and 2002-2004) is used. 
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Chapter 3 
Competition, Productivity Based 
Selection Effects and Prices: A Case 
Study of the European Passenger 
Aviation Sector 
3.1 Introduction 
The large and persistent output price and productivity dispersion across firms even 
within narrowly defined sectors of an economy is a stylised finding in the literature. 
There is large price dispersion across producers even within rather homogeneous 
product categories like ready mixed concrete (Syverson 2007) or manufactured ice 
(Roberts and Supina 1997).  Also, Griliches and Mairesse (1995), Bartelsman and 
Doms (2000) show evidence of similar large productivity dispersion across firms 
within detailed single sectors. During recent years there has been an increasing 
interest to explain these variations.  
This chapter studies the effects of competition on distribution of output prices. It 
endeavours to explain the persistent across-firm price variation within a single 
industry, using a case study of the Western-European short-haul passenger aviation 
sector. The main emphasis of the paper is on the effects of the competition-driven 
(and cost- and productivity-based) selection process among airlines active on different 
city-pair markets. This selection process can have reallocation effects across firms 
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within each market, resulting in effects on the productivity, cost and airfare 
distributions of airlines.  
Most of the empirical papers about selection effects tend to concentrate on analysis of 
large firm-level datasets of productivity related variables from the manufacturing 
sector. That way they bundle together very different sectors and producers that do not 
compete with each other (e.g. Foster et al. 2001, Baldwin and Gu 2006). 
Concentrating on a study of a single (transport services) sector with spatially 
differentiated markets, relatively similar technology and relatively easily substitutable 
products
21
 across different firms within these separate markets enables us to account 
to some extent for the usual product and technology heterogeneity problem. 
I outline the implications of the firm selection process based on recent heterogeneous-
producer competition models (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008, Syverson 2004a). Then, in 
my empirical analysis I test the hypotheses drawn from these models about the effects 
of competition on price distribution of airlines.  
I find some evidence consistent with the implications of these models. Also, the 
results are of interest from a competition policy aspect. I find that tougher competition 
(including due to entry of airlines) on a given aviation market leads (through an 
increase in substitutability between carriers) to lower average and median airfares on a 
market. However, I also find that tougher competition is associated with lower upper-
bound of airfare distribution on the market and less price variation (i.e. smaller across-
carrier price spread) across airlines. These latter results are related to somewhat 
similar previous findings by Syverson (2007), based on data of ready-mixed concrete 
plants in the US. My results show that these non-trivial effects of competition 
(product substitutability) on price distribution seem to be more general. These seem to 

21 I.e. a flight on a given city-pair. 
74 

exist also in a transport services sector that has a relatively small number of 
competitors, and are not specific only to the ready-mixed concrete production.   
The main contribution of this paper is empirical testing of hypotheses drawn from 
recent heterogeneous producer competition models, from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
and Syverson (2004a). The novelty is that I am investigating not only the effects of 
competition on average prices of airlines
22
, but also on the across-airline price 
distribution on a given aviation market. Arguably, the findings about the effects of 
competition on price distribution may give also information about the effects on 
across-firm cost and productivity distribution within the same given spatial market. 
Other papers that study the effects of competition on price dispersion in this sector 
study different type of airfare variation than this study. They look at determinants of 
within-airline price dispersion, not the across-airline (cost and productivity related 
part of) price dispersion. I.e., they investigate price discrimination and therefore 
concentrate on price differences across clients of the same airline. Notable examples 
from the US are by Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). A 
recent example based on detailed European data that investigates price discrimination 
by airlines are by Piga and Bachis (2007) and Gaggero and Piga (2009).  
Standard well-known competition models, like Salop (1979) assume that producers 
have homogeneous costs. In these models toughness of competition (extent of product 
substitutability) affects only the average unique priceit lowers the average optimal 
price in a given market. Recent extensions to these models in the IO literature 
(Syverson 2004a)
23
 or in the new-new trade theory (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) that 
assume heterogeneous firms have significantly richer predictions.   

22 The effects on average airfares have been studied in several papers before (e.g. Schipper et al. 2002, 
2007). 
23 Also: Alderighi and Piga (2008). 
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In these models tougher competition is associated not only with lower average prices, 
but also lower upper-bound and dispersion of prices. These effects work through 
competition driven cost- or productivity-based selection process among firms. Lack of 
competition is a barrier to product substitutability between producers. Increased 
competition (e.g. larger number of competitors on a route, as caused for example by 
abolition of regulations that deter entry into the market) makes it easier for consumers 
to substitute between producers. That way it makes it more difficult for low-
productivity and high-price firms to survive on a given market.  
This selection process drives the least efficient and high-price producers out of the 
market (city-pair), thus truncating the cost and price distribution of firms from above 
and truncating the productivity distribution from below. This lowers the average cost 
levels, raises the average productivity and lowers the average price level in a given 
market. But in addition to that, this truncation of price distribution from above results 
in lower maxima (i.e. the upper-bound) of the price distribution and, given some 
regularity conditions, also lower across-carrier airfare dispersion.   
This chapter concentrates on a single sector case study.  The European short-haul 
passenger aviation sector is a suitable case as it has been through significant changes 
in toughness of competition. The number of competing airlines on the studied city-
pairs varies significantly and there is a fair amount of entry and exit on different city-
pairs during the studied time period.  
At the same time, the hard technology (e.g. aircraft used) used in this sector has 
remained relatively similar over this decade across different airlines. Also, despite the 
high sunk entry costs, the know-how and innovations to the business model are not 
something excludable from use by an airlines competitors. In addition to that, on 
short haul routes the economy class flights by different airlines on the same city-pair 
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are fairly good substitutes for each other.
24
 As pointed out in Doganis (2010), one 
airline seat is from the passengers viewpoint very similar to another and a standard 
large jet aircraft to another. However, a flight on a given short-haul route is of course 
not even closely as homogeneous as the ready-mixed concrete or some other 
standardised manufactured product.  
Airlines do try hard to differentiate their products. But as they fly on the same short-
haul city-pair or route (i.e. on the same market) and almost identical large aircraft (e.g. 
often the Boeing 737 or Airbus A318-A321), consumers perceive them largely as 
substitutes for each other. Apart from either providing free food and additional 
amenities or not, it is difficult and costly to strongly differentiate economy class 
flights on short-haul routes. This sharpens the focus on how cost differences between 
airlines, rather than product heterogeneity alone, affect the airfare distribution across 
carriers on a given route.  
This chapter uses two types of data: i) unique primary data of economy class airfares 
collected by a web spider program during 2003-2005, and ii) secondary data of 
passenger traffic. Both databases cover flights on routes
25
 in three country-pairs: UK-
Ireland, UK-Netherlands, and UK-Belgium.  This European dataset of airfare postings 
is much more detailed than any other. The passenger airfare information is available at 
daily and flight-code level. However, the biggest difference from any other data 
source is that airfares for the same flights and by the same carrier are available by a 
number of different booking scenarios. Booking scenario is defined here as the time 
between booking of the ticket and departure. So, the airfares of different carriers on 
the same route or city-pair can be compared in the case of the same booking 

24 However, the air journey is only a part of, for example, a business or a holiday trip and not an aim in 
itself. The overall travel product is of course always a rather heterogeneous product. 
25 A route is hereafter defined as an origin-destination airport-pair.
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scenario.
26
 The raw airfare database covers over 1.7 million daily price observations, 
including information of both low-cost carriers (LCC) and full service carriers (FSC). 
I aggregate this database into monthly city-pair level observations and merge it with 
traffic database from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).  
The methods that I use to study this information include standard fixed effects (FE) 
regression, a 3-stage extension of the FE model, and system-GMM. GMM is used in 
order to endeavour to account for potential endogeneity of the competition variables 
in estimated equations. The endogeneity of competition variables is a standard 
problem in studies about the effects of competition. It needs to be accounted for in 
order to make conclusions about the effects, not only about the correlations.  
 
3.2 Literature review  
The relevant empirical literature can be divided broadly into three parts. First, a 
number of papers that document the effects of competition and deregulation on 
average prices in the aviation sector. Second, papers from other sectors that study the 
competition-induced selection processes and how these increase aggregate 
productivity by driving out the least productive firms. Third, papers that document 
and study the persistent across-firm price dispersion in a number of different sectors. 
Many empirical studies have shown that an increase in competition due to 
liberalisation has resulted in lower airfares in the aviation sector. For example, 
Blöndal and Pilat (1997) attribute in their study almost 60 per cent of the fall in 
average airfares in USA over 1976-1993 to deregulation.  Gönenc and Nicoletti 
(2000) conclude that airfares in OECD countries tend to decline with more 

26 For example, this cannot be done based on the US DOT airfare dataset, which is commonly used in 
airfare analysis. 
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deregulation and in the case of more competitive market structure.  Dresner and 
Tretheway (1992) find significant welfare gains from liberalisation in the US. 
Schipper et al. (2002), using a sample of 34 routes with varying liberalisation status 
over years 1988-1992, investigate the effects of European aviation sector reforms. 
They find that standard economy airfares are lower on fully liberalised routes than on 
others. Also, Marin (1995) shows that the 1992 liberalisation of aviation sector in the 
EU is associated with a fall in airfares. An important implication of his paper is also 
that the effects of deregulation on prices may take time. Using yearly data on 172 city-
pair markets in 8 European countries, Carlsson (2004) studies the association between 
the market structure and yearly averages of business class airfares. His results about 
the influence of market power are quite mixed and depend on the specification of 
price equation estimated.  
In general, most of these papers find that liberalisation and more competition (e.g. 
larger number of firms on a route) is associated with lower average prices in the 
aviation sector.  Also, in the case of the dataset that I use in this paper, Piga and 
Bachis (2006) show that enjoying a dominant position within routes from UK to 
Western Europe is conducive to higher airfares of an airline. 
An interesting and innovative approach is by Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) and 
Daraban and Fournier (2008), based on data from the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT 1A and 1B dataset).  These papers study how US airlines 
respond to the threat of entry of competitors. The main finding is that incumbent 
airlines cut airfares to a significant extent already before the actual entryi.e. when 
threatened by Southwests or other LCCs entry into their routes.  
There is a strand of literature that studies the effects of competition on price 
discrimination in airline sector. These papers concentrate on the within-airline price 
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dispersion and its changes due to the entry of competitors.  However, these do not 
investigate the determinants of the across-firm (cost and productivity related part of) 
price dispersion. Notable examples from US studying the price discrimination in 
airlines sector are the papers by Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro 
(2009). Both of them study the effects of competition, as measured by change in 
Herfindahl index and number of competitors, on within-airline airfare dispersion 
within each studied route. For example, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) use a Gini 
coefficient at route-airline level as a proxy for price dispersion across consumers. A 
recent related example based on European data documenting significant price 
discrimination is by Piga and Bachis (2007). A recent example that investigates how 
competition is related to within airline price dispersion across consumers in Europe is 
by Gaggero and Piga (2009). They find a negative correlation between market 
dominance and price dispersion, competition seems to limit the airlines' ability to 
price discriminate to exploit consumers' heterogeneity in booking time preferences. 
There are also some empirical papers related to this one that study the selection effects 
of competition. Usually these employ data from the manufacturing sector and 
investigate effects on productivity of firms. These empirical studiese.g. by Bailey, 
Hulten, and Campbell (1992), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), or Syverson 
(2004b)have shown that stronger competition tends to drive the less productive 
producers out of the market. As Syverson (2004a) shows based on data from ready 
mixed concrete sector, these selection effects increase aggregate sector productivity. 
At the same time, due to truncation of productivity distribution from belowi.e. due 
to driving out the bad firms, this selection process results in lower productivity 
dispersion and higher minima (lower bound) of the productivity distribution of 
production plants.  
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A closely related paper to this study is by Syverson (2007). He studies the 
implications from a heterogeneous producer version of Salops (1979) model about 
the price distribution of firms. His research question is: how do competition and 
product substitutability (more precisely: the market size and demand density) affect 
across-firm price distribution in separate geographical ready-mixed concrete markets 
in the US?  He finds confirmation to somewhat related hypotheses to these tested in 
this paper. He shows that higher demand density (a broad proxy for competition) on a 
market results, due to productivity-based selection process among the producers, in 
lower average prices, less price dispersion and lower upper bound of the price 
distribution.  
Other studies that document across-firm price dispersion and explain it with 
differences in search costs, repeat purchases vs one-time purchases, etc, include 
Sorensen (2000), Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) and Baye et al. (2004). These do not 
concentrate on selection effects of competition. 
 
3.3 Theoretical motivation 
The theoretical framework that I use is based on recent heterogeneous producer 
models of competition. In this section I derive the hypotheses to be tested in my 
empirical analysis, using the monopolistic competition model by Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008). I use a closed-country version of their new-new trade theory model. This 
model can be used to analyze the effect of changes in toughness of competition due to 
deregulation of entry and actual entry of competitors.  
The main result from recent heterogeneous producer competition models (incl. Melitz 
and Ottaviano 2008, Syverson 2004a, Bernard et al. 2006) is that tougher competition 
lowers the zero-profit (i.e. survival) cost cut-off on a market, truncating the (marginal) 
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cost distribution of firms from above. The lower survival cost cut-off makes the 
survival of high-cost firms more difficult, inducing exit of the highest-cost firms. This 
cost truncation means also a truncation of the productivity distribution (as productivity 
is defined as an inverse of the cost here). However, it can also result in the truncation 
of the price distribution (e.g., as in Syverson 2007) given that carriers rank ordering 
on a route is similar for both price and (marginal production) cost distribution, and 
that prices monotonically increase in costs.  
As an alternative to the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) approach, some related 
hypotheses can be derived based on somewhat different framework (see Annex 3.1), 
based on the heterogeneous cost version of Salops (1979) spatial competition mode 
(as in Syverson 2004a, or Alderighi and Piga 2008). The homogeneous producer 
version of Salops model has been used in earlier papers (e.g., Carlsson 2004) to study 
the effects of deregulation on average prices on a route. However, the more recent 
heterogeneous cost version has not been employed so far for the study of this sector. 
Syversons (2004a) monopolistic competition model, unlike Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008) has a special feature that is especially relevant in the case of aviation sector
spatially differentiated markets.  
In the context of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model and heterogeneous costs version 
of Salops (1979) model, the effect of competition can be seen as an increase in 
substitutability between airlines. Substitutability increases, for example, due to the 
entry of new carriers on a market (city-pair).  In Syverson (2004a) the substitutability 
increase is brought about by a specific mechanism, by an increase in market demand 
(and as the size of market area s fixed in his model, by an increase in demand density). 
The particular comparative static of interest is different in the Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008) and Syverson (2004a) models. The comparative static of interest in the Melitz 
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and Ottaviano (2008) model is dc*/dȖ, the change in survival cost cut off (c*) due to 
change in product substitutability parameter (Ȗ). In Syverson (2004a), the comparative 
static of interest is dc*/dD, the change in market demand (D).  
In Syverson (2004a), a rise in market demand will raise the expected value of entry 
into the market, which will increase the number of producers willing to cover the 
entry cost to the market. Increase in entry and number of competitors will raise the 
producer substitution possibilities for consumers on the market and, hence, will make 
the survival of high-cost producers more difficult (i.e. lowers the producers survival 
cost cut-off c* on the market). 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model extends the monopolistic competition intra-
industry trade model of Melitz (2003) with endogenous markups that depend on the 
size of the market.  Firm heterogeneity occurs here in the form of cost and 
productivity (defined as 1/marginal cost) differences across firms. Firm heterogeneity 
is introduced in a similar fashion to Melitz (2003). Firms face some initial uncertainty 
about their future marginal production cost (and productivity), when making their 
costly investment decision prior to entry. In this case, prior to entry on a separate city-
pair market.  Upon entry they learn their cost level. 
The demand side of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model is taken from Otttaviano, 
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002)an economic geography model, assuming quasi-linear 
preferences, that yield a linear demand for each variety. Consumers are identical, each 
has the following utility function: 
2
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where 0 is the homogeneous numeraire goodq ; 
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  is consumption level of each variety of the differentiated goodiq
27
; 
 i is index of variety in the differentiated good sector, N is the number of 
varieties consumed. 
 The demand parameters D, J and K are all positive. J  is the product substitutability 
(differentiation) parameter. Its higher values represent higher degree of differentiation 
between the varieties, as consumers give increasing weight to the distribution of 
consumption levels across varieties.  If J=0, consumers care only about their total 
consumption level of all varieties. 
These preferences yield a linear inverse demand for all varieties: 
 )( Qp
L
q ii KDJ  ,       (3.2) 
where L is the market size (number of consumers); 
N
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;     (3.3) Q is aggregate output: 
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Supply side of the model is summarized in Figure 3.1. The supply side of the model, 
the introduction of firm heterogeneity into the model and firm entry and exit, follows 
Melitz (2003). Firms pay sunk entry cost (s) to enter the market and after
_
       is average price (N is number of firms).   (3.4) 
 that 
ndomly draw their marginal cost from the c.d.f. G(c) with support on [0, cM].   
e
r of firms N and average price . In the long run, 
ere is free entry into the industry. 

ra
 
There is monopolistic competition and firms maximise profits bas d on their linear 
residual demand curve, given numbe
_
p
th
27 In this case: the flight on a city-pair by different airlines. 
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Figure 3.1. Firm
Entrants
Entrants with
 low  cost
Entrants with
high cost
Potential
entrants
Produce
No production
If expect positive 
profits, cover
 sunk entry costs 
and  enter
Randomly 
draw cost
(productivity)
 ci < c*
 ci > c*
c*- survival cost cut-off
s productivity uncertainty and entry/exit in Melitz and Ottaviano 
2008) model 
After entry, a firm with a cost draw c will m
(
 
aximise its profits, 
)()(max
0)( Lcq
»¼«¬ ¹©t cqccqQ
ºª ·¸§¨  JKDS .     (3.5) 
The first order condition from this yields: 
0)()(
2  ºª  cqccqQ JKD .      (3.6) »¼«¬ L
For all cost draws c for which it holds that Qcc KD {! * , the firm does not produce 
anything.  as its profit would be negative if it produced under these 
circum  
draw.  
These firms that draw  will stay in the market and sell quantity: 
0)(cq  
stances. These firms exit market after observing their cost (and productivity)
*cc 
)*(
2
)( cccq  J .        (3.7) 
L
 , such that 
Similarly to Melitz (2003) there exists thus a (endogenous) survival (zero profit) cost 
cut-off  *c 0*)(  cS . We can write the firm level variables like price, 
mark-ups, revenue and profit as functions of the survival cost cut-off and firms own 
cost c. 
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Prices: 
2
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Mark-ups: 
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pected profit condition. There the value of entry 
ntry is equal to sunk entry cost s. 
    (3.11) 
Hence, more productive firms, that have lower c,  have lower prices but higher mark-
ups, are bigger in terms of output and revenue, and earn higher profit. 
The free entry drives expected value of entry to zero. The industry equilibrium of the 
model is characterised by the zero ex
for firm is 0, i.e. the expected profit from e
³ ³   *0 *04J 2 )()*()()(
c c
scdGcc
L
cdGcS      (3.12) 
Assuming, for simplicity (in order to get the analytical solution) the Pareto 
distribution for the productivity draw
28
 G(c), the model can be solved for the survival 
cost cut-off . (Again, only the relatively efficient firms will produce, those that 
draw cost  will not, they will exit.)  
From above, the cost threshold   will be: 
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The survival cost cut-off is lower if the substitutability pa  J is lower (i.e. if 
better), or sunk cost of entry s is lower (e.g. because of deregulation of entry). The 
rameter
varieties are closer substitutes), if cM is lower (i.e. the distribution of cost draws is 
cut-off with respect to the substitutability parameter 
survival cost cut-off is decreasing in market size L. Thus, the implication of the Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008) model is the tougher competition (tougher selection and higher 
exit rate) in the larger market. From (3.13) we can see that the derivative of the cost 
0
*
Jd
dc
differentiation allows survival of higher cost firms (as also in Syverson 2004b). 
Increase in competition can be seen in this model as a fal
! ; higher product 
l in this substitutability 
J  (e.g due to larger nu
results in lower and thus truncation of the cost distribution from above
29
 (as in 
The result 
parameter mber of competitors offering their product). This 
Figure 3.2). [The fall in J can be interpreted here as follows: tougher competition (e.g. 
due to larger number of competitors or deregulation of entry) increases substitutability 
between airlines, as e.g. there are more flights on different times on a given route, or 
there are more possibilities to fly to some given destination].  
*c  
0
*dc !Jd  may show also the effects of competition on the survival price 
cut-off of the price distribution. Fall in producer substitutability parameter J will 
nd -price cut-off levels (and raise the survival productivity 
ut-off), resulting in the truncation of cost and price distributions from above (and 

lower the survival-cost a
c
truncation of productivity distribution from below). This effect on cost distribution of 
firms on a given market is given in Figure 3.2.  
29 Note that also the effects of deregulation of entry to a market can be studied based on this model.  
This can be considered as either: a fall in sunk cost of entry s or a fall in substitutability parameter Ȗ.  
Both these changes result in truncation of the cost distribution from above, as in Figure 3.2. 
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 Figure 3.2. Tougher com
distribution from
petition leads to truncation of the across-firm cost 
 above  
 
Notably, there are some assumptions that have to hold in order to have cost 
distributions truncation to result in similar truncation of the price distribution. Prices 
need to monotonically increase in costs, and firms rank ordering needs to be the same 
in both price and cost distribution (Syverson 2007).  
In summary, the main intuition behind the result 0
* !
d
dc
 is in our case shortly the 
following. Entry of new carriers into the rou
J
te increases the substitutability between 
differentiated varieties of a similar product) the high cost and high-price 
(city-
er average price, less price 
ariation across carriers, and lower upper-bound of price distribution on a given 
market (city-pair), as outlined in Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 that are to be tested in the 
empirical analysis. 
airlines, i.e. competition gets tougher. This results in a fall in the survival cost cut-off 
*c . Because of easier substitutability between airlines flying on the same city-pair 
(i.e. offering 
airlines find it now more difficult to hold their customers. This cost-based selection 
process eliminates relatively high-cost (inefficient) carriers from the market 
pair), truncating both the equilibrium production-cost distribution (on this market) and 
equilibrium price distribution from above. This means low
v
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Hypothesis 1. Tougher competition among airlines on a given city-pair leads (via 
30
  
This chapter uses two types of data: primary data of economy class airfares and 
secondary data of passenger traffic. Both datasets cover flights on routes  in 3 
country-pairs: UK-Ireland, UK-Netherlands, and UK-Belgium. The airfare data are 
collected by Claudio Piga from Loughborough University, a detailed description of 
this dataset can be found from Piga and Bachis (2007). The detailed passenger traffic 
data are from the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).  
The passenger airfare postings database covers over 1.7 million price observations, 
including both the LCCs and the FSCs. It includes the airfares of the following LCCs: 
Ryanair, Easyjet, Bmibaby, Buzz and MyTravelLight.  For FSCs the coverage is 
restricted to airlines flying on identical or similar routes with LCCs: BMI, BA, KLM, 
Lufthansa  and Aer Lingus.   The time period for which I have both LCC and FSC 
airfares available extends from April 2003 until June 2005.    

increase in substitutability between carriers) to lower average airfares on this city-
pair market. 
Hypothesis 2. Tougher competition among airlines on a given city-pair suppresses the 
upper-bound of the across-airline price distribution on a given city-pair market. 
Hypothesis 3. Tougher competition among airlines on a given city-pair leads to less 
price variation across carriers on this city-pair market.
 
3.4  Description of airfare and traffic data 
31
32 33
34
30 Obviously, hypotheses 2 and 3 can be studied only in routes that have initially more than one carrier.  
31 A route is here an origin-destination airport-pair. 
32 Lufthansa flies in codeshare with other airlines, i..e it does not service the studied routes itself. 
Therefore,  Lufthansa is excluded  from regression analysis testing the  hypotheses 1-3. 
33 Aer Lingus has changed its business model, by now it follows a business model similar to the LCCs.
34 For LCCs also data from 2002 is also available. 
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Over this period, each day the internet postings of airfares of LCCs and FSCs have 
been collected with a special electronic spider. Each day this program connected 
directly to the UK website of each LCC and retrieved a number of different price 
citations (in British pounds) posted there. During the data collection, the return flight 
of the journey was always scheduled one week after the departure. The retrieved LCC 
airfares are one-way prices on a return flight, priced separately for the outbound and 
return flight of the return journey, excluding taxes, fees and other charges.  Note that, 
unlike the FSCs, the LCCs always price the outbound and return leg of the journey 
separately. Therefore, there are no difficulties in distinguishing between the price of 
the outbound and returning stage of the journey of a LCC.  
Daily airfares of FSCs were collected from the booking website www.opodo.co.uk. 
The prices cited there include all taxes, fees and surcharges to the airfare. The flight 
class was always standard economy class. As FSCs priced most of their tickets as 
return flights, not separating the outbound and return part of the journey, the return 
ticket prices were collected. Half of the airfare of the return-ticket is assigned to the 
outbound journey and half to the return journey (as in Piga and Bachis 2007a, 2007b). 
The fares were collected for a number of different departure dates from the booking 
day. That is, I have a number of different fares for the same flight, depending on how 
 
many days before the actual flight the ticket was booked.  For both the FSCs and 
LCCs I have these booking scenarios available: the flight to a destination airport 
taking place 7, 10, 14, 17, 21, 28, 35, 42 49 and 56 days after the query.  The 
distinction between different booking scenarios is very useful for my study. Piga and
Bachis (2007) show that the airfares on the same flight of the same airline that are 
booked at different days can differ a lot. Therefore, when I compare airfares across 
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carriers on a given aviation market (route or region-pair), prices corresponding to the 
same booking scenario need to be used.  
The collection of airfares was conducted every day at the same time. In addition to 
airfare, also information on the name of company, date and time of query, departure 
date, scheduled departure and arrival time, origin and destination airport names and 
identification codes, season of flight, and the flight identification code was collected. 
Notably, for LCCs the airfares were collected without taxes, fees and charges, but for 
FSCs inclusive of these. In order to compare airfares between LCCs and FSCs some 
r. I add these average values to the corresponding LCC 
irfare values on each of these country-pairs. 
rline airfare dispersion on different 
viation
wou b t routes, i airs  as sep r, 
fligh o es ofte ntly w is 
defi io arrow he 
city-pairs, which consist of geographically close routes that are likely to compete with 
each other. I define the city-pa  of catchment areas of studied 
airports (see also Annex 3.2).  
assumptions about these additional ingredients of the airfare have to be made, and 
these added to the LCC fares. For that I use some (crude) country-pair level 
information about average taxes, fees and surcharges that can be calculated from 
Yamanaka (2005). Based on Yamanaka (2005) one can find the average approximate 
country-pair figures also for UK-Netherlands, UK-Belgium, and UK-Ireland country-
pairs. Based on her paper the average taxes and fees per one-way ticket amount to 13£ 
on routes connecting the UK and Ireland, 20£ on UK-Belgium country-pair, and 18£ 
on UK-Netherlands country pai
a
In order to compare airfares and calculate across-ai
a  markets one has to define these separate geographical markets. One option 
ld e to treat differen .e. airport-p , arate markets. Howeve
ts n different rout n compete significa ith each other. So, th
nit n would be too n .  Instead, I define t separate aviation markets as 
irs based on overlaps
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 Table 3.1. City-pairs covered in the airfare dataset 
 
 UK UK-Netherlands city-pairs UK-Belgiu  city-pairs 
1 London to 
Amsterdam/Rotterdam 
London to Brussels area 
-Ireland city-pairs 
London to Knock 
m
2 London to Cork London to Groningen East Midlands (EMA) to 
Brussels area 
London to Eindhoven Edinburgh-Glasgow-Dundee to 
Brussels area 
EMA to 
Amsterdam m 
5 Londo  Edinburgh-Glasgow-Dundee to 
Amsterdam/Rotterdam 
 
6 EMA to Knock Manchester-Liverpool-  
12 Manchester-Liverpool-   
13 Manchester to Dublin   
  
15 Bristol-Cardiff to Cork   
Dublin 
3 London to Dublin 
4 London to Kerry 
County 
n to Shannon
/Rotterda
 
Blackpool to 
Amsterdam/Rotterdam 
7 EMA to Cork   
8 EMA to Dublin   
9 Edinburg-Glasgow-
Dundee to Dublin 
  
10 Leeds-Hull to Dublin   
11 Southampton-
Bournemouth to 
Dublin 
  
Blackpool to Cork 
14 Newcastle to Dublin 
16 Bristol-Cardiff to   
 
In its 2002 RASCO survey the UK Department for Transportation (DfT) has 
conducted analysis about the size and also overlap of catchment areas of UK airports 
(as of year 2000). Based on their catchment area maps produced by the DfTs 
National Airport Accessibility Model we can determine which airports and hence 
which short-haul routes are directly competing with each other. In DfTs approach, 
the catchment area is calculated as the area within either an average one-hour, or an 
average two-hour travel time radius.  
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The largest number of city-pairs with price data available are from the UK-Ireland 
country-pair, followed by the UK-Netherlands and the UK-Belgium (see Table 3.1).  
In both UK-Ireland and UK-Netherlands country-pair I have airfare data available for 
7 airlines, in UK-Belgium market for 5 airlines. The detailed CAA traffic dataset for 
the period includes also other smaller airlines that have served these markets. 
However, with the exception of SN Brussels, VLM and Aer Arran, the UK airfare 
database includes the main airlines serving these markets. Airlines for which I have 
airfare data, account for about three quarters of all passenger flights in UK-Ireland, 
UK-Netherlands and UK-Belgium markets. 
The separate CAA database of traffic on these 3 country-pairs covers monthly data for 
the same studied period. It includes more than 35,000 observations, covering 
passenger flights from all UK airports. For each airline, route and month combination 
it provides the number of monthly aircraft seats, number of passengers and load 
factors. This data enable us to calculate the number of competitors active on each city-
pair, the Herfindahl index and other market structure related variables.  All the 
information in this database has also been aggregated to a city-pair level. For each 
city-pair and route it enables to identify the entering and exiting companies, as well as 
the time (month of a year) of this entry or exit.  
Entry is defined in this context as the first scheduled operation of an airline on an 
airport-pair (i.e. on a route) within a city-pair. Exit is defined as the last scheduled 
e caution is 
ervations, as it may also result from a 
merger of two airlines or as it may reflect a coding error of an airline.  Corrections 
for airline merger are however relatively easy to make as there are relatively few of 

operation of an airline on an airport-pair within a city-pair. However, som
needed in interpreting these entry-exit obs
35
35 For example BMI was in some periods coded differently in the dataset, thus creating spurious 
impression of entry and exit. 
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these.
36
  For a short overview of entry and exit on the largest studied city-pairs see 
Annex 3.3. A detailed account of entry, exit and their determinants based on data of 
3.5 Background information and descriptive 
statistics 
A general development since the 1992 (and 1997) deregulation packages of the 
aviation sector in the EU has been the entry and growth of market share of LCCs. This 
has resulted in strong price competition, especially on short haul routes, increase in 
number of airlines and an increase in number of routes served in the EU. 
In general, the main characteristic that differentiates the new entrants in the aviation 
market, the LCCs, is their costs.  The European LCCs have copied with remarkable 
success the first successful LCC in the USA, Southwest, in terms of its cost-related 
features of the product (Doganis 2006, 2010). They offer high-frequency short-
distance point-to-point services. To keep costs and thus also airfares low, they operate 
a single aircraft type and use high-density seating.
37
 Traditionally, LCCs have had 
much higher daily utilisation of aircraft and their personnel than the full service 
carriers (FSC) (CAA 2006, Calder 2002). They minimise the time that aircraft or the 
crew remains idle, for example by reducing the turnaround times between flights. 
They tend to avoid using main large airports, thus cutting the airport costs and 
avoiding congestion related problems (that way often reaching high punctuality of 
departures). They generally (with some exceptions like Virgin Express) have not 
provided free in-flight catering or pre-assigned seating, hence, lowering the time 

country-pairs in Western Europe is available in Gil-Molto and Piga (2007).   
 
36 E.g. the Ryanair takeover of Buzz in spring 2003. 
37 For example, according to Doganis (2006) EasyJet has been able to pack 148 seat on its Boeing 737-
300 aircraft. British Midland has had only 132 seats on the same type of aircraft.
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needed to keep the aircraft grounded at the airport between landing and take-off (e.g. 
Calder 2002, Jones 2006). The LCCs do not use travel agents for selling their ticket, 
but service their clients directly from their websites. This lowers their sales costs and 
amount of ticketing and sales staff needed. Also, the LCCs have usually achieved 
is product differentiation. To what extent can the flights on new LCCs be 
 service product (Doganis 2006, 
higher load-factors than the majority of the FSCs. 
Higher utilisation of both aircraft and personnel and savings in terms of labour costs 
have been the main success factors of the LCCs. Labour costs, have traditionally been 
the largest main single cost item of airlines (CAA 2006). Only very recently has the 
share of fuel costs (temporarily) surpassed the share of costs of labour in total costs of 
airlines (Pearce and Smyth 2007).  LCCs have achieved low labour costs by 
employing non-union labour and younger personnel. By the advantage of being new 
entrants, the LCCs have avoided some of the legacy costs of many old incumbent 
airlines, such as heavy pension liabilities 
An issue, that is relevant to a study of the effects of competition and liberalisation on 
airfares, 
seen as substitutes for the flights on FSCs? Some authors argue that the economy class 
airline flights on a given route are in fact relatively similar and airlines service 
standards are more-or-less converging (e.g. Calder 2002). Product differentiation is 
rather costly in this sector (Ibid. 2002, Doganis 2006).  Adding seat pitch to please the 
customers, frequencies, in-flight amenities and airport lounges drives costs up. So 
does expanding the network scope by using central hubs. Also, congestion due to 
using large hubs like Heathrow, used more by the FSCs can in fact lower the 
perceived quality of the traditional airlines full
2010).   
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One observation is also that on short- and medium-haul routes (which dominate in the 
EU) product differentiation is more difficult and also less lucrative, since passengers 
spend relatively little time in the aircraft and thus wider legroom and other amenities 
are often not that important for them (Doganis 2006).  Baily and Zitzewitz (2001) 
argue that the most important qualities of a flight that matter for consumers are the 
frequency of flights on a given route and the reliability of service. In that sense the 
LCCs product has not been inferior to that of FSCsas evident also in the 
punctuality statistics of flights from the UK CAA. 
The analysis of our airfare dataset confirms the known fact that on average the LCCs 
have significantly lower airfares than the FSCs on the studied city-pairs (see Table 3.2 
and 3.3). Over the period 2003-2005, Ryanair and MyTravelLite had the lowest 
average airfares. The average airfare (with added taxes and airport charges) of Ryanair 
on the 3 country-pairs was 39.8£. The highest average airfares were the ones of the 
British Airways, which on average were almost 3 times higher than the airfares of 
Ryanair. Also, the most expensive airfares of separate airlines were higher in the case 
of the FSCs. Notably, the ranking of airlines in the across-carrier price distribution is 
relatively similar in different city-pairs. In the case of BA, the variation of airfares 
differences in 

across the three country-pairs is larger than in other airlines. 
The large differences between LCC and FSCs are also shown in Table 3.4 in the case 
of labour productivity (RPK
38
 per employee), cost and departure/arrival punctuality. 
LCCs that have lower airfares than the FSC have also significantly higher labour 
productivity, better punctuality indicators and (with the exception of Easyjet) also 
lower labour costs than the FSCs (see Table 3.2). These cost, productivity and airfare 
differences between LCCs and FSCs have to do a lot with the general 
38 Revenue passenger kilometre. 
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the business models, as described above. A part of the large differences in RPK or 
number of passengers per employee can be due to different extent of outsourcing of 
some air service related activities.  
The dynamics of punctuality statistics over time is heavily affected by seasonality. 
able is log of average route-month-airline level airfare and the 
calculated as exp(0.365)-1))  than the LCC level.  The gap between the FSCs 
nd LCCs is similar if I consider only the morning flights, departing between 9 am 
 again, that there 
However, for the airlines studied here, based on the punctuality statistics form the UK 
CAA, there is no clear increasing or decreasing trend in average punctuality statistics 
on the three country-pairs over the period studied. The punctuality of airlines is a 
major factor of the quality of their service for consumers. Based on the UK CAA 
punctuality data, there appears no reason to argue that this aspect of quality of service 
has changed significantly over the 2-year period studied in this chapter. 
Piga and Bachis (2007) show that airfares depend a lot on the booking scenario. The 
earlier before the departure the ticket is booked, the lower is the airfare. I show similar 
finding in Figure 3.3. This tendency is evident both in the case of the LCCs and, to a 
bit smaller extent, also in the case of the FSCs.  
The results about the FSC airfare premium and the effects of booking time are further 
confirmed based on a simple pooled OLS regression model, given in Table 3.5 and 
3.6. The dependent vari
regression accounts also for city-pair specific fixed effects. It is evident from Table 
3.5 that, after accounting for booking day and city-pair specific effects, the FSCs still 
have on average about 86 per cent higher airfares (calculated as exp(0.63)-1)) than the 
LCCs.   However, note that, if a shorter period April 2003 to December 2004 is used 
instead, then the similarly calculated FSC premium is lower. Then it is 44 per cent 
higher (
a
and 12 noon. Then it is 48 per cent. The results in Table 3.5 confirm,
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is significant price discrimina across d nt consu based e of 
purchase of the ticket.  
The airfare premiums of individual airlines over the airfare of BMIbaby, conditional 
o king scenario, period a -pair effe re shown ble 3.6 ident 
 eff (e.g. so rlines 
oncentrating on more high premium city-pairs) does not explain the differences 
 two groups is still 
t
 
Table 3.2. Average one-way airfare by main LCCs and FSCs, in £s  
Mean Sd Median Max
aby 45 8 44.7 91.5
tion iffere mers, on tim
n boo nd city cts, a  in Ta . As ev
f ble, accounting for the city-pa ecificrom this ta ir sp ects me ai
c
between LCCs and FSCs: the large airfare difference between these
here.  
Airlines 
BMIb .1 11.
Ryanair 39 36.1 145.5
 53.7 2.4 51.6 117.1
 69.9
424.9
.8 14.3
Easyjet 1
MyTravelLite 31 2 29.8.7 8.
Aer Lingus 90.9 74.5 60.2 
BMI 60.6 26.5 50.6 153.3
 109.1 77.6 77.4 412.3
 81.9 38.0 73.1 197.9
 58.6 12.0 56.4 110.1
BA
KLM
Lufthansa*
Note: Period is 2003-2005. *Lufthansa flights are codeshare flights. 

Table 3.3. Ave  air inati  £s
Airlines  nds Irelan
40.8 

rage one-way
Netherla
fares by dest
Belgium 
54.0 
on country, in
d 
  
BMIbaby  55.9 
Ryanar  32.4 35.5 40.3 
   
te   31.7 
 90.9 
4 53.5 51.2 
 Airways   81.3 129.2 
   
Easyjet  54.8
MyTravelLi
Aer Lingus  
 
 
BMI 70.
British
KLM  
59.7  
81.9
Lufthansa   58.5 57.8 
Note: flights to and from UK, period 2003-2005. Due to small number of  
available price observations airline Buzz is excluded from Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 
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 Table 3.4. Productivity, costs and punctuality of airlines  
 Airline Punctuality of 
flights (%)*, 
2003-2005 
Passengers per 
employee** 
(BA=100), 
2005 
RPK per 
employee** 
(BA=100), 
2005 
Labour costs per 
employee*** 
(BA=100), 2005 
Bmibaby 60.5   72 
Ryanair 72.8 1910 600 82 
Easyjet 69.9 1049 331 98 
Aer Lingus 60.5 312 156  
BMI 58 317 69 67 
100 100 
138 
53 130 
BA 54.1 100 
KLM 55.4 116 118 
Lufthansa  72 
T
m
hese statistics are calculated based on data from: * -  UK CAA (short-haul flights to/from UK, 10 
ain airports, average over  the 3 country pairs studied, 2003-2005), ** - IATA WATS, *** ICAO.      
PK  revenue passenger kilometres. Punctuality is measured as the share of flights that are on time or 
ax 15 minutes late. 
R
m
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Figure 3.3. Aver  s
Note: horizontal axis measures day ooking and 2005.  
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Table 3.5. Full service mium 
 Dependen
log(averag
 
Explanatory variable
r 
s Coeff. 
 
Robust  st. err. 
Full service carrie dummy 
 
0.632*** (0.009) 
Booking scenario dummies: 
D_10 days before departure 
 
-0.076***
 
(0.013)  
* 
 
 
D_14 days before departure 
D_17 days before departure 
-0.165**
-0.206***
(0.013) 
(0.016) 
D_21 days before departure 
re 
-0.267*** (0.013) 
D_28 days before departu -0.324*** (0.013) 
D_35 days before departure -0.34** (0.013) 
D_42 days before departure -0.36*** (0.013) 
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D_49 days before departure -0.375*** (0.013) 
D_56 days before departure 
Citypa
-0.405*** (0.013) 
ir dummies:   
 
on-Groningen 0.001 (0.022) 
 
oven * .021) 
erry county  .025) 
don-Shannon  .027) 
ds-Brussels area ** .021) 
s-Amsterdam area *** .018) 
_Midlands-Dublin area 0.172*** (0.02) 
_Edingurgh-Glasgow-Dundee to Brussels 0.107*** (0.022) 
Amsterdam area 
D_Leeds-Hull to Dublin 0.057*** (0.018) 
Cork 
anchester-Liverpool-Blackpool to 
 
-0.027* (0.016) 
_Newcastle-Teesside to Dublin -0.018 (0.016) 
_Bristol-Cardiff to Cork 0.291*** (0.017) 
_Bristol-Cardiff to Dublin 
eriod dummies 
0.37*** 
YES 
(0.021) 
 
o. of Obs. 13699  
D_London-Amsterdam area 
D_ Lond
0.065*** (0.016) 
D_London-Knock 0.524*** (0.024) 
D_London-Cork 0.263*** (0.02) 
D_London-Dublin -0.011 (0.016) 
D_London-Eindh 0.106* (0
D_London-K 0.129*** (0
D_Lon 0.17*** (0
D_Midlan 0.429* (0
D_Midland 0.434 (0
D_Midlands-Knock -0.145*** (0.022) 
D_Midlands-Cork 0.056** (0.022) 
D
D
area 
D_ Edingurgh-Glasgow-Dundee to 0.6*** (0.015) 
D_ Edingurgh-Glasgow-Dundee to Dublin 0.017 (0.017) 
D_Southa-Bournem to Dublin 0.202*** (0.025) 
D_Manchester-Liverpool-Blackpool to 
Amsterdam area 
0.358*** (0.015) 
D_ Manchester-Liverpool-Blackpool to 0.085*** (0.019) 
D_ M
Dublin
D
D
D
P
N
F-test 251.13  
rob > F 0.000  
-squared 0.51  
P
R
Note: *** significant at 1 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, * significant at 10 per cent level. Period: 
ata. Pooled least squares regression. 
y into port leve n airfares. The highest average 
are in London C rt, Br port and Birmingham airport. E.g. 
 airport has ce hig rage airfares than London Gatwick.  
fore, London City  exclud  the regression analysis in Section 
2003-2005. Monthly route-airline-booking scenario level d
 
I also looked briefl UK air l differences i
airfares ity airpo istol air
London City about twi her ave
There airport is ed from
3.7. 
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 Table 3.6 Airfare premium for different airlines 
 Dependent variable 
 log(average price) 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Robust  st. err. 
Airline dummies:   
Ry * 
Easyjet *** (0.0
MyT 7*** (0.0
Ae *** (0.0
*** (0.0
ooking scenario dummies YES  
City-pair dummies YES  
anair -0.139**
0.221
(0.011) 
13) 
ravelLite -0.31 25) 
r Lingus 0.538 14) 
BMI 0.274 16) 
BA 0.729*** (0.014) 
KLM 0.544*** (0.019) 
Lufthansa 0.293*** (0.019) 
B
Period dummies YES 
No. of Obs. 13699  
F-test 294.5  
Prob > F 0.000  
R2 0.5  
Note: OLS regression. *** significant at 1 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, * significant at 10 per 
regression. Comparison group is the airline BMIbaby: the coefficients for different airlines show their 
(conditional) price premium over the price by BMIbaby. 
 
Table 3.7. Average prices by 4 types of airlines 
Type of airline Log average 
price 
St. error of log average 
price 
Log median 
price 
cent level. Period: 2003-2005. Monthly route-airline-booking scenario level data. Pooled least squares 
Continuer 3.686 0.432 3.679 
Enter and Exit 3.36* 0.314 3.328 
Exiting incumbent 3.887 0.401 4.002 
Enter and Stay 3.714 0.466 3.694 
*Note: averages over all city-pairs. The low average and median price by these airlines that enter and 
e corresponding 
od studied. An enter and exit type airline 
nters a city-pair after April 2003 and exits before June 2005.  An enter and stay 
type airline enters a city-pair after April 2003 and exists also at the end of the time 
exit as well on a city-pair is due to dominance of the LCCs among this group. Th
average for the enter and exit group FSCs was significantly higher: 3.97.  
 
In Table 3.5, the carriers on the 25 different city-pairs are divided into 4 different 
types, based on data from April 2003 to June 2005. These are: i) continuing 
incumbent, ii) entering and also exiting firm, iii) entrant that stays in the city-pair, iv) 
incumbent that exits the city-pair. A continuer airline exists on a city-pair at the 
beginning and at the end of the time peri
e
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period studied. An exiting incumbent is an airline that provides its services on a city-
ese airlines that enter and exit soon is due to 
ominance of the LCCs among this group. The corresponding average for enter and 
e
In order to test the hypotheses about the effects of an increase in competition on 
pair level price equations. The studied dependent variable is different in different 
 
.     (3.14) 
In Equation (3.14) the dependent variable y  is depending on specification either: 
1) city-pair level median or average monthly airfare; 
2) city-pair level upper-bound monthly airfare (see below for definition); 
3) or city-pair level across-carrier variation in airfare (see below for definition). 
Note that all these price variables are calculated separately for each booking scenario 
b. The upper-bound airfare on a city-pair is calculated (for each month) as follows: 
at first for each route-carrier combination an average (arithmetic mean or median) 
pair at the beginning, but not any more at the end of the studied period.  
I find that exiting incumbents have the highest average airfares among these 4 groups. 
This group has a high share of FSCs. Those entering the city-pairs have on average 
lower airfares, however, not necessarily lower than the continuing airlines. The low 
average and median price by th
d
xit type FSCs was significantly higher. 
 
3.6 Methodology  
moments of across-carrier price distribution (as derived in Section 3) I estimate city-
specifications of the model. The empirical model is the following (r denotes city-pair, 
b booking scenario, and t month): 
rbtrbtrttbrrbt XEy HJEWOD cc 
rbt
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airfare is calculated. The maximal (minimal) airfare on a city-pair is then simply the 
largest (smallest) average airfare among the route-carrier combinations within that 
e 
 
di
Shapiro (2009). Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) study determinants of price 
discrimination and some of the competition proxies they use are similar to the ones in 
this chapter. Their dependent variable is a route and airline level Gini coefficient of 
airfares that measures the dispersion of airfares within each studied airline. My study 
concentrates on a different topic and therefore on a different dependent variable, on 
investigation of across-airline airfare differences.  
Vector  in Equation (3.14) indicates competition-related key control variables on 
city-pair.  The across-carrier variation in airfare is then simply defined as a differenc
between this maximal and minimal airfare.
39
 Note that this dependent variable is
fferent from the one used in a recent study of price dispersion by Gerardi and 
E rt
city-pair (market) r at time t. rbtX  is a vector of other city-pair specific control 
variables. tW  denotes time-specific effects, rD  city-pair specific and bO  booking 
scenario specific effects. 
The key proxies of competition used in vector rtE  include: 
a) Herfindahl index of carriers market shares in the city-pair (based on number of 
flights) ; 
b) Number of competitors active on the city-pair; 
c) Entry dummy (route level entry) indicating occasions of entry
40
 of airlines on 
routes within a city-pair. 

39 Or alternatively, it was calculated as a ratio of this difference to the median price on the city-pair.  
40 Note that these entry dummy is defined based on entry on routes within a city-pair. Therefore entry 
of an airline, already operating on a route within a city-pair, to another route within this city-pair is 
considered as entry.  Entry of airlines on a city-pair means an increase in substitutability between 
travelling options, thus the expected sign of it should be negative in all the specifications.
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These three variables are used separately, in order to avoid the multicollinearity 
problem, as they are correlated with each other. Hence, for each dependent variable, 
3.8). Based on Hypotheses 1 to 
ry dummy to have negative 
tions 
wit rice distribution as dependent variables.  A usual problem 
wit
the
I es
effe
city
inv
FE
x 
x rage seat capacity (total available seats divided by total number of 
s the Plümper and Troeger (2007a, 2007b) 3-stage 
 
ls. The Plümper and Troeger (2007a, 2007b) model is 
ing the 
ther 
fixed effects estimates for the time-varying variables. For more 
three different main models were estimated (see Table 
3, I would expect the number of competitors and ent
coefficients and Herfindahl index to have positive coefficients in all the specifica
h different moments of p
h these kinds of competition proxies is their possible endogeneity. I try to deal with 
 endogeneity issue, to an extent, by using also the GMM approach. 
timate different versions of Equation (3.14). First version is a standard panel fixed 
cts (FE) model that includes only the competition proxy, period dummies and 
pair-booking day fixed effects. Second specification adds also some other time-
ariant controls that may affect the moments of airfare distribution, to the standard 
 model: 
Number of all UK airports serving the destination; 
x Number of flights on a given month in the city-pair; 
Log of ave
flights) on the city-pair. 
The third specification estimate
fixed effects (FE) model, where also some time-invariant controls have been
included as additional contro
a vector decomposition model that extends the standard FE model by allow
researcher to estimate the effects of time-invariant in one single model toge
with standard 
information on this method see Section 3.7.2.  
The additional time-invariant controls included in this specification are:  
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x Dummies for main departure regions: South England, North England, Midlands, 
Scotland; 
x Booking scenario dummies; 
x Destination country dummies. 
Other variables that are not included in the baseline specification, but have been tried 
during the robustness tests, are: 
x Interaction terms of competition proxies with booking scenario dummies; 
x Number of routes within the city-pair (this shows within-citypair substitution 
possibilities). 
As an alternative to number of flights, I have also tried the total number of passengers 
instead of the number of flights as an explanatory variable. However, the number of 
flights may be a preferable one, as it is less dependent on current airfares. The flight 
schedules are determined some months before the actual flights. The number of 
passengers
41
 on the city-pair is, however, much more dependent on current airfares, it 
is simultaneously determined with airfares.  
Number of UK airports serving the destination shows either the effects of general 
product substitutability or the popularity of the destination (e.g. as in Piga and Bachis 
an indicator of larger competition, then its sign could be positive in specifications 

2007). It may show the effects of a larger number of (indirectly) competing routes, i.e. 
larger substitutability between routes and, hence, more competition. Also, this 
explanatory variable might indicate the importance and popularity of each destination 
city, which may be related to its population size/market size.  If this variable is more 
an indicator of popularity of the destination (i.e. an indicator of strong demand) than 
41 Total number of passengers on the city-pair could also be an indicator of the size of the market for 
flights on a given city-pair. Market size is related to the toughness of competition, it can be also seen as 
a broad proxy for the extent of competition (e.g. in Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). See also Annex 3.1. 
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where average or maximal price are used as the dependent variable. If it is more an 
indicator of extent of indirect competition, then I would expect it to have a negative 
part from these, the 3-stage FE model includes a set of time-invariant dummies and 
period dummies as explanatory variables.
42
 Booking scenario dummies enable to 
al prices decrease monotonically with an 
 booking the flight and date of departure. To 
competition proxies I also use GMM 
t first I present the results from the fixed effects (FE) models and in the next section 
lso the results based on the system-GMM approach (system GMM, as developed by 
lundell and Bond 1998, Bond 2002). Some descriptive statistics of variables used in 

sign in all specifications, just similarly to the expected sign of the number of 
competitors. Average seat capacity variable could help to account for possible 
changes or across-citypair differences in size of the aircraft used. 
A
study whether the average and maxim
increase time difference between date of
check whether there are, ceteris paribus, destination country (Ireland, Belgium, 
Netherlands) or UK departure region specific effects, I include the destination and 
departure region dummies. 
Finally, in order to allow for endogeneity of the 
specification (Blundell and Bond 1998) to investigate the relationship between 
competition and different moments of airfare distribution (see Section 3.7.2). 
 
3.7 Econometric results 
3.7.1 Standard fixed effects model  
A
a
B
the regression analysis are given in Annex 3.4.   
 
42 Unlike the standar
used here, en
d FE, the version of FE model (Plümper and Troeger 2007a, 2007b) that is also 
ables to consistently estimate the effects of time-invariant dummy variables (booking day 
ummies, etc), while sti e-i t cross-section specific control variables by 
using the cross-section specific fixed effects.
d ll accounting for other tim nvarian
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The coefficients of main competition proxie he standard FE model are given in 
able 3.8 and 3.9. ncludes the specifica th o ompetition 
roxies, period dum ies and city-pair fixe ects ntrols. le 3.9 includes 
xed effec s I accoun for any other city-
ecific time-in : e.g. dist etw n airports, existence of travel 
ptions with alterna t n (e.g. E  train  etc.    
3.8. Main reg standard o ship between competition and 
ifferent moments o price dis
ependent variable odel 3 
s from t
T  Table 3.8 i  tion wi nly the c
p m d eff as co  Tab
also other time-varying controls. By using 
air sp
fi t t 
p variant effects ance b ee
o tive forms of transporta io urostar ),
 
 
 
able T
d
ression results: 
f across-carrier 
FE, relati
n 
n
tributio
odel 1 D Regression statistic M Model 2 M
Ln(across-carrier 
ariation in median 
price)rbt
  
v
  
 Herfindahl indexrt  2.105
(1.357) 
  
 Number of competitors on .078 
rt-1
.07) 
.05 .06 
the city-pairrt
 -0
(0.063) 
 
 Entry dummy   -0
(0
.195** 
 R2 0.06 0 0
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 000 
n(across-carrier 
 
rice)rbt
0.
 L
variation in average
p
    
 Herfindahl in exrt 1.817 
) 
  d
(1.328
 Number of competitors on 
rt-1  
.063) 
.03 .08 
the city-pairrt
 -0.036 
(0.061) 
 
 Entry dummy   -0
(0
.198***
 R2 0.04 0 0
 Prob>F 0.000 
odel 1 
0.000 000 
ependent variable odel 3 
0.
D Regression statistic M Model 2 M
Ln(upper-bound 
rice on the city-
r)rbt
p
pai
    
 Herfindahl indexrt *** 2.906
(0.643) 
  
 Number of competitors on **  -0.093  
the city-pairrt (0.04) 
 Entry dummyrt-1   -0.09* 
(0.047) 
 R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(median price on     
city-pair)rbt
 Herfindahl indexrt 2.345*** 
(0.666) 
  
 Number of competitors on  -0.072*  
 Entry dummy
the city-pairrt (0.037) 
rt   -0.019 
(0.026) 
 R2 0.07 0.09 0.06 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(average price on     
city-pair)rbt
 Herfindahl indexrt 2.604*** 
(0.526) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.098*** 
(0.025) 
 
 Entry dummy   -0.058* 
 R 0.10 0.12 0.09 
rt-1
(0.032) 
2 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 No of obs 2399 2399 2233 
Note: robust standard errors clustered at city-pair level are in parentheses. Standard FE model. On
period dummies and citypair-booking day fixed effects are included as additional controls in eac
ly 
h 
model. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent level. These 
03 to June 2005. Only these city-
resented in the airfare dataset. 
However, this airline is excluded because it is flying only under codeshare agreements 
on the three studied country-pairs (incl. a codeshare agreement with BMI). Codeshare 
results are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where the number of airlines active on a city-
pair is at least 3.  
 
I include only these periods and booking scenarios into regression analysis for which I 
have both the low-cost carriers and full service carriers airfare data available. 
Therefore the period studied here is from April 20
pairs that had at least 3 carriers competing on them were included. However, I did also 
robustness checks of these results by including city-pairs with just 2 competitors.  
Also, data of airfares and flights on routes originating from London City airport or by 
Lufthansa airline are excluded from estimating all of the regressions below. London 
City airport is more oriented towards business travellers and has therefore often higher 
airfare observations in the dataset than other airports. To keep the flights within city-
pairs relatively comparable, the flights to and from this airport need to be excluded.  
Among other FSCs, Lufthansa is significantly rep
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agreement means that it is not flying on a route itself, it is selling tickets to other 
airlines flights under the Lufthansa brand name.
43
  
One problem with studies on the effects of competition is that the coefficients of 
ect.  
site argument could be that both entry and exit and thus change in 
petitors takes time in this sector, and these decisions of carriers are not 
n only price ple of months. Although I observe quite a number 
f months, it is still a  I can inc  the egression analysis. 
herefore, the caus  of this s  is m ely to  entry and 
umber of competit ices than the oth .  
x, h wever, is much more
 on prices an dex is based on ma s. 
able 3.9. Regressio dard FE with additional time-varying control 
on and different moments of across-carrier 
rice distribution 
competition proxies may show just correlation, and not necessarily the causal eff
However, an oppo
number of com
ased ob s from last cou
o  just a 2-year-period th t lude in  r
T ality in the case tudy ore lik  run from
n ors to pr er way
Herfindahl inde
epend
o  likely to be endogenous. Market shares 
d d Herfindahl in rket shares of firm
 
T n results: stan
variables, relationship between competiti
p
Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(across-carrier 
variation in median 
price)rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 4.859*** 
(1.588) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.085 
(0.064) 
 
 Entry dummy rt-1   -0.186*** 
(0.063) 
 R2 0.08 0.06 0.07 
 Prob>F 
egressi
0.000 
odel
0.000 
odel
0.000 
odelDependent variable R on statistic  1  2  3 M M M
 Ln(across-carrier 
ariation inv
price)
 average 
rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 3
(1
.907** 
.688) 
  
 Number of com
the city-pair
petitors on 
rt .066) 
ry dummyrt-1  

 -0
(0
.037  
 Ent   -0.195***
(0.057) 
 
43 However, the main
change if Lu
 qu litative findings about the c petition v les in Tab e 3.6 and 3.7do not 
fthansa and City airport are included.
a om ariab l
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 R2 0.13 0.14 .7 0
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
ependent variable odel 1 odel 3 
0.000 
D Regression statistic M Model 2 M
Ln(upper-bound 
rice on the city-
pair)rbt
  
p
  
 Herfindahl indexrt *** 3.739
(0.764) 
  
 Number of competitors on ** 
 0.09 0.07 
 -0.077  
the city-pairrt (0.034) 
 Entry dummyrt-1   -0.081* 
(0.038) 
 R2 0.09
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ln(median price on     
city-pair)rbt
 Herfindahl indexrt 2.705*** 
(0.965) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
rt
 -0.056***  
 Entry dummy
the city-pair (0.04) 
rt   -0.01 
(0.026) 
 R2 0.06 0.07 0.04 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(average price on     
city-pair)rbt
 Herfindahl indexrt 3.064*** 
(0.653) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.081*** 
(0.021) 
 
 Entry dummy   -0.05* 
 R 0.11 0.10 0.07 
rt-1
(0.025) 
2 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 No of obs 2399 2399 2233 
Note: robust standard errors clustered at city-pair level are in parentheses. Standard F
control variables are included in all regressions. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significa
E model. Other 
nt at 5 per cent; 
*** significant at 1 per cent level. These results are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where 
 
The majority of the coefficients of competition proxies in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 are 
both statistically and economically significant. For example, an increase in number of 
competitors on a city-pair is associated with 8-10 per cent fall in upper-bound prices 
and average prices, and 6-7.5 per cent fall in the median of prices. The result 
concerning the upper bound of airfares on a city-pair is in accordance with predictions 
from Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Syverson (2004b) concerning the truncation 
effects of competition on price distribution. The coefficients of competition proxies in 
the number of airlines active on a city-pair is at least 3.  
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the FE specification have expected signs. However, in the case of the simplest 
standard FE specification, only the route-level entry is the competition proxy that is 
 can be seen from
 
the R
2
s of my regression analysis, competition proxies 
he 
of effects of market demand density on across-producer price 
t 3 active airlines flying on them. 
However, I checked these results also by including the city-pairs with just 2 
statistically significantly related to lower across-airline price dispersion. 
As can be seen from the comparison of these last two Tables, adding other control 
variables does change some of the coefficients magnitudes.  In the case of price 
dispersion measures as dependent variables, inclusion of other controls affects also the 
statistical significance of the estimates. The estimated effect of change in Herfindahl 
index on productivity dispersion becomes larger and statistically significant only if 
other additional controls are included in the regression equation. 
Notably, as
explain only a rather small share of the overall variation of airfare distribution 
moments. The R
2
s in Table 3.8 have values between 0.04 and 0.12. The within-R
2
s 
are in each estimated model, however, significantly larger than the overall R
2
s shown 
in Tables 3.8 and 3.9.  
The small values of R
2
s may be not too surprising. These indicate that there are many 
unobserved factors affecting the across-airline differences in airfares. These results are 
also not too surprising if compared to a related study by Syverson (2007) about t
effects of product substitutability on output price distribution. He studied across-
producer output price distribution in the ready-mixed concrete sector in the US. In his 
regression analysis 
dispersion, Syverson (2007, page 211) reports very low R
2
s that lie between 0.000 
and 0.121. 
I conduct several checks of the robustness of my results. My findings that I have 
presented here are based on city-pairs that had at leas
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competitors. In this case, the effects on price dispersion are significantly smaller than 
in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 and sometimes not significant. The truncation of price 
dis u ems to be taking place, for quite 
obv titors. 
As mper and Troeger (2007a, 
 is that the coefficients of main 
m a shorter time period (2003-2004). 
no (2008) we would expect 

trib tion from above due to tougher competition se
ious reasons, more for these city-pairs that have at least 3 different compe
an additional robustness check I estimate also the Plü
2007b) 3-stage FE model. The outline of this method and the results are given in 
Annex 3.5 and 3.6.  
My main finding based on the 3-stage FE model
control variables are similar to these in the standard FE specification. More 
competition is associated with lower price dispersion, lower maximal airfares and 
lower median or average airfares within a city-pair.  
Some further robustness tests tend to confirm these findings (see Annex 3.6). Based 
on the 3-stage FE specification, I conduct three additional robustness tests by:  
i) use of quarterly data instead of monthly data; 
ii) using data of morning flights (departing from 9 am to 12 noon) only; 
iii) using data fro
These are summarized in Annex 3.6. These results again show that increase in 
competition within a city-pair market is associated with lower price dispersion, upper-
bound prices and average prices within that market. 
As an additional robustness check I have also investigated the correlation between 
market size and airfares. According to Melitz and Ottavia
larger market size
44
 (i.e. larger number of potential passengers) to be associated with 
tougher competition and thus lower cost and price dispersion across firms. This 
implication can be derived from Equation (3.13). Based on Equation (3.13) we can 
44 In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) the market size is measured by change n number of consumers (L), in 
Syverson the effects of market demand is measured bases on number of consumers per geographic size 
of the market. 
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conclude that, the derivative dc*/dL has a negative sign. Higher market size (L) results 
in lower survival cost cut-off (c*), and therefore also lower cost and price dispersion 
on a larger market.  
A related implication is based on Syverson (2004a) who develops a heterogeneous 
producer version that extends the standard Salops circular market model of 
competition. An implication from his modelsee Annex 3.1 for an outline of these 
of time-invariant variables in the 3-stage FE 
model are mostly as expected.  As indicated earlier by Piga and Bachis (2007), I find 
also in the 3-stage FE model that the average and median price on a city-pair falls 
This tendency holds also in the case of the upper-bound airfares on a city-pair.  
highest on city-pairs originating from Southern and Central England. I find also a 
effectsis that higher demand density is associated with lower upper bound prices 
and lower price dispersion across producers on a market.  
However, the results in Table A3.8 in Annex 3.7 provide no strong support for these 
predictions. Larger market size on a city-pair, as measured by number of passengers, 
is associated with lower average price level on that city-pair. At the same time, it is 
not associated with lower airfare dispersion. The coefficient of market size (number of 
passengers) in a model with upper-bound price level as dependent variable is as 
predicted by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Syverson (2004a) models, but it is not 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. Also, one has to stress that 
the FE specification in Table A3.8 does not account for likely endogeneity of market 
size. This is very likely to bias the estimated effects of change in market size. 
The results concerning the effects 
monotonically with an increase in the days between the booking day and departure.  
On average, the city-pair upper-bound, median and average airfares are higher in 
South and Central England than in North England or Scotland. Price dispersion is the 
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small positive effect of an increase in number of UK airports serving the destination 
city on the airfare distribution moments.  I.e. increase in popularity of the destination 
3.7.2 Robustness checks: Dynamic (system)-GMM approach 
s in estimating the relationship between competition and 
airfare distribution with fixed effects specification. Although the FE model allows for 
and other control variables as endogenous. FE model is appropriate if one believes 
the part of the error term (in Equation 3.14) that is correlated with right-hand side 
If this is not the case, then FE method does not identify the causal effects of an 
correlation between some proxies of competition and moments of price distribution. A 
solution would be to use external or internal (e.g. lags of endogenous variables) 
Potential solutions (with their own pitfalls) to both the endogeneity problem, omitted 
variable bias and to a lack of good external instruments, that are often used to 
conclude a bit more about the causal effects, are either the difference or system GMM 
(Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998, Roodman 2009a, Roodman 
2009b). These two estimators allow us to treat some right-hand-side variables as 
potentially endogenous. They use appropriate lagged levels and/or differences of the 
dependent variable and of the independent variables as internal instrumental variables.  
is positively related to average and median price, upper-bound price level and across-
airline price dispersion on a city-pair.  
There are several problem
fixed city-pair specific effects in Equation (3.14), it does not treat competition related 
that the number of competitors, entry of airlines, etc, are strictly exogenous, and that 
they do not depend on airfares on the city-pair. Also, FE model is only appropriate if 
variables can be included as a fixed effect.  
increase in competition on moments of price distribution. It shows simply the 
instrumental variables.  
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The GMM methods also allow for cross-section specific fixed effects and enable the 
researcher at the same time to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems and omitted variable bias. Note that when I use (the one step) GMM
45
, the 
Equation (3.14) is now estimated in its dynamic version, with lagged dependent 
variable included among the explanatory variables: 
 
rbtrbtrtrbttbrrbt XEyy HJEOWOD cc 1 .    (3.15) 
As system GMM uses more instruments than the difference GMM there are some 
important problems related to using it with a dataset that has a relatively small number 
of groups (i.e. city-pairs in our case) and relatively large number of periods. In this 
monthly dataset, the number of periods (T) is 27 in the regression analysis. However, 
the GMM estimators are designed especially for panels with relatively short time 
R odman 2009a, 2009b
46
).  In that case the instruments can overfit 

dimensions, and by default they generate instruments sets whose number grows 
quadratically in T ( o
endogenous variables, failing to exclude their endogenous components and biasing 
coefficient estimates. Meanwhile, they can degrade the usability of the Hansen J test 
for joint validity test of those instruments (Roodman 2009b). Therefore, I keep the 
overall number of instruments (lagged levels and differences of dependent variable, 
competition related endogenous variables, number of flights) smaller than the 
45 The system GMM (Blundell and Bond 1998) is an extension of Arellano-Bond difference GMM 
model. As it is considered to be superior to difference GMM method in terms of efficiency, I use here 
the system GMM approach. It has been also pointed out that the difference GMM suffers often from 
weak instrumentation (Blundell and Bond 1998, Roodman 2009a).   
I report the one-step system GMM estimators results (accounting also for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation) of estimating (3.15), as the standard errors associated with the two-step estimators tend 
to be significantly downward biased, as noticed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
46  E.g. if number of periods T = 3, difference GMM may generate only one instrument per 
instrumented variable, and system GMM only two. But as T grows the number of instrument can grow 
large relative to the sample size. Too many instruments can overfit endogenous variables and therefore 
fail to remove their endogenous components (Roodman 2009b). 
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number of groups.
47
 This is the suggested rule-of-the thumb from the literature 
ie  flights on the ci nd aria e 
ification instrumented with lagged two and/or three periods. Hansen 
ver-identifying tes d, with a p-value s arge as 0.  in most 
s. The Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation is accepted 
with a p-value greater than 0.1 in all but one specification. Based on these statistics, 
ost of the empirical models in Table 3.10 seem
49
 
able 3.10. Summar res sult ects o
fe -carrier price distribution 
Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(Roodman 2009b).
48
  
Competition prox s, total number of ty-pair a  price v bles hav
been in each spec
o t is not rejecte at least a  l 1
specification
m  to be correctly specified.   
 
T y table of the system GMM reg
rent moments of across
sion re seff f 
competition on dif
Dependent variable 
Ln(across-carrier 
ariation in median 
price)rbt
    
v
 Herfindahl index 6.539*** 
(1.53) 
  
 Number of competitors on the city-
pair
.169 
(0.15) 
 
) 
 ontrol variables included YES YES YES 
 
Entry dummy 
 -0  
   -0.311
(0.756
 Period variables 
Other c
YES YES YES 
 Hansen test of over-identification, p-
value 
0.161 0.421 0.544 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 1st 
differences, p-value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 2nd  
ifferences, p-value 
 
n in average 
rice)rbt
    
d
0.910 0.398 0.783 
 Ln(across-carrier
variatio
p
 Herfindahl index
.55) 
   6.23*** 
(1
 ber of competitors on the city-  
.164) 
 
 Entry dummy   
) 

Num
pair 
-0.125 
(0
 -0.28 
(0.492
 
ion in 47 I use the collapse opt xtabond2 command in Stata, and also limit the number of lags used, so 
ot all possible lags are 
 When the number of i  than the number of groups the Sargan/Hansen test may be 
eak and high p-value ase he va f the G sults 
(Roodman 2009b).
lts in Table 3.10 are indeed sensitive to how many lags are used. For example, the 
coefficient of Herfindahl index varies a lot depending on that. 
n
48
used. 
nstruments is greater
w on the Hansen test might not in that c  show t lidity o MM re
49 However, the resu
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 Period variables YES YES YES 
ables included ES ES 
 Hansen test of over-identification, p- 0.193 0.205 
 Other control vari YES Y Y
value 
0.185 
 ano-Bond test for AR(1) in 1  0.001 0.000 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 2nd  
ue 
0.456 0.499 
ependent variable: l 1 l 2 l 3 
Arell st
differences, p-value 
0.000 
differences, p-val
0.614 
D Regression statistic Mode Mode Mode
Ln(upper-bound 
price on the city-
air)rbtp
    
 3.595***   Herfindahl index 
(0.589) 
 rs on the city-  -0.137***  
ntry dummy .262 
(0.17) 
ES ES 
 Other control variables included YES YES 
- .282 .406 
Number of competito
pair (0.042) 
 E   -0
 Period variables YES Y Y
YES 
 Hansen test of over-identification, p
value 
0 0.125 0
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 1st 
differences, p-value 
.000 0.000 
st for AR(1) in 2nd  
n(median price on 
city-pair)rbt
0 0.000 
 Arellano-Bond te
differences, p-value 
0.763 0.454 0.544 
L     
 Herfindahl index 1.235 
(0.87) 
  
 Number of competitors on the city-
pair 
 -0.048* 
(0.027) 
y
 
 Entry dumm  
(0.293) 
 Period variables YES YES YES 
 Other control variables included YES YES YES 
  -0.01 
 Hansen test of over-identification, p-
value 
0.237 0.226 0.265 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 1st 
differences, p-value 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 2nd  
differences, p-value 
0.246 0.375 0.777 
Dependent variable: Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(average price on 
city-pair)rbt
    
 Herfindahl index 2.771*** 
(0.42) 
  
 Number of competitors on the city-
pair 
 -0.106*** 
(0.027) 
 
 
(0.253) 
 Period variables YES YES YES 
 Other control variables included YES YES YES 
 Hansen test of over-identification, p-
value 
0.1 0.04 0.199 
 Entry dummy   -0.181 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 1st 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 2
differences, p-value 
 No of obs 2233 2233 1671 
nd  
differences, p-value 
0.122 0.26 0.791 
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Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at city-pair level are in parentheses. Other control variables 
dummies. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent level. 
These results are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where the number of airlines active on a 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM estimates reported are one-step results. I collapsed the 
large T and relatively limited number of cross sections). This is available in the Stata command 
xtabond2 (Roodman, 2009a). In all the reported specifications the count of instruments is smaller than 
the number of cross-section groups (citypair-booking scenario combinations). 
 
Note, that the GMM results are qualitatively relatively similar to these with the FE 
models in previous tables. Accounting (to an extent) for endogeneity affects the 
estimated size of the effects of competition. Now, entry of airlines on routes within a 
city-pair has a negative, but not significant, effect on
(except time invariant variables) are included in these regressions. All regressions include time 
city-pair is at least 3. The equations are estimated using the dynamic panel data model based on 
instruments to limit the instrument count (as suggested in Roodman 2009b for samples with relatively 
 both across-carrier price 
a 
ity-pair have still the expected and significant effects on the upper-bound airfares on 
ll in Herfindahl concentration index and an increase in 
ult in lower average and upper-bound of airfares. 
The magnitude of these effects is different from the FE model (see also Table 3.9). 
Notably, whereas the entry at route level within a city-pair has the same sign as in the 
FE model, this effect on different moments of airfare distribution is not any more 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels. 
In general, also the results of the GMM model are broadly consistent with 
implications from heterogenenous producer models of competition. Tougher 
competition tends to be associated with lower upper-bound of airfares. However, the 
significance of the results depends on the choice of proxy of changes in competition. 
 
variation measures used. However, the fall in Herfindahl index (i.e. increase in 
competition) within a city-pair is associated with a fall in price dispersion. The 
coefficient of Herfindahl index is statistically significant, also if the robust and 
clustered standard errors are used. Herfindahl index and number of competitors on 
c
a city-pair market. Both the fa
number of competitors appear to res
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3.8  Conclusions  
This paper studies the relationship between competition and price distribution, 
endeavouring to explain the persistent across-firm price variation within separate 
markets of a single industry. For that I use a case study of the European airline sector 
 flights between UK and Ireland, Belgium and Ireland. The paper concentrates on the 
effects of competition-driven selection process among airlines operating on each city-
pair (i.e. the reallocation effects across firms within the sector), resulting in effects on 
price distributions of airlines.  These effects are outlined in recent heterogeneous 
producer competition models (incl. Melitz and Ottaviano 2008, Syverson 2004a).  
Based on a unique airfare dataset, I find some evidence that tougher competition on a 
city-pair is associated with truncation of across-firm price distribution from above. I 
show that tougher competition tends to be associated with lower upper-bound of 
prices on a city-pair, and also lower average airfares and less price variation on a city-
indings about competition 
pair. The results found are broadly consistent with implications of Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008) or Syverson (2004a). These results based on price data may give us 
information about the effects of competition on productivity or cost distribution of 
firms on different spatial markets (city-pairs). The (average) prices that airlines charge 
function in this case study to some extent as a proxy for costs or (inverse of) 
productivity of firms on different spatial markets. The f
lowering the price dispersion and upper-bound prices within-city-pairs can possibly be 
due to similar effects on cost and productivity distribution. They can appear due to 
competition-induced selection process lowering the cost and productivity dispersion 
and lowering the upper-bound cost level (i.e. increasing the lower-bound of 
productivity distribution) of firms in separate city-pair markets.  
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Note that our results are related to these of Syverson (2007) who studied the effects of 
changes in product substitutability and demand density among ready-mixed concrete 
plants in the US. Our results show that these non-trivial effects of competition 
ould be testing the implications from recent heterogeneous producer 
competition models in a cleaner research environment where one can more credibly 
identify the causal effects and separate fully the different channels of the effects: i.e. a 
study based on natural experiment framework. 
Another caveat in the analysis is that the flights of different airlines on the same city-
pair may be not as good substitutes for each other as assumed in this chapter. Then, 
one would need to use quality-adjusted prices for each airline in similar analysis, in 
order to account for quality and service differences across airlines. For that, one would 
need a lot of detailed and accurate route and airline level data about quality of service. 
As my results showed, differences in competition explain only a small share in 
variation of airfares across airlines on a city-pair. Heterogeneity of service (incl. 
unobserved heterogeneity) is still a likely explanatory factor of large share of these 
differences. 
(product substitutability) on price distribution can be more general. These are likely to 
exist also in a service sector that has relatively small number of competitors, and are 
not specific only to the ready-mixed concrete production.  
It should be stressed, though, that the aviation sector has a small number of 
competitors on each market (city-pair). Hence, the effects of strategic interactions 
(which are not covered in the models studied here) between airlines cannot be ruled 
out. Strategic interactions on participants in an oligopolistic market may affect the 
different moments of across-airline price dispersion on a city-pair. An extension of 
this study c
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Annex 3.1: Heterogeneous cost version of Salop 
(1979) competition model: implications about the 
effects of market size and market demand density 
on output price distribution 
 
Hypotheses regarding the role of the size of market demand and spatial competition in 
shaping the across-firm output price distribution can be derived based on Syversons 
(2004a) heterogeneous cost version of Salops (1979) spatial competition model.
50
 
Notably, the mechanism that brings about entry of additional firms and increase in 
producer substitutability is different in Syverson (2004a) compared to the Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008) framework. 
In Syverson (2004a), the producer substitutability increase is brought about by a 
specific mechanism, by an increase in market demand (and as the size of market area 
is fixed in his model, by an increase in demand density). The particular comparative 
static of interest is different in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Syverson (2004b) 
models. The comparative static of interest in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model 
was dc*/dȖ, the change in survival cost cut off due to change in product 
substitutability parameter (Ȗ).  
In Syverson (2004a) the comparative static of interest is dc*/dD, the change in market 
demand. A rise in market demand will raise the expected value of entry into the 
market, which then will increase the number of producers willing to cover the entry 
cost to the market. Increase in entry and number of competitors will raise the producer 
substitution possibilities for consumers on the market and, hence, will make the 

50 Homogeneous producer versions of spatial competition models, or their multi-flight extensions, are 
often used in IO papers studying the effects of liberalisation in airlines sector. For example, in Schipper 
et al. (2007), Carlsson (2004). 
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survival of high-cost (and high-price) producers more difficult (i.e. it lowers the 
producers survival cost cut-off c* on the market). 
Hypotheses regarding the role of market demand (per market area) from the 
heterogeneous costs extension of Salop model by Syverson (2004a): 
Hypothesis 1. Larger market demand results (via increase in substitutability between 
carriers) in lower average airfares on a given route. 
Hypothesis 2. Larger market demand results (via increase in substitutability between 
carriers) in lower upper-bound of price distribution on a given route. 
Hypothesis 3. Larger market demand results (via increase in substitutability between 
carriers) in lower price variation across carriers on a given route.
51
  
In the Syverson (2004a) model, entry of carriers depends on the expected value of 
entry. The expected value of entry will be higher in routes where the demand density 
is higher. 
The Syverson (2004a) model includes two stage entry and production decision of 
producers that have heterogeneous costs and the consumers choosing among the 
differentiated products e.g. a flight on a given time in, for example, 24-hour interval.  
Consumers are identical, except (in our case) for their preferences about departure 
time, and are in terms of their preferred departure times evenly distributed around a 
circular market, a time interval. This circle time interval has unit circumference with 
density of D consumers per unit length of the interval (e.g., per one day). 

51 Obviously, Hypotheses 2 and 3 can be studied only in routes where there was initially more than one 
carrier.
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The departure times of flights are located on this circular time interval and spaced in 
equal time distance from each other. The headway between each flight is equal to the 
length of the market divided by the total number of flights offered in the market. 
Consumer derives gross utility v  from taking the trip, and faces a price pi.  He suffers 
disutility tx if he has to choose a departure time (or alternatively: an arrival time) that 
is different from his ideal time. Here, x is difference between consumers ideal and the 
actual departure time. The disutility increases linearly in x. The price that each 
consumer faces, is thus equal to the airline price p plus disutility from delaying his 
flight, that is: .  txpp  '
The supply side is modeled here as a two-stage simultaneous entry game, where at 
first (initially similar) potential entrants consider the entry decision. If they enter the 
market, a sunk cost s has to be paid. These who choose to enter, receive each an 
individual marginal cost ic  from a distribution of marginal cost g(c) within the limits 
of [0, ], where Mc  is the upper bound of cost distribution. The ones that enter the 
market observe their own cost, but not that of others. Then in the following stage the 
airlines that entered decide whether or not to start the production (given the expected 
number and costs of their competitors). The airlines will face a common fixed cost of 
production f (also a sunk cost). After paying it they will receive a place, randomly at 
evenly spaced locations on this circle (the circle has circumference equal to 1, thus 
distance between producers is 1/n), and set their factory price p
Mc
i. Then the 
consumers make their buying decisions based on . 'p
We will examine equilibria where there will be a consumer between any two 
neighboring airlines that is indifferent between buying from either of the two. The 
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location of that indifferent consumer depends on the prices ip , jp  and his 
tility tx . 
 For any two neighboring airlines i and j, the 
disu
indifferent consumer will be at distance 
from plant i, where  solves the equality
producers at the doorstep of the consumer.  
jix , jix ,  condition (3.16) of prices of these two 
¹¸©¨   jijjii xntptxp ,,        (3.16) 
·§ 1
purchases from i. If he buys at all, i.e. if his net utility from buying is larger than 0. 
The consumers that are further away, buy from j. If we assume that all custom
itors j and k is 
Equation (3.16) can be solved for jix ,   - the address of consumers indifference 
between two adjacent airlines in terms of their departure times.  
Any consumer on the line between i and j, who is closer to carrier i than jix ,  
ers have 
net utility from buying the ticket larger than 0, then total quantity sold by airline i 
between compet Dxx kiji )( ,,  , its market share is thus .  
A costs,
)( ,, kiji xx 
ssuming that firms do not know others  )()( ,, kiji xExE  , and this coupled 
with solving (3.16) for jix ,  yields: 
.
1
2
1
2
)(
)()()( ,, ¹¸
·
©¨
§   
n
E
t
ppE
xExExE iikiji     (3.17) 
Here E(p) is the expected price charged by other firms. The expected profit of an 
airline i is thus given simply as: 
.)(
1)( ppE
i
ºª ·§
))((2)( fDcp
n
E
t
fDcpxEE ii
i
iii »¼«¬ ¹¸©¨  S  (3.18) 
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Each carrier chooses its price pi to maximise its own (expected) profits. Taking the 
first order condition of (3.18) with respect to price pi gives us the optimal price for 
plant i: 
  .
1
2
)(
2
1
2
1
¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
n
E
t
pEcp       (3.19) 
Thus an airlin
ii
es optimal price on a route is increasing in expected price charged by 
its competitors, customers disutility coefficient t from having to delay their flight, and 
its own marginal cost.  
From equation (3.19) we can then take expectations and compute the competitors 
expected prices as a function of the expected costs and equilibrium number of 
competitors: 
.
1
)()( ¹¸
·
©¨
§ 
n
tEcEpE        (3.20) 
Then substituting (3.19) and (3.20) into the expected profit function (3.18) gives us 
the mark-ups per unit (3.21), and exp
cost, expected cost of other producers and the expected number of producers in the 
market: 
ected profits (3.22) in terms of producers own 
iii
t
cEcp )(
1   c
n
E
2
11
22
¹¸
·
©¨
§
,      (3.21)  
.
1
2)(
4
)( fc
n
tEcE
t
E ii »¼«¬ ¹¸©¨ S      (3.22) 
2
D ºª ·§
ual with 0: 
The survival cut-off cost c
*
 (i.e. firms with ci >c
*
 decide not to produce as it is not 
profitable, and exit) can be found from the zero expected profit condition, setting 
(3.22) eq
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.
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§  S      (3.23) 
Cut-off cost is higher the smaller is the expected number of competitors.  
As the next step, the maximized operating profits are found as a function of 
parameters, the cut-off cost c* and producers own cost (by substituting (3.23) into 
(3.22)): 
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Only these producers that get marginal cost level resulting in positive profits (i.e., c  
c*) choose to service the route in equilibrium. Others do not; they do not earn 
operating profits and lose their sunk cost. Thus this means that the expected payoff 
f er cost distribution g(c), conditional upon 
. Here V
e
 is 
equal to expected operating profits before getting to know ones own marginal cost 
minus the sunk entry cost. Thus c* solves: 
rom paying s is the expectation of (3.24) ov
drawing c c*. This expected payoff is affected by the cut-off cost level c*. Free 
possible entry of plants results in the following (Syverson 2004a): the equilibrium c* 
must set the net expected value of entry into the industry, V
e
, equal to zero
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Note that the expec
4
2
»« Dt
ted value of entry depends on demand density D in the market, i.e. 
s on sunk 
costs of entry s, so if entry gets easier (
e
the number of potential customers in a given time interval. It also depend
s gets smaller), then V  gets larger. 
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Comparative Statics of Changes in Demand Density 
in the sign of derivative dc*/dD. That is, how the change in demand 
the upper bound of costs of the 
producers). This derivative can show also the effects on survival price cut-off of the 
price distribution.  
 function theorem to Equation (3.25) we can write: 
We are interested 
density affects the cut-off cost level c* (i.e. 
By applying the implicit
.
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DV
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e
e
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The negative of the numerator in (3.26) is, after simplification: 
         (3.26) 
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and it is positive. 
The denominator in (3.26) is, after simplification: 
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which is also positive.  
Thus dc*/dD < 0, and c*, the cut-off level of the producers cost distribution 
decreases as demand density increases. This has implications for both cost and output 
price distribution across producers on the market. High cost, and thus also high prices 
are not sustainable in the dense market environment.  
The truncation of the cost distribution from above means also truncation of the output 
price distribution from above.  Thus in denser markets the average and upper bound 
output price levels are lower than in markets with less market density. When market 
density is low, inefficient producers are protected from rivalry from lower-cost and 
low-price competitors and can operate profitably in equilibrium.   
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The higher demand density makes it tougher for high-cost firms to survive, because 
increase in market demand induces additional entry of producers and, thus, consumers 
on the market can find lower cost substitutes of the product more easily than before. 
This increase in substitutability between producers will lower the survival cost and 
rice cut-offs, resulting in the truncation of cost and price distributions from above. 
The main intuition behind the main result (dc*/dD < 0) is that an increase in demand 
density (D) raises the expected value of entry , this induces entry of new carriers 
into the route, increasing substitutability between airlines, i.e. competition gets 
tougher, and resulting in a fall in the survival cost cut-off c*. High-cost/high-price 
airlines find it now more difficult to hold their customers. This cost-based selection 
process eliminates relatively high-cost (inefficient) carriers from the market, 
truncating both the equilibrium production-cost distribution and equilibrium price 
distribution from above. This means lower average price, less price variation across 
carriers and lower upper bound of the price distribution on a given route. 
 
p
eV
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Annex 3.2: Routes within the 3 largest city-pairs  
 
Table A3.1. Routes within the 3 largest city-pairs  
City-pair London-Amsterdam London-Brussels London-Dublin 
Routes 
within 
the city-
pair 
London City  Amsterdam 
London Gatwick   
Amsterdam 
London Heathrow  
Amsterdam 
London Luton  Amsterdam 
Stansted  Amsterdam 
London City  Rotterdam 
Southend  Rotterdam 
London Gatwick    
Rotterdam 
Heathrow    Rotterdam 
Stansted    Rotterdam 
Gatwick  Brussels 
Heathrow  Brussels 
Stansted  Ostend 
Stansted  Charleroi 
Stansted  Maastricht 
London City  
Antwerp 
London City  
Brussels 
Stansted  Brussels 
Heathrow  Maastricht 
 
London City  
Dublin 
Gatwick- Dublin 
Heathrow   Dublin 
Stansted  Dublin 
Luton  Dublin 
 
 
 
Note: routes serviced during 2003-2005. 
 
Defining the overlap of routes 
In its 2002 RASCO survey the UK Department for Transportation (DfT) has 
conducted analysis about the size of catchment areas of UK airports (RASCO 2002). 
This survey includes, among other issues, also some information about the overlap of 
catchment areas of airports in UK in year 2000. It provides some catchment area 
maps, produced using the DfTs National Airport Accessibility Model (NAAM) and 
published in the annex of Catchment  Analysis of the 2002 survey:  
These maps of catchment areas show, separately for each UK airport, the geographic 
location of the modelled demand in the UK in terms of number of trips to the airport 
from different CAA planning regions. Also, these maps indicate which regions are 
one and two-hour trip away from the airport. These maps enable to get a general 
overview which airports are broad substitutes for each other and which are not.  
In DfTs approach, the catchment area is calculated as the area within either:  
1) an average one-hour, or 
2) an average two-hour travel time radius.  
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Annex 3.3: Entry and exit on routes in the 3 largest 
city-pairs 
 
Table A3.2. Entry and exit on routes in the largest 3 city-pairs 
 Number and names of entrants Number and names of exiters  
 
 
 
Period: 
London-
Amsterdam 
area 
London-
Brussels 
area 
London-
Dublin 
London-
Amsterdam 
area 
London-
Brussels area 
London-
Dublin 
July-Dec 
2002 
3 entries: 
(Easyjet, 
KLM, 
KLM) 
 1 entry: 
(Aer 
Lingus) 
2 exits: 
(TTA, 
VLM) 
1 exit: 
(Virgin) 
 
JanJune 
2003 
2 entries: 
(KLM, 
Transavia) 
1 entry: 
(Ryanair) 
 1 ‘exit’ due to 
merger: 
(Buzz) 
1 exit: 
(KLM) 
 
July-Dec 
2003 
1 entry: 
(BA) 
2 entries: 
(BA, 
SN Brussels)
3 entries: 
(Aer 
Lingus, 
Cityjet, 
Cityjet) 
1 exit: 
(City Flyer) 
3 exits: 
(City Flyer, 
United 
Airlines, 
VLM) 
3 exits: 
(City Flyer, 
Aer Lingus, 
Aer Lingus) 
JanJune 
2004 
1 entry: 
(Transavia) 
(1 entry: 
Cyprus 
Airways*) 
2 entries: 
(BMI/ 
Bmibaby, 
BMI/ 
Bmibaby) 
1 exit: 
(Transavia) 
5 exits: 
(Ryanair, 
VLM, 
Ryanair, 
VLM, 
Cyprus 
Airways) 
1 exit: 
(Air Luxor) 
July-Dec 
2004 
1 entry: 
(KLM) 
 1 entry: 
(EUJET) 
 2 exits: 
(Ryanair, 
BA) 
 
JanJune 
2005 
4 entries: 
(KLM, 
VLM, 
VLM, 
KLM) 
1 entry: 
(Air Exel) 
 5 exits: 
(EUJET, 
KLM, 
KLM, 
VLM, 
United Airlines)
1 exit: 
(Air Exel) 
3 exits: 
(Cityjet, 
EUJET, 
Aer Lingus) 
Note: entry is defined as a first scheduled operation of an airline on an airport-pair (i.e. on a route). 
The number of entries (exits) during a period on a city-pair, is simply the sum of entries (exits) on 
different routes belonging to that city-pair.  
Entries and exits of relatively large carriers are given in bold script. 
Names of low-cost-carriers are underlined. 
City Flyer is owned by British Airways, CityJet is subsidiary of Air France. Eujet ceased all its 
operations in June 2005. *Cyprus Airways is in codeshare with Belgian Airlines (earlier SN Brussels). 
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Annex 3.4: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A3.3. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max
 
Log (average price) 3.996 0.541 2.842 6.052
Log (median price) 3.888 0.577 2.595 6.167
Log (across carrier 
price variation 1)* 
3.588 1.220 0 5.952433
Log (across carrier 
price variation 2)** 
3.583 1.173 0 6.075
Log (maxima of 
average price on a 
city-pair)* 
4.235 0.584 2.959 6.052
 
Log (maxima of 
average price on a 
city-pair)** 
4.145 0.619 2.646 6.170
Number of airports 
serving the destination 
20.720 6.601 1 30
Entry dummy  0.147 0.354 0 1
 
Exit dummy  0.152 0.359 0 1
Log (number of 
passengers on a city-
pair) 
11.07 0.995 8.231 12.967
Number of 
competitors on a city-
pair 
3.808 1.362 3 10
H-index (based on 
number  of 
passengers) 
0.427 0.118 0.198 0.732
H-index (based on 
number of flights) 
0.380 0.097 0.186 0.699
Note:  *calculated based on average price, **calculated based on median price.  
Descriptive statistics are given for these observations where the number of competitors  
on a city-pair is at least three) 
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Annex 3.5: Robustness checks I: three-stage FE 
regression results, coefficients of main competition 
proxies and other controls  
 
As an additional robustness check I estimate the Plümper and Troeger (2007a, 2007b) 
3-stage FE model. Unlike the standard FE model, the 3-stage FE model enables to 
estimate the effects of time-invariant and rarely time-varying control variables (e.g. 
booking scenario, country and region dummies, etc). For estimating this 3-stage FE 
model I use a user-written procedure xtfevd, developed by Plümper and Troeger 
(2007a, 2007b).  
The main idea of the Plümper and Troeger (2007a, 2007b) 3-stage FE model (xtfevd) 
is similar to an earlier method developed by Oaxaca and Geisler (2003).  xtfevd 
command in Stata estimates a three stage panel fixed effects vector decomposition 
model that allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables and efficiently 
estimates almost time-invariant explanatory variables within a panel fixed effects 
framework.  The first stage in this 3-stage FE estimation procedure estimates a pure 
fixed effects model to obtain an estimate of the unit effects. The second stage 
decomposes the fixed effects vector into a part that is explained by the time-invariant 
and almost time-invariant variables and an unexplainable part - the error term of the 
second stage. The third stage re-estimates the original model by pooled OLS, 
including the time-invariant variables and the error term of the second stage.  This 
third step assures to control for collinearity between   time-varying and invariant right 
hand side variables, and adjusts the degrees of freedom (Plümper and Troeger 2007a). 
For more discussion about the method see Plümper and Troeger (2007a) or Breusch et 
al. (2010). 
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Note that in the case of time-varying variables this estimator produces estimates that 
tend to be close to the classical fixed-effects estimates, i.e. compare Table A3.4 and 
Table 3.9. The majority of the results from the 3-stage FE are both statistically and 
economically significant. For example, an increase in number of competitors on a 
city-pair is associated with 8 per cent fall in upper-bound prices, 5.7 and 8.5 per cent 
fall in median price and average price. However, the route level entry indicators are 
not statistically significant. 




Table A3.4. Summary table of the 3-stage FE regression resultseffects of 
competition on different moments of across-carrier price distribution (with time-
varying and time-invariant other controls included) 
Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(across-carrier 
variation in median 
price)rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 5.141*** 
(0.92) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.085** 
(0.028) 
 
 Entry dummy rt-1   -0.126 
(0.184) 
 R2 0.80 0.77 0.78 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Ln(across-carrier 
variation in average 
price)rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 4.917*** 
(0.838) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.037 
(0.059) 
 
 Entry dummyrt-1   -0.193 
(0.125) 
 R2 0.80 0.76 0.77 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(upper-bound 
price on the city-
pair)rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 3.742* 
(2.163) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.077*** 
(0.011) 
 
 Entry dummyrt-1   -0.05 
(0.064) 
 R2 0.62 0.59 0.59 
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 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dependent variable Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(median price on 
city-pair)rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 2.726** 
(1.276) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.056*** 
(0.008) 
 
 Entry dummyrt-1   -0.01 
(0.027) 
 R2 0.55 0.52 0.51 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dependent variable: Regression statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(average price on 
city-pair)rbt
    
 Herfindahl indexrt 3.074*** 
(0.904) 
  
 Number of competitors on 
the city-pairrt
 -0.082*** 
(0.005) 
 
 Entry dummyrt-1   -0.052 
(0.032) 
 R2 0.62 0.62 0.57 
 Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 No of obs 2399 2399 2233 
Note: robust standard errors clustered at city-pair level are in parentheses. 3-stage FE model. Other 
control variables are included in all regressions. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; 
*** significant at 1 per cent level. These results are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where 
the number of airlines active on a city-pair is at least 3.  
 
As expected, also the 3-stage FE model shows that the average price on a city-pair 
falls monotonically with an increase in the days between the booking day of ticket and 
the departure.  This holds also in the case of the upper-bound airfares on a city-pair 
(see Table A.3.5).  
On average, the city-pair upper-bound, median and average airfares are higher in 
South and Central England than in North England or Scotland. Price dispersion is the 
highest on city-pairs originating from Southern and Central England. I find also a 
small positive effect of an increase in number of UK airports serving the destination 
city on some of the airfare distribution moments.  I.e. increase in popularity of the 
destination is positively correlated with average and median price, and across-airline 
price dispersion on a city-pair.  
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Table A3.5. Coefficients of control variables in the three-stage FE regression
relationship between competition and different moments of across-carrier price 
distribution 
 Dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln(across-
carrier 
variation in 
median price) 
Ln(across-
carrier 
variation in 
average price) 
Ln(max. 
price) 
Ln(median 
price) 
Ln(average 
price) 
Herfindahl index 5.141*** 
(0.92) 
4.917*** 
(0.838) 
3.742* 
(2.163) 
2.726** 
(1.276) 
3.074*** 
(0.904) 
Number of UK airports 
serving the destination 
-0.009 
(0.024) 
0.043** 
(0.022) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
0.021** 
(0.01) 
Ln(number of flights on a 
city-pair) 
-0.009 
(0.6) 
-0.029 
(0.621) 
-0.569 
(0.411) 
0.522 
(0.403) 
-0.563 
(0.356) 
Ln(average seat capacity) 0.705*** 
(0.265) 
0.746*** 
(0.223) 
0.112 
(0.577) 
0.018 
(0.339) 
-0.016 
(0.241) 
Dummies for UK departure/arrival regions (Central England is the comparison group): 
Northern England -0.29 
(0.752) 
-0.275 
(0.711) 
-0.288*** 
(0.049) 
-0.227 
(0.029) 
-0.255*** 
(0.02) 
Southern England 0.247 
(0.287) 
0.436 
(0.273) 
-0.029 
(0.019) 
0.117*** 
(0.011) 
0.037*** 
(0.01) 
Scotland -0.772*** 
(0.18) 
-0.538*** 
(0.17) 
-0.513*** 
(0.011) 
-0.247*** 
(0.007) 
-0.397*** 
(0.005) 
Booking scenario dummies: 
D_10 days before 
departure 
-0.118*** 
(0.045) 
-0.102** 
(0.042) 
-0.09*** 
(0.002) 
-0.095*** 
(0.002) 
-0.087*** 
(0.01) 
D_14 days before 
departure 
-0.023 
(0.041) 
-0.039 
(0.038) 
-0.124*** 
(0.003) 
-0.163*** 
(0.002) 
-0.145*** 
(0.001) 
D_17 days before 
departure 
-0.478*** 
(0.07) 
-0.51*** 
(0.06) 
0.2*** 
(0.003) 
-0.126*** 
(0.002) 
-0.133*** 
(0.002) 
D_21 days before 
departure 
-0.154*** 
(0.067) 
-0.166*** 
(0.064) 
-0.221*** 
(0.004) 
-0.273*** 
(0.002) 
-0.241*** 
(0.002) 
D_28 days before 
departure 
-0.253*** 
(0.066) 
-0.369*** 
(0.062) 
-0.31*** 
(0.004) 
-0.334*** 
(0.002) 
-0.312*** 
(0.002) 
D_35 days before 
departure 
-0.205*** 
(0.045) 
-0.193*** 
(0.04) 
-0.305*** 
(0.003) 
-0.333*** 
(0.002) 
-0.314*** 
(0.001) 
D_42 days before 
departure 
-0.307*** 
(0.045) 
-0.316*** 
(0.042) 
-0.361*** 
(0.003) 
-0.368*** 
(0.002) 
-0.353*** 
(0.001) 
D_49 days before 
departure 
-0.263 
(0.055) 
-0.3*** 
(0.052) 
-0.372*** 
(0.003) 
-0.392*** 
(0.002) 
-0.369*** 
(0.001) 
D_56 days before 
departure 
-0.431*** 
(0.092) 
-0.46*** 
(0.089) 
-0.465*** 
(0.005) 
-0.452*** 
(0.003) 
-0.442*** 
(0.002) 
Country dummies ( the comparison group is Netherlands): 
Belgium  1.20*** 
(0.314) 
1.969*** 
(0.293) 
0.579*** 
(0.02) 
0.306*** 
(0.012) 
0.284*** 
(0.009) 
Ireland  2.21*** 
(0.04) 
2.015*** 
(0.038) 
0.231*** 
(0.002) 
-0.081*** 
(0.001) 
-0.01 
(0.001) 
R2 0.80 0.80 0.62 0.55 0.62 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No of Obs 2399 2399 2399 2399 2399 
Note: robust standard errors clustered at city-pair level are in parentheses. 3-stage FE model. * 
significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent level. These results 
are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where the number of airlines active on a city-pair is at 
least 3.  
 
  
135 

Annex 3.6: Robustness checks II 
 
Some further robustness tests with the 3-stage FE model results tend to confirm our 
findings from Annex 3.5.  I conduct three main types of robustness tests by:  
i) use of quarterly data instead of monthly data; 
ii) using data of morning flights (departing from 9 am to 12 noon) only; 
iii) using data from a shorter time period (2003-2004). 
These are summarized in the following Table A3.7. The majority of results confirm 
the findings from the regression table sin this chapter. 
The first robustness test uses quarterly data instead of monthly data. One problem in 
previous Sections of this chapter might be that the results are based on monthly 
information. This means that we are considering relatively short-term effects. The 
effects on equilibrium productivity and prices in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), 
however, may need some time to materialise. Therefore it is crucial to test our 
findings based on more aggregate time periods.  
Note from Table A3.7 that most of the results based on quarterly data are statistically 
significant and have similar sign as based on the monthly dataset.  The magnitude of 
these effects can, however, vary somewhat from these estimated in Annex 3.5. 
Also, it may be reasonable to assume that an early morning flight on the same day and 
a late evening flight are not always substitutes for each other. Therefore, next I 
concentrate on only morning flights departing between 9 am and 12 noon and exclude 
all other flights from analysis. This way I am comparing more comparable products 
across different airlines.  Again, the results are relatively similar to the benchmark in 
Annex 3.5. 
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Finally, I test whether the findings are driven by our choice of the particular time 
period of studyfrom April 2003 to August 2005. Therefore, I drop all observations 
from, alternatively, year 2005 or year 2003 and run the same regressions again. If I 
exclude year 2005 from analysis, then the coefficient of Herfindahl index is 
significantly smaller than in the case of the whole period. Also, it is not significant if 
airfare dispersion is the dependent variable. I.e. the effect of change in concentration 
is, for example, in the case of price dispersion measures about 40-50 per cent lower. 
The same tendency of smaller effect is evident also in the case of some other moments 
of price distribution and other competition proxies.  
 
Table A3.7. Robustness checks of results of 3-stage FE model: coefficients of proxies 
of competition  
  Specification (FE) 
Dependent variable (in 
logs) 
 
Competition proxy 2003-2005 2003-2004 Quarterly 
data, 2003-
2005 
Morning 
flights 
(2003-
2004) 
Price dispersion 1 Herfindahl index 5.141*** 3.072 5.323** 5.628 
Price dispersion 1 No. of competitors -0.085 0.022 -0.105 -0.118 
Price dispersion 2 Herfindahl index 4.917*** 2.624 5.636** 5.114 
Price dispersion 2 No. of competitors -0.037 -0.034 -0.146 -0.079 
Upper bound price Herfindahl index 3.742* 2.935* 3.715** 3.635*** 
Upper bound price No. of competitors -0.077*** -0.039*** -0.111** -0.071*** 
Median price Herfindahl index 2.726** 0.621 2.921 1.474 
Median price No. of competitors -0.056*** -0.016*** -0.086* -0.006* 
Average price Herfindahl index 3.074*** 1.8*** 3.016*** 2.121** 
Average price No. of competitors -0.082*** -0.029*** -0.113*** -0.031*** 
Note: regression coefficients are from the 3-stage FE model, heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at city-pair level were used. Other time-varying and time-invariant controls, as described in 
Section 3.7.1, are included in all regressions.  * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; 
*** significant at 1 per cent. These results are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where the 
number of airlines active on a city-pair is at least 3. Price dispersion 1 is calculated based on median 
airfares. Price dispersion 2 is calculated based on average airfares. 
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Annex 3.7: Robustness checks III: correlation 
between market size and moments of airfare 
distribution  
 
Table A3.8. Relationship between number of passengers and different moments of 
across-carrier airfare distribution: standard FE model,  
Dependent variable Regression statistic Coefficient 
Ln(across-carrier variation in median price)rbt Number of passengersrt 0.379 
(0.253) 
 Overall R2 0.07 
 Within-R2 0.21 
Ln(upper-bound price on the city-pair)rbt Number of passengersrt -0.117 
(0.124) 
 Overall R2 0.05 
 Within-R2 0.20 
Ln(median price on city-pair)rbt Number of passengersrt -0.281*** 
(0.105) 
 Overall R2 0.03 
 Within-R2 0.17 
 No. of obs. 2399 
Note: robust standard errors clustered at city-pair level are in parentheses. Standard FE model. Only 
period dummies and citypair-booking day fixed effects are included as additional controls in each 
model. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent level. These 
results are calculated for a sub-sample of observations where the number of airlines active on a city-
pair is at least 3.  
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Chapter 4  
Effects of Liberalisation on Airline 
Passenger Traffic: An Event Study 
of the Enlargement of the EU and 
the Single European Aviation Market 
4.1 Introduction 
How large is the increase in industry output, productivity or other performance 
measures after a liberalisation event in a sector, relative to the counterfactual case if 
no liberalisation took place? The evidence presented in the literature
52
 about the 
effects of liberalisation in the aviation sector and elsewhere is often limited because it 
is difficult to find out, how the sector would have developed in the absence of these 
changes.  
This chapter provides an empirical assessment of the economic effects of deregulation 
of the aviation sector, based on an event study of the enlargement of Single European 
Aviation Market (SEAM) and European Union (EU) in 2004. To my best knowledge, 
this is the first study of the effects of the SEAM enlargement in 2004 on economic 
performance of the airline sector. It employs a recently developed extension to the 
difference-in-differences method (by Abadie et al. 2009).  

52 For example: Borenstein (1989), Dresner and Tretheway (1992), Gonenc and Nicoletti (2000), Marin 
(1995), Martin et al. (2005), Schipper et al. (2002), Ng and Seabright (2001). 
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I use volume of passenger traffic and revenue passenger kilometres (RPK, i.e. number 
of paying passengers*kilometres flown) on a country-pair or route as outcome 
variables to measure these economic effects. These two are standard output measures 
of the airline sector. The main reason why I use traffic as a proxy for economic 
performance of the sector is the availability of data. In the case of traffic figures one 
can employ a large dataset that has large number of observations and covers both pre- 
and post-2004 period.  
The main finding is that after the enlargement of the SEAM, already by the end of 
2004, passenger flows on affected routes grew 80-106 per cent relative to what these 
would have been in the absence of the enlargement.
53
 This gap widens rapidly further 
in the following years. There is also some evidence that the effects of liberalisation in 
2004 on air traffic, in percentage growth terms, are larger than the immediate effects 
of the 1992 large-scale deregulation of aviation sector in Western Europe.
54
  
The passenger aviation industry in Europe is a particularly suitable sector for studying 
the effects of the changes in the competitive environment of the firms. It has 
witnessed large regulatory changesin Western Europe in 1992 (and 1997) and in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 2004. The liberalised aviation markets in the EU 
and US are in fact big exceptions in the world. According to Pearce and Smyth 
(2007), only 17 per cent of international air traffic in the world is conducted in 
liberalised environment.  

53 Use of RPK as an output measure shows similar large effects. Alternatively, use of number of 
competitors on a country-pair as a dependent variable shows similar large effects.  
54 The immediate effects of liberalisation in 2004 on percentage growth of number of passengers and 
flights are much larger than some simple estimates (found using the standard least squares regression 
approach) from earlier literature about the effect of the 1992 deregulation event in Western Europe on 
number of flights (e.g. in Schipper et al. 2002). However, my results and Schipper et al. (2002) 
coefficients from simple regression analysis are not directly comparable. So, it cannot be determined 
here exactly by how much the effects in CEE in 2004 were larger than in Western Europe in 1992.
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In terms of the size of the population, the eastern enlargement in 2004 has been the 
largest enlargement of the EU so far. The 8 new members
55
 from the CEE that entered 
in 2004 were Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania. For the passenger aviation sector in these countries the enlargement of 
the SEAM (at the same time with the overall EU enlargement) meant a significant 
change in the competitive environment. Entry of airlines to routes connecting the 
affected CEE countries with Western Europe became much easier than before.  
However, identification of the effects of the enlargement of the SEAM is a difficult 
task. One standard approach would be to implement the before-after analysis based on 
the time series of only the affected country-pairs or routes. Another approach would 
concentrate on the analysis of cross-section of country-pairs. Both suffer from a 
number of econometric problems.   
Time series analysis of affected routes would ignore the construction of a suitable 
control group of untreated country-pairs and routes. It is also complicated by a 
number of other changes taking place at the same time due to the overall enlargement 
of the EU. The EU enlargement was also a positive demand shock for the airline 
industry. It meant introduction of visa-free movement of people from the CEE and 
potential positive effects on GDP growth and growth of trade with the EU countries. 
In the case of some old EU countries (e.g. UK, Ireland, Sweden) it meant also 
opening of the labour market for people from new members. All this increased the 
demand for passenger air transport in 2004 and the following years. 
Also, new members of the EU and SEAM differed in 2004 from old members in terms 
of their determinants of passenger traffic growth. Therefore, a simple comparison of 
post-2004 dynamics of passenger traffic in the new and an average of the old 

55 In addition to these, also Malta and Cyprus entered the EU in 2004. 
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members would show not only the impact of enlargement of the EU (demand shock) 
and SEAM, but also the effect of pre-2004 differences in determinants of passenger 
traffic.  
My identification approach relies, firstly, on building a suitable control group to proxy 
the counterfactual By how much would the volume of air travel to and from the CEE 
have grown in the absence of the EU and SEAM enlargements? For that I use 
difference-in-differences and its extensionthe synthetic control method (as in 
Abadie et al. 2009). Based on the change in regulatory regime in May 2004 we can 
identify a treatment group and a control group of routes.  The treatment group consists 
of routes or country-pairs connecting the CEE8 with Western Europe, and therefore 
affected by the change. The potential pool of control units can consist of routes or 
country-pairs within Western Europe.
56
 These were not affected by the 2004 
expansion of the SEAM.
57
  
The synthetic control method (SCM) by Abadie et al. (2009) enables us to include the 
possibility of non-parallel trends of the treated group and the control group of country-
pairs. It accounts for the time-varying unobservable country-pair characteristics which 
are ignored by the standard estimation methods. The main idea of the synthetic control 
approach is that a combination of control units can often provide a better comparison 
for the unit exposed to the intervention than any single unit alone. SCM provides a 
formal way to select a synthetic control for each treated unit. The synthetic control is a 
weighted average of control units that is most similar in terms of its pre-treatment 
trend to the treated unit. 

56 I.e., the EU and SEAM members before the 2004 accession round. The use of the non-EU European 
destinations as a control group is hindered here by the fact that the dynamics and scale of passenger 
traffic to the new EU members and  to many of the outside-EU Eastern European countries is very 
different. 
57 There the deregulation of the sector had taken place already in 1992 and 1997. 
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Secondly, I check whether the results are different between scheduled flights and 
charter flights. The scheduled flights were affected by both the EU and the SEAM 
enlargement, charter flights only by the EU enlargement. This difference between the 
coverage of the effect of enlargement could possibly help us in determining the 
relative roles of the overall EU enlargement and the SEAM enlargement in growth of 
scheduled flights after May 2004.
58
 It has to be acknowledged though, that this 
approach relies on a restrictive assumption that scheduled and chartered flights are 
affected similarly by the EU enlargement, and that in the absence of the enlargement 
these two types of flights would have followed similar trend over time. 
Thirdly, I use differences in the country coverage of the EU and the SEAM to further 
study whether the effects are because of the EU enlargement or the liberalisation of 
the aviation sector. For that I study also the effect of Croatias entering the European 
Common Aviation Area in 2006 (the SEAM was reorganised and renamed into ECAA 
in 2006). Croatia became a member of the SEAM in 2006 but not a member of the 
EU. That way I can in the case of the 2006 enlargement round concentrate more 
specifically on the effect of the SEAM, not on the combination of the effects of the 
SEAM and the overall EU enlargement as in the case of the 2004 enlargement round.   
4.2 Literature review 
The difference-in-differences (DID) approach is very popular in labour economics, 
starting from the seminal work by Ashenfelter and Card (1985).  It has also been 
employed before to study the effects of regulatory change. One such recent example is 
by Symeonidis (2008), who examines the impact of competition on wages and 

58 Conditional on the assumption that in the absence of the treatment in May 2004 the quantity of 
scheduled and charter passengers on routes to new member countries would have followed similar 
trend over time.
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productivity using a natural experiment created by the change in cartel laws in the 
UK in the 1950s. That change affected some industries but left others unaffected.   
The SCM by Abadie et al. (2009) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) is a new 
extension of the DID and has been previously applied to study the effects of: anti-
tobacco laws in California on tobacco consumption (Abadie et al. 2009); terrorist 
conflict in Basque Country on GDP per capita (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003); 
hurricane Katrina on labour market outcomes of evacuees (Groen and Polivka 2008); 
financial liberalisation on FDI (Campos and Kinoshita 2009); trade liberalization on 
GDP per capita (Billmeier and Nannicini 2008).    
The majority of earlier academic papers about the effects of liberalisation or market 
power in the aviation sector study the effects on (yearly) average airfares. The 
examples include: Morrison and Winston (1986), Dresner and Tretheway (1992), 
Gönenc and Nicoletti (2000), Marin (1995), Martin et al. (2005), Schipper et al. 
(2002). The general finding is that more competition and liberalisation are associated 
with lower average airfares. Ng and Seabright (2001) look also at the effect of 
competition on costs of airlines and labour rents. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) study 
the effects of entry threat of Southwest (a low-cost carrier in USA) on the airfares of 
incumbent airlines and provide some information about the effects on their capacity.  
The vast majority of studies about the impact of liberalisation events concentrate on 
the USA in 1970s or Western Europe in 1992. A paper by Schipper et al. (2002) tries 
to explore the size of the welfare effects associated with bilateral airline liberalisation 
in Western Europe. They investigate a sample of European routes during the period 
1988/92, using yearly data. Their estimated fare and frequency (number of flights) 
equations (estimated with 2-stage least squares) show that standard economy fares on 
fully liberalised routes were 34 per cent lower and the number of departures 36 per 
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cent higher than on routes without full liberalisation. However, their results about the 
effect of liberalisation on traffic and its significance vary a lot depending on which 
type of liberalisation variables are included in the estimated equation.  Once a partial 
liberalisation dummy is included, no significant effect of any type of liberalisation on 
traffic is found. Also, the number of observations that they use in their regression 
analysis is small. 
To the best of my knowledge there are no academic papers studying the effects of the 
SEAM enlargement in 2004 on air passenger traffic. The novelty of this chapter, if 
compared to the majority of earlier literature about deregulation in the airline sector, is 
the focus on analysis of the effects, using an event study approach. The few earlier 
studies about liberalisation and air traffic either provide the simple descriptive 
statistics (INTERVISTAS 2006) about the growth of traffic or rely on standard OLS 
regression analysis. Recently, the standard gravity model estimation has been used in 
some papers to examine the impact of liberalisation on bilateral air traffic. These 
papers (Piermartini and Rousova 2008, Geloso Grosso 2008, InterVISTAS 2006) use 
cross-section data of a large number of country-pairs to regress the number of 
passengers travelling on a country-pair on a set of control variables and a proxy for 
the level of regulation.  
The standard approach means ignoring several econometric problems; including the 
potential endogeneity of control variables, and the question of how to identify the 
most suitable control group for the units affected by the deregulation.  This paper 
attempts to address some of these issues, to an extent.    

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4.3 Background information and some descriptive 
statistics  
In 2004 eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
59
 and also two Southern 
European countries Malta and Cyprus became members of the European Union (EU) 
and also members of the Single European Aviation Market (SEAM).  For the 
passenger aviation sector this meant that entry of airlines with scheduled services on 
routes connecting these CEE countries with Western Europe became much easier than 
before.  There were no more restrictive bilateral agreements that had tended to favour 
the national carriers and had helped to keep airfares relatively high. Now, there was a 
free market and airlines could fly freely anywhere in the enlarged EU (and to Norway, 
Iceland and Switzerland) where they wanted.
60
 The SEAM included by 2004, in 
addition to the EU countries, also countries like Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. 
Therefore, routes to Norway were also affected by the enlargement of the SEAM. 
The simplification of entry to routes to the CEE resulted in rapid entry
61
 of low cost 
carriers (LCC) and Central and Eastern Europe became a key growth area of air traffic 
in Europe.  For example, at the end of April 2004 Easyjet started flying from Gatwick 
to Prague, on 1
st
 of May from Stansted to Ljubljana and from Luton to Budapest, in 
October 2004 from Stansted to Tallinn, Estonia.  Other LCCs like Ryanair, BMIbaby 
and Jet2 started providing their services on routes to the CEE as well. The airfares of 
these new entrants were substantially below the ones of the old full service carriers 
that had dominated these routes so far (Jones 2007).  This entry of LCCs meant an 

59 Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
60 In SEAM, every airline having licence, issued by any member state, enabling it to offer air passenger 
transport services can fly any route within SEAM and offer his services for any price that it deems 
suitable. 
61 Notably, some entry of LCCs took place also 1-2 years before the enlargement of the EU and SEAM. 
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increase
62
 in the number of passengers flown between Western and Eastern Europe, 
stronger price competition among airlines and an increase in the number of routes 
served (CAA 2006), i.e. an increase in variety of travelling options.  
Figures 4.1-4.3 confirm that there has been a very large significant and permanent 
increase in scheduled traffic between UK and the new EU and SEAM members. This 
occurs closely around the time of the enlargement of the EU and SEAM in May 2004. 
Simple before-after analysis using data series of only the new member states shows 
that number of flights from 10 main UK airports to new members was, by 2006, more 
than two times higher than before the enlargement. However, the before-after analysis 
may overestimate the effect as it does not account for the trend in air traffic, the fact 
that air traffic could have increased to some extent also without the EU enlargement. 
As expected, monthly data in figures below demonstrate the seasonal nature of 
international air traffic. 
 
Figure 4.1. Number of scheduled flights from UK to the EU15 and to the new Central 
and Eastern European EU member countries  
Source: UK CAA. 

62 Anecdotal evidence from Western Europe indicates (Calder 2002) that many customers of LCCs 
were new clients who had not flown before.
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 Figure 4.1 and 4.2 indicate some similarity in pre-enlargement trends of traffic from 
the UK to the CEE with the traffic to the EU15.  One of the next steps is to perform a 
formal test whether the pre-treatment trends are similar or not. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Number of passengers (10,000s) of scheduled flights on country-pairs 
between UK and EU15, and between UK and CEE8 
Source: UK CAA. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Number of passengers (1,000s) on country-pairs between Norway and 
EU15, and Norway and CEE8 
Source: AVINOR. 
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 A good example of the expansion in the number of routes before and after the 
enlargement of the EU is Poland. According to data from the UK CAA, in 2000 there 
were only 5 scheduled air routes between the UK and Poland. In 2006 there were 
already 27 scheduled services that linked 12 UK airports with 12 Polish cities.  This 
argement. can be related to large migration from Poland to the UK after the EU enl
Figure 4.3 reveals that the number of passengers since 2004 has grown more rapidly 
also on routes from Norway to the new members of the SEAM than on routes to the 
EU15. Interestingly, although there is already an increase in 2004, the most significant 
growth of traffic from Norway to the eight studied CEE countries takes place in 2006.  
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Figure 4.4. Labour productivity levels in the airline industry in Europe  
Note: NMS - 7 flag carriers of the new EU member states (from countries that acceded in 
2004). EU -  6 of the main full service carriers in Western Europe (BA, Air France, Alitalia, 
statistics from IATA WATS 2007 and 2002 publications. (RPK- revenue passenger 
KLM, Lufthansa, SAS). Weighted average is weighed by the employment shares. Source: 
kilometre). 
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Figure 4.4 shows how the physical productivity of the CEE flag carriers, which were 
significantly affected by the EU enlargement, has changed after the enlargement if 
compared to the full service carriers in Western Europe. Figure 4.4 gives the estimates 
of labour productivity differences between the Central and Eastern European local 
 to 100 for each productivity measure. For these airlines the 
service carriers in the EU 
low-cost airline specific business organisation. This change is likely to be related to 
carriers and the largest Western European full service carriers in 2001 and 2006. It 
shows the breakdown of the yearly labour productivity figures into the performance of 
the different groups of employees. The calculation of these standard productivity 
indicators of the airline sector follows the approach from Baily and Zitzewitz (2001). 
 In Figure 4.4, for both year 2001 and 2006,  the level of the 6 main Western European 
full service carriers is set
routes to the CEE made up only a small share of all of their routes. Therefore, they 
were less affected by the EU enlargement than the local flag carriers of the new 
member states, for whom the majority of their routes were to the EU15 countries. 
Notably, aviation enterprises from the new accession countries (Adria Airways, Air 
Baltic, Czech Airlines, Estonian Air, LOT, Lithuanian Airlines, Malev)  have rather 
high labour productivity levels if compared to the main full 
(British Airways, Air France, Alitalia, KLM, Lufthansa, SAS). The airlines of the new 
member states (NMS) of the EU have also shown substantial productivity catching-up 
over the period 2001-2006. Especially high values of labour productivity of these CEE 
airlines are in 2006 found in the case of maintenance, ground handling and cockpit 
staff, where they even surpass the level of Western European full service carriers. 
This rapid growth in productivity of airlines in new member countries is likely to be 
due to changes in their business model. Several of these Eastern European flag 
carriers (e.g. Air Baltic, Czech Airlines) have taken over (some) main ideas of the 
150 

the enlargement of the EU and the following entry of many low cost competitors 
(Ryanair, Easyjet, etc).   
Unfortunately, the productivity or cost data of airlines is available for researchers only 
at yearly and aggregate airline level. Based on these data, we cannot identify the 
effects of enlargement of the EU on productivity indicators. Therefore, I concentrate 
in this chapter on the effects of the enlargement on physical output indicators. These 
orwegian company AVINOR. 
AVINOR owns most airports in Norway and also collects aviation sector data. The 
Norwegian route level dataset was available for period from January 2003 to 
nthly frequency and covers all international routes 
ata on number of passengers, also some additional country-pair (or 
are available at route or country-pair level, and separately for the routes affected and 
the routes not affected by the enlargement of the EU.  
This chapter uses route and country-pair level panel datasets of the number of 
passengers on routes originating from the UK and Norway. UK monthly data of 
passenger numbers are taken from the website of the UK Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA).  These cover routes from the UK to the rest of the world for the period June 
2001 to April 2008. Norwegian monthly data of passenger numbers on international 
routes originating from Norway are obtained from a N
December 2006. It has mo
originating from Norway.  
This route level information of UK and Norway is then aggregated into corresponding 
country-pair level datasets. I use the sub-sample of routes and country-pairs from the 
UK and Norway to countries of the EU25 (i.e. the members of the EU after the 2004 
accession round). 
In addition to d
destination) level control variables are used as control variables. These include 
distance between origin and destination, real GDP growth rate, trade openness (ratio 
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of export and import to GDP), size of the population of the destination country. 
Distances between countries are from the CEPII database of geodesic distances. This 
old 15 EU members 
 such changes in the competitive 
nvironment.  
Treatment is here defined as accession of new member countries to the SEAM in 
2004. However, at the same time other aspects of EU enlargement have affected the 
database is available from the CEPII website. Real GDP and real GDP growth and 
population are yearly figures taken from Eurostat.  Trade openness is taken from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators Database.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Difference-in-differences approach  
The methods employed here to study how the enlargement of the European Single 
Aviation Market and the EU to the new members in May 2004 affected airline traffic 
include the difference-in-differences (DID) approach and its recent extension  the 
synthetic control method. The latter deals with some potential shortcomings of the 
DID approach. 
As a first exercise I use the standard version of the DID approach (see e.g. Meyer 
1995, Angrist and Pischke 2009), based on monthly data of number of passengers on 
route or country-pair as the outcome variable. As I work with data from more than 
two periods, I employ the regression version of the DID estimator.  
The treatment group is here defined as the routes between UK and these new CEE 
members of the EU that acceded to the EU and European Single Aviation Market in 
May 2004. The control group is routes from UK to the 
countries, as these routes did not experience any
e
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aviation sectorespeciall ening 
my empirical implementation includes a study of the effect of the SEAM enlargement 
based on Norwegian international air traffic data, as Norway is a member of the 
SEAM but not of the EU. Also, I estimate the DID effects separately for scheduled 
les of the overall EU enlargement and the SEAM 
estimated DID equation is the following: 
y, the free movement of people within the EU and op
of labour markets for people from new members in some EU countries. These meant 
an increase in demand for aviation services on routes to EU countries and especially 
to the UK and Ireland, which were the first to open up their labour markets. Therefore, 
flights and charter flights. The scheduled flights were affected by both the EU and the 
SEAM enlargement in May 2004, charter flights only by the EU enlargement. This 
difference between the coverage of the effect of enlargement can help us in 
determining the relative ro
enlargement in growth of scheduled flights after May 2004.
63
The first 
 
igtgtgtigt uxy  EDO ,      (4.1) 
where i indexes the cross-section unit (country-pair or route
64
), g indexes the group 
(treatment or control group), t time period (month). Outcome variable yigt is the log of 
number of passengers.
65
 The model has a full set of time effects tO , group effects gD , 
the policy variable gtx  that is defined to be 1 for units and time periods subject to  
policy, and cross-section unit specific error term . The coefficient
 the
igtu E  in Equation 
(4.1) gives us the standard difference-in-differences estimate of the treatment effect of 

63 Conditional on the assumption that in the absence of the treatment in May 2004 the quantity of 
scheduled and charter passengers on routes to new member countries would have followed similar 
trend over time. 
64 Route is an airport-pair. 
65 As a robustness test I also use revenue passenger kilometres (number of passengers*kilometres 
flown) instead.
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liberalisation on the outcome variable yigt. The year effects capture common period-
specific shocks, group effects show permanent difference between the outcome of the 
treatment and control group. 
Alternatively, the DID regression is specified with cross-section unit specific fixed 
effects:  
 
igtgtitigt uxy  EDO ,       (4.2) 
where gD is replaced by country-pair or route specific fixed effect iD . Note that the 
standard errors in all estimated specifications will be clustered by the cross-section 
unit (i.e. either country-pair or route) to deal with concerns with serial correlation 
(Bertrand et al. 2004, Besley and Burgess 2004, Imbens and Wooldridge 2007). 
The standard DID estimator given in Equation (4.1) or (4.2) is based on strong 
identifying assumptions. In particular, it requires that, in the absence of the treatment 
the average outcomes for the treated and control group would have followed parallel 
trends over time. Only in that case does the simple DID approach take out the 
selection bias in Equation (4.1). However, in practice, differences in observed or 
unobserved characteristics can create nonparallel outcome dynamics for the treated 
and untreated groups (e.g. Meyer 1995). 
Based on data from the pre-treatment period one can get some idea whether the trends 
of these two groups could be also different in the after-treatment period. Using pre-
treatment data one can apply a two-period DID estimator: 
 
iii Dy HDP  ' ,       (4.3) 
where the dependent variable is constructed as the differences in the outcome  variable 
for route i between two pre-treatment periods (Abadie 2008). Variable Di indicates the 
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membership of the treatment group (i.e. routes to the new member countries). The 
simple t-test of hypothesis 0 D  in Equation (4.3) is a test of the common pre-
u
treatment trend assumption. 
If there are observable variables that affect treatment and control group differently, 
one can account for that by including these country-pair/route specific covariates 
(Zigt)
66
 into the analysis as control variables: 
 
igtgtgtigt Zxy c JEDO igt      (4.4) 
hen the identification assumption is that, apart from the control variables Zigt , there 
a trol groups differentially before and 
after treatment.  The variables in vector Zigt have been chosen based on earlier 
literature on the determinants of passenger traffic (e.g. Piermartini and Rousova 
2008). These include the distance between countries in the country-pair, real GDP of 
D approach adds also country-pair (or 
d effects
T
re no other forces affecting the treatment and con
the destination country (other than UK and Norway), trade openness (ratio of export 
and import to GDP), size of the population of the destination country. 
Finally, a further robustness check on the DI
 iD and group) specific time trends to the controls. in addition to group-fixe
control variables Zigt. This is similar to the approach in Besley and Burgess 
(2004).The following to DID equations give, correspondingly, the model with group-
specific time trends (Eq. 4.5), and the model with group specific trends and additional 
control variables (Eq. 4.6): 
 
igtgtggtigt uxtcy  EDO ,     (4.5) 

66 One can also include the interaction terms between the control variables and group identifiers. 
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igtigtgtggtigt uZxtcy c JEDO ,     (4.6) 
Here   is a treatment group specific trend coefficient multiplying the time trend gc
variable, t.  Equations (4.5) and (4.6) allow the treatment and control units to follow 
different linear trends.  It is important to check if the estimated effects of interest stay 
similar after inclusion of these trends.
o d a synthetic control method 
se studies performed at the aggregate 
dies
uncertainty related to the choice of the control group.
68
  

67
4.4.2 Synthetic control method for comparative case studies 
Abadie, Diamond and Heinmueller (2009), building on the original approach of 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), have recently devel pe
(SCM) to estimate treatment effects in comparative case studies. It is an extension to 
the standard DID analysis. It relaxes the strong assumptions of the traditional DID 
approach by allowing the effects of unobservable confounding factors to vary with 
time. This means that it addresses the endogeneity problem caused by the existence of 
unobservable heterogeneity of studied units. It is a useful method especially at 
aggregate (country) level analysis when the number of observations and number of 
treated and control units is small, or when there is just one treated unit.  
Abadie et al. (2009) stress that in comparative ca
level (incl. country, region, firm level) there is no sample-based estimation 
uncertainty. The effect of policy change is measured based on information of the 
entire population (country, firm) and the aggregate is measured without error.  They 
concentrate instead on another source of uncertainty in comparative case stu
67 For example, in Besley and Burgess (2004) study about the effets of labour regulations on 
performance of firms, the inclusion of cross-section unit specific trends elimiminates the treatment 
effect found with standard DID approach. 
68 Often the standard approach is to use time series data in order to study the effects of a policy on some 
aggregate level variable. Using only data of the unit that was affected by the policy change has its 
disadvantages, as it does not use a control group. Suitable control groups would account for aggregate 
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The SCM gives a way to select a synthetic control group based on data of a number of 
potential controls. Whereas often the choice of the most suitable controls is done 
informally, Abadie et al. (2009) provide a formal way to build a most appropriate 
control group, in terms of the similarity of its characteristics to the treatment group in 
e absence of treatment. Synthetic control is found as a weighed combination of 
potential control units (e.g. c
ates s 
(and trends) of unit(s) affected by the treatment. 
This synthetic control can be used after the treatment to approximate the 
the assumption that there is a panel  of units (e.g. 
ountries) over T periods.  Only unit i undergoes the treatment
69
 at time T0 , whereas  
the remaining potential co
u
YYYY   
th
ountry-pairs not affected by the EU and the SEAM 
expansion) that most closely approxim the relevant pre-treatment characteristic
counterfactual situation of the treated unit(s)if there had been no policy change 
(treatment).  This can be done by comparison of differences in trends of the outcome 
variable after treatment between the treated unit and the synthetic control unit. 
Abadie et al. (2009) start with 1J
c
J  ntrol  units remain untreated. The treatment effect for this 
nit i at time t is:  
 
ititititit )0()0()1(W       (4.7) 
where )(lYit denotes the potential outcome: )1(itY  outcome if the unit i is treated at 
time T0, )0(itY  if it is not treated. Our aim is to estimate the vector )..., ,, 10 TiTi( WW   , i.e. 
during the after-treatment period 0Tt ! .  This means that we have to estimate the 
mi  is observed for the treated unit. Abadie 

ssing counterfactual )0(itY , as only the itY
level changes in the outcome variable between pre- and after-treatment periods that are due to other 
factors than the change in policy. 
69 I.e. if there are several units undergoing the treatment, one can estimate the effects separately on all 
these units. Or, one can aggregate the treated units into one treated unit (e.g. CEE region) and use that 
in the analysis. 
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et al. (2009) identify the treatment effects in (4.7) in the case of the following general 
model for potential outcomes: 
 
ititittit ZY HPGJO  )0(  ,      (4.8) 
ititititit ZY t WO HPGJ  )1( ,      (4.9) 
where tO is now an unknown time-specific common factor that is constant across 
nits, Zu i is a vector of observed covariates that are not affected by the policy change
70
, 
tJ  is a vector of unknown parameters, tG  is a vector of unobserved common factors, 
iP  is (in our case) a country-pair or route specific unobservable, and itH  are 
u rved transito uation (4.8) 
and (4.9) generalizes the standard DID model (as given, for example, in Equation 
(4.2)). Whereas the standard DID model restricts the effect of unobserved factors to be 
nobse ry shocks with zero mean for all i. This model in Eq
constant over time, this more general model allows them to vary with time.  
Next, Abadie et al. (2009) define a 1uJ  vector of weights ),....,( c1 J
w  and w W, i.e. a weighted average of control 
wwW  such that 
j j0t 1 ¦ . Every value of the vector 
units, is a potential synthetic control for the treated unit (e.g. country-pair) i. Then 
they define ¦   0 1Ts jsskj YkY as a generic linear combination of pre-treatment 
outcomes. They show that, as long as we can choose W* so that (for every ): 0Tt 
 
¦   
 
k YYw  and 
J
j
k
ijj
1
i
J
j
jj ZZw¦   
 
,      (4.10) 
1

70 The fact that Zi should be chosen so that it is not affected by intervention means that the researcher 
needs to use pre-treatment values of the variables (then also ruling out anticipation effects) and values 
of these variables from the after-treatment period that are not affected by intervention. 
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 then ¦
 
 
J
j 1
W  is an unbiased estimator of jtjitit YwY itW . In practical applications of 
the SCM, the synthetic control W* is selected so that the condition (4.10) above holds 
approximately: the difference between the vector of pre-treatment characteristics of 
the treated country and the vector of pre-treatment characteristics of the potential 
synthetic control is minimised with respect to W*. 
Note that the weights W* identify these units that are used to estimate the 
counterfactual. So, in our case, SCM identifies which country-pairs make up the 
synthetic control unit.  
ificance of the results is still needed.  
change in policy. 
Abadie et al. (2009) say that this inferencial exercise is exact, as regardless of the 
amount of available comparison units, time periods, or whether the data are aggregate 
In the case of comparative case studies the researcher observes a time series for a 
particular unit (treatment unit) and often has a limited number of potential control 
groups. Large sample inferencial techniques are often not suitable in such case. But 
some information about sign
Abadie and Gardeabazal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2009) address this inference 
problem by conducting a number of placebo treatment studies. They apply SCM, 
similarly to the treated unit, also on every non-treated unit available in the sample. 
This is similar to permutation tests and it enables us to assess whether the treatment 
effect estimated by the SCM for the affected unit is large relative to the effect 
estimated for a randomly chosen unit. It answers the question: How often would we 
get results of this magnitude if the researcher had chosen a unit at random for study 
instead of the treated unit? If the placebo studies generate estimates of placebo 
treatment effects of similar magnitude to our estimated actual treatment effect, then 
we would interpret this as lack of evidence of a significant treatment effect due to the 
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or individual, it is possible to calculate the exact distribution of the estimated effect of 
the placebo interventions.    
The stages of the inferencial exercise of finding out the significance of the results are 
as follows: at first the SCM is implemented based on the true treatment unit. Then a 
series of placebo studies is conducted iteratively applying the SCM for all the 
potential comparison units. In each iteration the status of treatment unit is reassigned 
to one of the control units. It is as if one assumed iteratively that units in the control 
pool would have had similar policy change as the actually treated unit at a specific 
period. At each iteration the estimated treatment effect associated with each placebo 
om all control units in terms of the 
values of its outcome variable and its predictor variables, the SCM will not succeed in 
reproducing well a similar synthetic control using the convex combination of potential 

test is computed. This placebo treatment effect is calculated as the gap between the 
values of outcome variable of the treated unit and its synthetic counterpart.  The 
iterative process provides us with a distribution of estimated placebo treatment 
effects for units where no policy change occurred. These placebo results can then be 
compared to the actual treatment effect.
71
In addition to the placebo studies, the goodness of results can be assessed based on 
pre- and post-treatment mean square prediction error (MSPE). The mean-squared-
prediction error is the average of sum of squared differences in the outcome variable 
(and its predictors) between the treated unit and its synthetic counterpart. The pre-
treatment MSPE, and its comparison with MSPE from placebo studies, indicates how 
well the SCM succeeded in finding a synthetic control that is similar to the treated unit 
in terms of the pre-treatment outcome and its predictor variables.  
Sometimes, if the treated unit is very different fr
71 An alternative is to use the time dimension of the data to produce placebo studies.  In this case the 
dates of placebo policy changes would be set at random. 
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control units. This will be then reflected in lack of fit in the synthetic controls 
dynamics of the outcome variable during the pre-treatment period, and 
igh values of the MSPE. Using information of pre- and post-
onally evaluate the significance 
72

correspondingly in h
treatment MSPE from the placebo runs we can additi
of the (post-treatment) gap between the outcome variable of the treated unit and its 
synthetic counterpart relative to the placebo cases. For that we can study the 
distribution of the ratios of post- to pre-treatment MSPE, using MSPEs from placebo 
runs and the treatment run of the SCM.  In the case of significant treatment effect, the 
placebo studies should have a lower post/pre-treatment MSPE ratio than in the case of 
the unit actually affected by the policy change.   
 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Difference-in-differences analysis 
Difference-in-differences results based on UK data 
This section employs DID analysis to study how the enlargement of the European 
Union and European Single Aviation Market in May 2004 affected number of 
passengers travelling on scheduled flights between UK and the CEE8. I also check 
whether the results are similar if revenue-passenger-kilometres (RPK) is used as an 
outcome variable instead. RPK is equal to the number of paying passengers times 
number of kilometres flown. It accounts for differences of flight distances of different 
passengers.  
72 For example, in Abadie et al. (2009) this ratio was 130 in the case of the state of California, where a 
change in anti-tobacco policy took place. No control state among the other 38 US states studied, where 
the policy was not implemented, achieved such high ratio. Therefore if one were to assign the 
intervention at random in their data, the probability of finding a post/pre-treatment MSPE ratio as large 
as that of California would have been only 1/39,  i.e. 2.6 per cent (Abadie et al. 2009).
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Equations (4.1), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) from Section 4.4 are estimated with OLS, with 
group-specific fixed effects. However, the results are similar if country-pair or route-
specific fixed effects are used instead. Table 4.1 uses country-pair level data of 22 
country-pairs (14 from the UK to the old EU members, 8 from the UK to the new 
Central and Eastern European EU members). Table 4.2 uses a much more detailed 
data at route and airline level. Columns 1 and 6 in Table 4.1 show the results from 
standard DID regression (Eq. 4.1). Columns 2 and 7 include country-pair specific 
control variables (i.e. Eq. 4.4).
73
Columns 3 and 8 allow also for different group 
(treatment or control) specific time trends, as in Eq. (4.5). Note that this last 
specification estimates in fact a very simplistic gravity model based on bilateral 
passenger traffic data. Finally, Columns 4 and 9 include both country-pair specific 
controls and group-specific time trends, as in Eq. (4.6).   

I use monthly panel data of routes between the UK and the rest of the Europe, from 
June 2001 to April 2008. The number of passengers travelling on a country-pair or 
route and RPK are output measures of airlines active on that route. One would expect 
that the liberalisation of the air transport sector (enlargement of the SEAM) would 
increase the number of passengers (and therefore also RPK) on a route or a country-
pair. Liberalisation enables more competitionby making it easier for new airlines to 
enter the market and by toughening competition among incumbent airlines. This 
increase in competition should lower airfares, which would lead to increased demand 
for air travel and an increase in passenger volume. Again, in the case of the scheduled 
flights to and from UK this enlargement effect of the SEAM cannot be easily 
differentiated from the overall effect of the EU enlargement (the positive demand 
shock).  
73 These characteristics are the distance between countries (from CEPII database), size of population 
(yearly data) of the destination country, level of GDP per capita (yearly data) and trade openness (ratio 
of exports plus imports to GDP) of the destination country (yearly data). 
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Table 4.1. Difference-in-differences regression results based on monthly UK country-pair level data  
 (1)-(4) Scheduled flights (5) Charter flights          (6)-(9) Scheduled flights 
Column:     (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estimated equation no.: 4.1         4.4 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.6
Dep. var.: ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(RPK) 
 
ln(RPK) 
 
ln(RPK) 
 
ln(RPK) 
 
NewEUmember 
dummy 
-3.005*** 
(0.596) 
-2.065** 
(0.721) 
-3.205*** 
(0.615) 
-2.263*** 
(0.743) 
-3.538*** 
(0.913) 
-2.435*** 
(0.571) 
-2.192*** 
(0.776) 
-2.633*** 
(0.583) 
-2.414*** 
(0.796) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewEUMember*Post-
2004May)A
1.153*** 
(0.165) 
1.132*** 
(0.173) 
0.702*** 
(0.101) 
0.695*** 
(0.091) 
-0.275 
(0.522) 
1.142*** 
(0.161) 
1.191*** 
(0.177) 
0.697*** 
(0.1) 
0.699*** 
(0.087) 
Constant 
          
         
          
        0.796 
12.434*** 11.24*** 
(0.32) (0.484) 
12.497*** 
(0.322) 
11.5*** 
(0.491) 
9.24*** 
(0.898) 
19.146*** 
(0.338) 
24.86*** 
(6.097) 
19.208*** 
(0.339) 
24.99*** 
(6.093) 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair specific 
controls 
NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
Group specific trends NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES
R2 0.485 0.843 0.487 0.845 0.187 0.36 0.794 0.362
Prob>F          
          
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of Observations 1800 1800 1800 1800 1362 1800 1800 1800 1800
Notes: 22 country-pairs. Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level, ** - significant at 5 per cent level, * - significant at 10 per cent level.  Robust standard 
errors, clustered at country-pair level are in parentheses.  
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 for routes to new EU member countries for periods starting from May 2004.  
As expected, country-pairs (Table 4.1) and routes (Table 4.2) going from UK to the 
new EU members have significantly lower number of passengers (see the coefficient 
of NewEUmember dummy) than these from the UK to the Western Europe.  
The average treatment effect of the policy change is given by the coefficient of the 
Policy dummy. The coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant 
in the table above, indicating strong positive treatment effect of enlargement of the 
Single Aviation Market and the EU on passenger numbers and RPK. However, the 
size of the estimated effect on number of passengers or RPK varies considerably 
depending on the specification of the DID model. Inclusion of country-pair specific 
controls changes the estimated treatment effect only by a limited extent (compare 
Column 1 and 2, or 6 and 7 in Table 4.1).  What matters the most is inclusion of 
separate group-specific time trends. This allows treatment and control units to follow 
different trends.  Notably, now the estimated positive effect of the EU and SEAM 
enlargement is about 40 per cent lower than otherwise. Evidently, this is due to the 
fact that air traffic to and from the accession countries was growing somewhat faster 
than elsewhere anyway. Control for this trend difference therefore drives the 
estimated effect down. 
Based on country-pair level results that include separate group specific trends and 
country-pair specific controls (the most preferred specification), we can see from 
Table 4.1 (Column 4 and 9) that on average the enlargement of the EU and European 
Single Aviation Market resulted in a 100 per cent
74
 increase in airline traffic on 
country-pairs between the UK and Central and Eastern Europe if compared to the 
counterfactual situation.  As evident from Annex 4.1, the country-pair level result is 
relatively robust to the exclusion of some countries from the treatment and control 

74 I.e. calculated as:  exp(0.695)  1. 
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group. The effect on RPK is in the case of UK data very similar to the effect on 
number of passengers (Columns 6-9 in Table 4.1).  Also, the effect on number of 
competitors offering scheduled flights on routes to new member countries is of very 
similar magnitude (see Table 4.2). Thus, we can argue that the effect is not only due to 
increase in number of passengers served by existing airlines, but also due to entry of 
new competitors. At the same time, as evident from Table 4.2 the EU enlargement is 
not associated with an increase in number of charter airlines serving the routes to the 
new member countries. 
 
Table 4.2. EU enlargement in 2004 and number of scheduled and charter carriers on a 
country-pair  
 Scheduled flights Charter flights 
Estimated equation no.: (4.1) (4.5) (4.1) 
Dep. var.:  ln(number 
of airlines) 
ln(number 
of airlines) 
ln(number of 
airlines) 
NewEUmember dummy -2.382** 
(0.126) 
-2.512*** 
(0.372) 
-2.366*** 
(0.415) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewEUMember*Post-2004May)A
0.949*** 
(0.112) 
0.664*** 
(0.118) 
0.107 
(0.083) 
Constant 3.036*** 
(0.256) 
3.073*** 
(0.255) 
3.333*** 
(0.416 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Group specific trends NO YES NO 
R2 0.494 0.496 0.314 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 1800 1800 1362 
Notes: Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at country-
pair level, are in parentheses. Estimated equation: 4.1. Monthly country-pair level data. 
 
An important result concerns the charter flights (see Column 5 in Table 4.1). There is 
no significant effect of enlargement of the EU on number of passengers of charter 
flights. Notably, in the case of charter flights, the treatment in May 2004 includes 
the EU enlargement (i.e. the demand shock), but not the SEAM enlargement. Unlike 
the scheduled carriers, the entry barriers for charter flights did not change significantly 
in May 2004. Their entry was relatively easy already before that. As evident from 
Table 4.2 the EU enlargement is not associated with an increase in number of charter 
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airlines serving the routes to the new member countries.  The fact that the EU entry 
does not affect charter flights to new member countries at all could potentially say us 
something about the effect of May 2004 on scheduled flights as well. If we were 
willing to make a fairly restrictive assumption that in the absence of the treatment 
the quantity of scheduled and charter passengers would have followed similar trend 
over time, and that the demand effect of EU enlargement of scheduled and charter 
flights was similar, then the treatment effect on scheduled carriers (as given in Table 
4.1) could be due to change in entry barriers because of the enlargement of the SEAM 
and not due to the effect of overall enlargement of the EU. However, I acknowledge 
the demand effect of EU enlargement is rather likely to be quite different for the 
scheduled and charter flights. 
 
Table 4.3. Difference-in-differences regression results based on UK route-airline level 
data of scheduled flights 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. var.: ln(number of passengers) UK-Europe London-Europe 
NewEUmember dummy -0.353*** 
(0.126) 
-0.462*** 
(0.111) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewEUMember*Post-2004May)A
0.239*** 
(0.12) 
0.157*** 
(0.071) 
Constant 8.668*** 
(0.69) 
9.413*** 
(0.787) 
Full set of time dummies  included YES YES 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 48,529 15,723 
Notes: Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at route 
level, are in parentheses. Estimated equation: 4.1. Frequency of data: monthly. 
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 for routes to new EU member countries for periods starting from May 
2004. 
 
The impact on number of passengers of scheduled flights at a lower level of 
aggregation, on route and airline level (Table 4.3) is much smaller than at country 
level. This is because in the case of route-level data my analysis looks at the effects on 
already existing routes and airlines, excluding any new ones. The country-pair level 
analysis includes also expansion in terms of number of routes and entry of new 
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carriers to the Eastern Europe. One of the most visible characteristics of post-2004 
development in the aviation sector of the new member states of the EU has indeed 
been the increase in number of routes served.  
As evident from Annex 4.2, the treatment effect of May 2004 on the number of 
flights on a country-pair is also positive. However, the magnitude of the effect on 
number of flights is to some extent smaller than the effect on number of passengers 
(compare Column 1 in Table 4.1 with Table A4.3 in Annex 4.2). Hence, we could 
argue that the enlargement has also increased the average load-factor of airlines. This 
means that on average each flight carries more passengers than before. The effect of 
the EU and SEAM enlargement on routes from London is smaller than in UK on 
average (see Table 4.3). Hence, the effect of enlargement is larger on routes 
originating from outside London airports. 
The main results in this and the next Section are also robust to various modifications 
of equation (4.1), (4.5) and (4.6):  
(i) to inclusion of country-pair or route specific (not treatment/control group 
specific) fixed effects;  
(ii) to allowing the coefficients of control variables ( J ) in Equation (4.5) to be 
different for treatment and control units. 
To check whether the results in 2004 might be more due to EU enlargement or air 
traffic liberalisation (SEAM enlargement) I will utilise the differences in the 
membership coverage of the EU and the SEAM. For that, I show here the effect of 
Croatias entering the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) in 2006. The SEAM 
was reorganised into ECAA in 2006. Croatia became a member of the ECAA but did 
not become a member of the EU at the same time. For this reason I can in the case of 
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the 2006 enlargement round concentrate more specifically on the effect of the ECAA, 
not the overall effect of the EU enlargement.    
Table 4.4. Robustness test: effect of Croatias entry to the European Common 
Aviation Area in 2006  
Dep. var.: ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewECAAMember*Post-
2006January)A
0.592*** 
(0.035) 
0.532*** 
(0.025) 
EU enlargement in 2004 
(Croatia dummy* postMay2004 
period) 
 
 
0.126*** 
(0.054) 
Time dummies YES YES 
Country-pair specific controls NO NO 
Group specific trends YES YES 
R2 0.26 0.26 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 1245 1245 
Notes: Method: OLS. Estimated equation: 4.5. *** - significant at 1 per cent level. Robust standard 
errors, clustered at country-pair level, are in parentheses. UK country-pair level data. Treatment group 
is UK-Croatia country-pair, control group is UK-EU15 country-pairs. Frequency of data: monthly. 
A. 2006 policy dummy is equal to 1 for routes to Croatia for periods starting from January 2006. 
 
The results in Table 4.4 are based on monthly country-pair level data of flights to and 
from UK.  The treatment group is the UK-Croatia country-pair, the control group 
consists of the country-pairs between UK and the EU15.  As evident from the 
coefficient of the policy dummy in Table 4.4, there is significant increase after 
January 2006 in the number of passengers on UK-Croatia country-pair if compared to 
the routes between the UK and the EU15. There was already some increase after May 
2004 (see Column 2 in Table 4.4), but the majority of increase coincided with the 
SEAM enlargement. The SEAM enlargement in 2006 increases the number of 
passengers on the affected routes on average by 70-80 per cent, even if we allow for a 
different linear trend for the Croatia-UK country-pair. This gives more credibility to 
claim that the effects in Table 4.1 and 4.2 for the 2004 enlargement round are not only 
due to the overall effect of the EU enlargement. We find effects of similar magnitude 
if we look at the 2006 enlargement of the ECAA (i.e. Single Aviation Market) alone. 
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Difference-in-differences results based on Norwegian data  
Similar analysis has been implemented in the case of routes between the CEE and 
Norway (Annex 4.3 shows also the results in case of yearly data of Sweden). The 
period of study covers monthly data from January 2003 to December 2006, as earlier 
monthly route level data was not available for Norway. I investigate routes from 
Norway to the EU25 (i.e. EU after the 2004 accession round). The treatment group 
consists of routes to countries that became part of the SEAM in 2004. The control 
group consists of routes to countries that were already SEAM members before 2004.   
The results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show that, generally, country-pairs or routes 
going from Norway to the new SEAM members have lower number of passengers and 
RPK than country-pairs or routes to the Western Europe (as evident form the 
coefficient of the NewSEAMmember dummy). 
The average treatment effect of a change in policy is again given by the coefficient of 
the Policy dummy. This coefficient is positive in Table 4.5 and also in Column 1 of 
Table 4.6. It indicates a large positive treatment effect of the SEAM enlargement on 
number of passengers and RPK. However, the coefficient is still positive but not 
statistically significant in the case of routes originating from Oslo (Column 2 in Table 
4.6). 
Therefore, the positive effect of SEAM enlargement seems to take place on routes 
outside Oslo airport. This and similar result based on UK data are consistent with the 
standard entry strategy of the LCCs. It is well known that the LCCs tend to avoid 
using main large airports. That way they cut the airport charges and avoid congestion 
related problems (Doganis 2010).  
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Table 4.5. Difference-in-differences regression results based on monthly Norwegian country-pair level data 
Column: (1) (2) (3)      (4) (5) (7) (6) (8)
Estimated equation no.: 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.1 4 4.5 4.6 4.
Dep. var.: ln(nu ber of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(number of 
passengers) 
ln(RPK) 
 
ln(RPK) 
 
ln(RPK) 
 
ln(RPK) 
 
m
NewSEAMmember 
dummy 
-3.326*** 
(0.741) 
-2.496* 
(1.21) 
-3.677*** 
(0.787) 
-2.625* 
(1.233) 
-2.844*** 
(0.577) 
-1.666 
(1.224) 
-3.172*** 
(0.608) 
-1.699 
(1.148) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewSEAMmember*Post-
2004May)A
1.65*** 
(0.497) 
1.71*** 
(0.487) 
0.712* 
(0.391) 
0.631* 
(0.322) 
1.008*** 
(0.309) 
1.134*** 
(0.311) 
0.597* 
(0.32) 
0.577* 
(0.33) 
Constant 8.231*** 
(0.612) 
13.171*** 
(3.854) 
8.245*** 
(0.613) 
13.422*** 
(3.991) 
15.763*** 
(0.474) 
9.562*** 
(2.417) 
15.788*** 
(0.476) 
9.524*** 
(2.63) 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-pair specific 
controls 
NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Group specific trends NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
R2 0.4 0.673 0.424 0.687 0.406 0.58 0.424 0.607 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 
Notes: Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level, ** - significant at 5 per cent level, * - significant at 10 per cent  level.  Robust standard errors, clustered at 
country-pair level, are in parentheses.  Data of scheduled flights is used.  
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 for routes to new SEAM member countries for periods starting from May 2004.
Table 4.6. Difference-in-differences regression results based on Norwegian route level 
data 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. var.: ln(number of passengers) Norway-Europe Oslo-Europe 
   
NewSEAMmember dummy -1.1*** 
(0.189) 
-0.148 
(0.259) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewSEAMMember*Post-
2004May)A
0.755*** 
(0.211) 
0.336 
(0.296) 
Constant 7.078*** 
(0.197) 
6.667*** 
(0.353) 
Full set of time dummies  included YES YES 
R2 0.015 0.016 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 7081 3241 
Notes: Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1per cent level. Robust standard errors, clustered at route level, 
are in parentheses. Data of scheduled flights is used. Estimated equation: 4.1. Frequency of data: monthly. 
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 in the case of routes to the new SEAM member countries for periods starting 
from May 2004.  
 
As in the case of UK, the point estimate of the treatment effect is different depending of 
the type of DID approach: adding group specific time trends to the list of controls lowers 
the estimated effect a lot. Based on Column 4 and 8 in Table 4.5 we can see that over the 
period studied the enlargement of the SEAM resulted in 88 per cent
75
 increase in number 
of passengers on country-pairs between Norway and Central and Eastern European 
countries if compared to the control group of country-pairs to EU15.
76
 The corresponding 
effect on RPK is 78 per cent. The results vary a bit depending on which countries are 
included or excluded from the treatment and control group (see Annex 4.1). Notably, the 
effect on RPK is smaller than the effect on number of passengers. This is because the 
growth on flights to the CEE has concentrated more on relatively nearby CEE countries. 
Such concentration on closer destinations after 2004 does not take place in UK. 
Tests of common pre-enlargement trends 

75 This is found as: exp(0.631)-1 
76 See Annex 4.3 for similar analysis based on yearly passenger volume data of country-pairs from Sweden 
to the rest of Europe.   
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As outlined in the methodology section, one needs to formally test whether the trends of 
traffic figures of the treatment group and control group differed already before the 
enlargement of the SEAM. I use pre-treatment data and apply two-period DID estimator 
to that data. The simple t-test of hypothesis that 0 D  in Equation (4.3) is a test of the 
common (pre-treatment) trend assumption. Using UK data on number of passengers or 
RPK we can reject the hypothesis that the difference in pre-treatment trends is not 
significant, at 95 per cent level of confidence. Hence the common (pre-treatment) trend 
assumption of Equation (4.1) or (4.2) does not hold. However, as a number of Figures 
from Section 2 indicated, these trends are in fact not very different before 2004. 
Similarly, the common trend assumption does not hold for Norwegian data of number of 
passengers or RPK.  
However, if instead of number of passenger we use the number of flights as a dependent 
variable in Equation (4.3), then based on the UK data, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that 0 D . Hence, the common pre-treatment trend assumption holds in this case (see 
also Annex 4.1).  Because of these results I have relied mostly on the point estimates of 
the treatment effect from Equation (4.5)the DID model with different group specific 
linear trends. The corresponding findings are given in Columns 4 and 9 in Table 4.1 and 
Columns 4 and 8 in Table 4.5. 
 
4.5.2 Results with the synthetic control method   
SCM results - based on UK data of passenger numbers 
We saw that the strong assumption of the DID approach does not strictly hold here. 
Therefore one needs to control for the possible non-parallel trends of the treated and 
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untreated group. In order to do that in a more flexible way than in Equation (4.6), I use 
the synthetic control method (SCM). Using SCM, I demonstrate the effect of expansion 
of the EU and Single European Aviation Market in May 2004 on passenger traffic 
between UK and Poland and between UK and the aggregate region of the 8 new Central 
and Eastern European member states that acceded the EU in 2004 (CEE8). Synthetic 
control destinations, like synthetic Poland and a synthetic CEE8, are constructed as 
convex combinations of country-pairs between UK and other 14 before-2004 members of 
the EU and Single European Aviation Market.  
The construction of these synthetic controls is based on country-pair level data of number 
of passengers and some standard predictors of passenger flows. I use here UK monthly 
traffic data that cover the same period as in Section 4.1.1. A weighted average of Western 
European destinations is chosen by the SCM to resemble the values of passenger traffic 
and its predictors prior to May 2004 for Poland and the CEE8 as a whole region. My 
sample of potential controls includes the following old EU destinations originating from 
the UK: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 
The country-pair level outcome variable is the monthly number of passengers of 
scheduled flights.
77
 The predictor variables of passenger traffic in the post-treatment 
period are chosen based on literature on determinants of bilateral passenger traffic (e.g. 
Piermartini and Rousova 2008). The predictor variables used for our application, based 
on flights from the UK, are:  
(i) number of passengers  during the pre-treatment periods; 

77 I.e.: excluding passengers of charter flight. 
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(ii) distance between the origin and destination
78
;  
(iii)size of population of the destination country; 
(iv) trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) of the destination country; 
(v) real GDP growth rate of the destination country.    
As the CEE countries have lower GDP per capita than the Western European ones it 
would be impossible to find a good match based on that variable. Therefore, it has not 
been included in the set of air traffic predictors and the GDP growth rate of the 
destination country is used instead.  Trade openness is additionally included as a predictor 
variable because of its potential effect on airline passenger traffic growth, incl. through its 
possible effect on GDP growth.   
Table 4.7 shows the weights of each EU destination country in the synthetic Poland and 
in the aggregate synthetic CEE8.  The synthetic Poland is a weighted average of Finland, 
Luxembourg and Greece. The synthetic CEE8 is weighted average of Greece, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany and Luxembourg. Other countries from the pool of potential controls 
were assigned zero weights by the SCM. 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 compare the pre-enlargement characteristics of the actual Poland and 
its synthetic counterpart, and actual CEE8 and its aggregate synthetic counterpart. The 
synthetic CEE8 approximates the actual one accurately in terms of pre-enlargement 
passenger traffic figures, distance between countries, GDP growth rate and trade 
openness figures of the destination. Also in the case of Poland, the figures of actual and 
synthetic Poland are relatively similar, with the notable exception in terms of the size of 

78 Distances between countries are defined similarly to the studies estimating the trade gravity equation. 
Distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most 
important city (in terms of population).
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population (see Table 4.8). The difference between the traffic figures of the Poland and 
Synthetic Poland is larger than in the case of CEE8 as a whole and synthetic CEE8.   
  
Table 4.7. Country weights in synthetic Poland and synthetic CEE8, estimated using UK 
origin-destination passenger traffic data 
 Synthetic Poland Synthetic CEE8 
Austria 0 0 
Belgium 0 0.279 
Denmark 0 0 
Finland 0.552 0.224 
France 0 0 
Germany 0 0.122 
Greece 0.164 0.296 
Ireland 0 0 
Italy 0 0 
Luxembourg 0.283 0.078 
Netherlands 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 
Spain 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 
Sum 1 1 
 
Table 4.8. Pre-treatment predictor and outcome means for Poland and its synthetic 
counterpart 
 Treated Synthetic 
Monthly scheduled passengers* 41435 45051
Distance, km 1451.6 1492.9
Real GDP growth rate, % 2.5 2.53
Trade openness, % of GDP 50 66.6
Average population, mill. 38 4.8
*Also, pre-treatment data of each available quarters passenger numbers, each years GDP growth and trade 
openness figure was used in building the synthetic control. The averages over the whole pre-treatment 
period are presented here. 
 
Table 4.9. Pre-treatment predictor and outcome means for CEE8 and its synthetic 
counterpart 
 Treated Synthetic 
Monthly scheduled passengers 181289 181605
Distance, km 1325.5 1294.1
Real GDP growth rate, % 2.39 2.31
Trade openness, % of GDP 85.7 81
*Also, pre-treatment data of each available quarters passenger numbers, each years GDP growth and trade 
openness figure was used in building the synthetic control. The averages over the whole pre-treatment 
period are presented here. 
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Figure 4.5. Trends in scheduled passenger numbers from UK: Destination Poland (treated 
unit) vs synthetic Poland 
Note: vertical dotted line denotes May 2004. 
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Figure 4.6. Trends in scheduled passenger numbers from UK: Destination CEE8 vs 
synthetic CEE8  
 
Figure 4.5 plots the passenger traffic trajectory of the UK-Poland country-pair and its 
synthetic counterpart for the June 2001April 2008 period. The synthetic Poland 
reproduces here a trend in pre-treatment passenger traffic that is very similar to the actual 
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Poland. This fit in Figure 4.5 together with the evidence of covariate balance in Table 4.8 
suggests that the weighted average of Finland, Greece and Luxembourg may possibly 
serve as one relatively sensible estimate of the counterfactual passenger traffic trend that 
Poland may have experienced in the absence of EU enlargement. 
Figure 4.6 shows similar results for the CEE countries as a whole. SCM succeeds here to 
mimic well the pre-enlargement dynamics of the CEE passenger traffic. 
The estimate of the effect of enlargement of the EU and the Single European Aviation 
Market is given in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 by, respectively, the after-treatment 
difference between the actual Poland and the synthetic Poland, and the difference 
between the actual CEE8 and its synthetic counterpart. In both cases the enlargement had 
a very large effect on the passenger traffic.  
Already a couple of months after enlargement the monthly passenger numbers between 
the UK and the CEE8 countries were up by about 100,000 passengers if compared to the 
estimate of the counterfactual scenario. One year after the enlargement this gap had 
already widened to 200,000 people. In percentage terms, by December 2004 this 
difference between the CEE8 level of outcome variable and that of its synthetic control 
was already 106 per cent of the level of synthetic CEE8. So, the volume of passengers to 
and from CEE8 was about 2 times higher than the volume of passengers to and from the 
synthetic CEE8. By December 2005 this gap had grown to 146 per cent.
79
  
This growth is remarkable, especially given that until 2003 the overall number of 
passengers travelling in a given month between UK and these 8 CEE countries had 

79 Also, analysis of yearly data confirms these findings of a very large effect of the EU and the Single 
European Aviation Market enlargement. 
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remained below just 200,000 people. It is also unprecedented: there was no even remotely 
similar growth occasion during the pre-enlargement period. 
I have also implemented similar SCM study based on other CEE8 countries. To save 
space I have reported here the results for Poland and the CEE8 as a whole. The results for 
both Hungary and Czech Republic show similar significant effects of the enlargement. 
These are given in Annex 4.4. The SCM was relatively successful in finding the synthetic 
controls for Poland and the CEE8 as one aggregate unit. For very small CEE countries 
like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia the SCM failed to find a synthetic control 
with good fit in the pre-treatment period (see Annex 4.4).  However, despite the failure of 
implementing the SCM in these cases, UK traffic to and from these countries grew a lot 
after enlargement. For example, one year after enlargement monthly passenger traffic 
between the UK and Estonia was more than 3 times larger than before May 2004. 
 
Statistical significance of the results 
To estimate whether the effects found with SCM are statistically significant I conduct a 
number of placebo studies. In placebo studies the treatment is iteratively assigned to 
country-pairs among old EU destination countries, as these did not face the change in 
regulatory framework in May 2004. The results of the placebo studies are given in next 
three Figures. For example, Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that the routes from UK to Finland 
and Greece did not experience any significant increase in terms of traffic around 2004 if 
compared to their own synthetic counterparts. In our previous section, we showed that 
both Finland and Greece had important shares in the synthetic controls for Poland and 
CEE8.  
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Figure 4.7. Placebo testpassengers travelling on the UK-Finland country-pair (solid 
line) and the synthetic UK-Finland country-pair 
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Figure 4.8. Placebo testpassengers travelling on the UK-Greece country-pair (solid 
line) and the synthetic UK-Greece country-pair 
 
The results of all placebo studies and the actual treatment study are summarised in Figure 
4.9. It plots the gap between the outcome variable of the treated unit (CEE8) and its 
synthetic control group, and shows also the similar placebo gaps
80
 for the 14 old EU 
destinations.
81
 Note from Figure 4.9, that if one were to re-label the treatment status in 
this country(region)-pair level data of 14 control units and one treatment unit (CEE8) at 

80 For example: between actual Finland and its synthetic control, between Spain and its synthetic 
counterpart. 
81 There are 14 old EU destination countries as flights from UK to UK itself are excluded from analysis.
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random, the probability of obtaining the results of the magnitude of those obtained for 
CEE8 would be small. It is equal to 1/15, i.e. 6.7 per cent. This is below the 10 per cent 
level typically used in standard tests of statistical significance. We can see that the gap 
between the treated CEE8 and its synthetic unit is far larger than the corresponding gap 
from placebo studies of country-pairs within the EU15. Based on lack of similar placebo 
gaps it can be argued that this result is statistically significant and that the liberalisation 
on routes to the CEE8 has resulted in a large increase of volume of passenger traffic.  
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Figure 4.9. Difference between the actual number of passengers travelling on a country-
pair and the corresponding synthetic control of the country-pair. UK-CEE8 region-pair vs 
placebo studies of the 14 control country-pairs.  
Note: Bold line - outcome difference (as per cent of the synthetic control) between the CEE8 and 
its synthetic control.  Grey lines - outcome difference between each of the control units and their 
synthetic controls in the placebo studies.  
 
Using information of pre- and post-treatment MSPE from the placebo runs we can 
additionally evaluate the significance of the post-treatment gap between the outcome 
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variable of the treated unit and its synthetic counterpart relative to the placebo cases. For 
that I study the distribution of the ratios of post- to pre-treatment MSPE, using MSPEs 
from placebo runs and the treatment run of the SCM.  In the case of significant treatment 
effect, the placebo studies should have a lower ratio of post-treatment MSPE to pre-
treatment MSPE than study of the unit actually affected by the policy change (Abadie et 
al. 2009). This is indeed the case here (see Annex 4.5). Based on UK data, the ratio of 
Post-SEAM enlargement MSPE and Pre-SEAM enlargement MSPE in the treated region 
pair (CEE-UK) is more than 70 times higher than in the case of placebo studies based on 
control country-pairs. No country-pair in the control group achieved such high ratio. 
Again, if one were to assign the intervention at random in the data, the probability of 
finding a post/pre-treatment MSPE ratio as large as that of UK-CEE region pair would 
have been only 6.7 per cent. 
 
SCM results - based on Norwegian data of passenger numbers 
Next, I show the effects of the expansion of the Single European Aviation Market with 
SCM based on data of international flights from Norway.  In this case the synthetic CEE 
destinations are constructed based on data of routes between Norway and the EU15 
countries.  That is, the potential pool of controls is considered to be the old EU 
destinations.  Data used in my analysis is passenger traffic data aggregated to country-
pair level, where one end in the country-pair is always Norway. The time-frame studied 
here is the same as in Section 4.1.2. The predictor variables of passenger traffic are 
exactly the same as in previous sections.  
Table 4.10 shows the weights of each EU destination country in the synthetic CEE8 and 
synthetic Poland.  Now, the synthetic destination of Poland is a weighted average of 
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Finland, Ireland and Italy. The corresponding weights were 0.035, 0.811, and 0.154.  All 
other destinations have zero weights. The synthetic CEE8 turned out to be a weighted 
average of Finland (0.1), France (0.234) and Ireland (0.666). 
Tables 4.11 and 4.11 compare the pre-enlargement characteristics of the actual Poland 
(Table 4.11) or the aggregate CEE8 (Table 4.12) with their synthetic counterparts. Note 
that this time the fit of pre-treatment characteristics is not as good as in the case of UK 
data. However, the synthetic control group is still more similar to the treated group than 
the population-weighted average of all EU15 destinations would be. 
Table 4.10. Country weights in synthetic Poland and synthetic CEE8, estimated using 
Norwegian origin-destination passenger traffic data 
 Synthetic Poland Synthetic CEE8 
Austria 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 
Finland 0.035 0.1 
France 0 0.234 
Germany 0 0 
Greece 0 0 
Ireland 0.811 0.666 
Italy 0.154 0 
Luxembourg 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 
Spain 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 
Sum 1 1 
 
Table 4.11. Pre-treatment predictor and outcome means for Poland and its synthetic 
counterpart, estimated using Norwegian origin-destination passenger traffic data 
 Treated Synthetic 
Monthly scheduled passengers* 1455.4 1703.8
Distance to Norway, km 1062.1 1364.9
Real GDP growth rate, % 3.9 3.7
Trade openness, % of GDP 58.3 83.9
Average population, mill. 38.2 12.3
*Also, pre-treatment data of each available quarters passenger numbers, each years GDP growth and trade 
openness figure was used in building the synthetic control. The averages over the whole pre-treatment 
period are presented here. 
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 Table 4.12. Pre-treatment predictor and outcome means for CEE8 and its synthetic 
counterpart, estimated using Norwegian origin-destination passenger traffic data 
 Treated Synthetic 
Monthly scheduled passengers* 5374.6 5389.4
Distance to Norway, km 1056.9 1237
Real GDP growth rate, % 6.03 4.03
Trade openness, % of GDP 97.1 87.9
*Also, pre-treatment data of each available quarters passenger numbers, each years GDP growth and trade 
openness figure was used in building the synthetic control. The averages over the whole pre-treatment 
period are presented here. 
 
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show, respectively, the dynamics of passenger volume to and from 
the destinations CEE8 and Poland, compared in both cases to their synthetic control 
group. The synthetic CEE8 and synthetic Poland have relatively similar pre-treatment 
passenger traffic dynamics if compared with the actual CEE8 or actual destination 
Poland.  In the case of CEE8 as an aggregate region we, find a large effect of the 
enlargement of the European Single Aviation Market in year 2004. In percentage terms, 
by December 2004 the difference between CEE8 level of outcome variable and that of its 
synthetic control was already 80 per cent of the level of the synthetic CEE8. 
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Figure 4.10. Trends in passenger numbers from Norway: Destination CEE8 (treated unit) 
vs synthetic CEE8 

183 

0
50
00
10
00
0
15
00
0
Nu
m
be
r o
f p
as
se
n
ge
rs
2003m1 2004m5 2005m1 2006m1
Month
treated unit synthetic control unit
 
Figure 4.11. Trends in passenger numbers from Norway: Destination Poland (treated unit) 
vs synthetic Poland 
 
Notably, in the case of the Norway-Poland country-pair (see Figure 4.11), the increase in 
number of passengers starts one year after the enlargement of the Single Aviation Market. 
No significant treatment effect of the enlargement was found immediately after the 
enlargement. The results based on Norway-Poland country-pair are consistent with 
previous experience from liberalisation of air services in Western Europe (in 1992) where 
it took at first some years after the liberalisation before the spread of low cost airlines 
started (Civil Aviation Authority 2006). In 2004 the volume of traffic to the CEE reacted 
at first more quickly in the case of the UK (see previous section). Similarly, the effects 
after previous large-scale air traffic liberalisation event in 1992 were at first evident in 
routes from UK and only gradually appeared elsewhere in Europe (CAA 2006, Pearce 
and Smyth 2007). 
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Figure 4.12. Difference between the actual number of passengers travelling on a country-
pair and the corresponding synthetic control of the country-pair. Norway-CEE region-pair 
vs placebo studies of the 14 control country-pairs.  
Note: Bold line - outcome difference (as per cent of the synthetic control) between the CEE8 and 
its synthetic control.  Grey lines - outcome difference between each of the control units and their 
synthetic controls in the placebo studies.  
 
To evaluate the statistical significance of my results, I conduct a placebo study in a 
similar way to the last section. Figure 4.12 plots the gap between the outcome variable of 
the treated unit (CEE8) and its control group, and also the similar placebo gaps for old 
EU destinations. Again, we can see that the gap between the CEE8 and its synthetic 
counterpart is far larger than the gap estimated from placebo studies of country-pairs from 
elsewhere in the EU. Based on lack of any similar placebo gaps it can be argued that this 
result is statistically significant and that the liberalisation on routes to the CEE8 has 
resulted in large increase of volume of passenger traffic.  
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4.6 Conclusions  
This chapter employed an event study of the enlargement of the EU and the Single 
European Aviation Market in 2004 and used difference-in-differences and synthetic 
control methods to identify its effect on volume of airline passengers. I demonstrate that 
this liberalisation event in 2004 resulted in substantial increase in number of passengers 
of scheduled flights travelling between UK and the CEE8, and Norway and the CEE8.  I 
do not find any effect of the enlargement on passenger numbers on charter flights.   
Based on implementation of the synthetic control method we can conclude that this 
sizeable effect is still evident even after construction and analysis of the proxy of the 
counterfactualif the liberalisation of air traffic had not taken place in 2004.   
I find that after the enlargement of the SEAM, already by the end of 2004, passenger 
flows on affected routes grew 80-106 per cent relative to what these would have been in 
the absence of the enlargement. In the case of flights to/from the UK the increase in 
traffic materialised immediately after the enlargement of the SEAM and EU.  In the case 
of flights to/from Norway (a member of Single European Aviation Market but not a 
member of the EU) the largest increases in passenger numbers started a year after May 
2004.   
The majority of the effects take place on routes connecting airports outside London and 
Oslo with CEE countries. Also, my findings about the immediate effects of the SEAM 
enlargement in 2004 are much larger, in percentage growth terms, than some estimates 
about the immediate effects of the deregulation of 1992 (e.g. in Schipper et al. 2002). 
Based on a number of placebo studies I show that the effect of actual liberalisation (on 
routes to the CEE8) on passenger numbers is much bigger than the estimated 
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corresponding placebo effects in old EU countries. If one were to re-label the treatment 
status in a country(region)-pair level data of 14 control units and one treatment unit 
(CEE8) at random, the probability of getting the results of the magnitude of those 
obtained for the CEE8 would be smallit is 0.067, both if the UK or Norwegian 
passenger volume data is used. 
I have concentrated here on analysis of the effects of the EU and SEAM enlargement in 
2004 on number of passengers on scheduled flights.  Notably, we do not find similar 
effects of the 2004 enlargement round on number of charter passengers. Number of 
charter flights is not expected to be directly affected by the SEAM enlargement in 2004 
as the entry barriers to charter entry on routes to the CEE did not change in May 2004. 
But the demand for charter flights could have been expected to be affected by the EU 
enlargement (the positive demand shock).  
If we were willing to make a fairly restrictive assumption that in the absence of the 2004 
enlargement, the quantity of scheduled and charter passengers would have followed 
similar trend over time, and that the demand effect of EU enlargement of scheduled and 
charter flights was similar, then the 2004 effect on number of scheduled passengers (as 
given in Table 4.1) would be fully due to change in entry barriers because of the 
enlargement of the SEAM and not only due to the demand effect of overall enlargement 
of the EU. However, it has to be acknowledged that the demand effect of the EU 
enlargement is likely to be very different for the scheduled and charter flights. Therefore 
we cannot fully separate these two effects in 2004. 
In addition, the study of the 2006 enlargement round of the SEAM shows similarly large 
effects on scheduled flights. In 2006 the enlargement of SEAM was not accompanied by 
the overall EU enlargement. Therefore, the effect is likely to be due to the SEAM 
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enlargement. This suggests that the large effects found in the case of the 2004 
enlargement round are not only due to the overall EU enlargement, but also due to 
liberalisation of the aviation market. However, I acknowledge that the present empirical 
approach does not separate the 2004 EU enlargement effects and the SEAM enlargement 
effect. 
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Annex 4.1: Robustness tests of the difference-in-
differences results: effects on number of passengers 
 
Here I describe the robustness of the results of my DID analysis, based on passenger 
volume data from UK and Norway to the European Union. The estimated DID equation is 
Equation (4.1) from Section 4.4. I check how the exclusion of some countries from the 
control group affects the results. Table A4.1 gives the results for UK, Table A4.2 for 
Norway.  The coefficient of the policy dummy in Tables below shows the average 
treatment effect of the enlargement of the European Single Aviation Market and the 
general effect of the enlargement of the EU. 
In the Tables below, Column 1 includes all old EU destination countries as a control 
group, Column 2 excludes Spain and Greece from the control group, Column 3 excludes 
also additionally Italy, France and Portugal. In the case of Norway (Table A4.2), Column 
4 excludes additionally also UK from the control group.  
 
Table A4.1. Difference-in-differences regression results based on UK country-pair level 
data 
Dep. var.: ln(number of passengers) (1) (2) (3) 
NewEUmember dummy -3.005*** 
(0.596) 
-2.978*** 
(0.289) 
-2.762*** 
(0.297) 
Policy dummy (i.e. NewEUMember*Post-2004May)A 1.153*** 
(0.165) 
1.186*** 
(0.148) 
1.24*** 
(0.189) 
R2 0.485 0.465 0.414 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 1,800 1,634 1,385 
Notes: All regressions include also a constant term and full set of time dummies. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses.  Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level. Period: 
June 2001- April 2008. Frequency of data: monthly. Estimated equation: 4.1. 
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 for country-pairs to new Single European Aviation Market member 
countries for periods starting from May 2004. 
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The results in Table A4.1 show that the size of estimated treatment effect  varies only  
little depending on which destination countries are included in the analysis. The DID 
effect is still always positive and significant. Although no additional control variables are 
included here, the estimated model explains a large share of variation in the dependent 
variable based on UK databetween 41 and 48 per cent of its variation. 
 
Table A4.2. Difference-in-differences regression results based on Norwegian country-pair 
level data 
Dep. var.: ln(number of passengers) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NewEUmember dummy -3.326*** 
(0.741) 
-2.647*** 
(0.187) 
-2.893*** 
(0.197) 
-2.718*** 
(0.197) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewEUMember*Post-2004May)A
1.65*** 
(0.497) 
0.978*** 
(0.322) 
1.095*** 
(0.334) 
1.096*** 
(0.334) 
R2 0.4 0.352 0.358 0.336 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 1010 899 756 708 
Notes: All regressions include also a constant term and a full set of time dummies. Robust standard errors, 
clustered by country-pair, are in parentheses.  Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level. ** - 
significant at 5 per cent level. Period: January 2003  December 2006. Frequency of data: monthly. 
Estimated equation: 4.1. 
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 for country-pairs to the new Single European Aviation Market member 
countries for periods starting from May 2004. 
 
In Norwegian dataset the inclusion or exclusion of destination countries from the control 
group affects the size of the estimated effect. Still, the coefficient of the policy dummy is 
statistically significant in all the columns of Table A4.2.  
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Annex 4.2: Difference-in-differences regression 
results: effects on number of flights  
 
In addition to the effects on number of passengers I check whether similar effects of 
SEAM and EU enlargement can be found based on data of number of flights. Monthly 
data of number of number of flights on a country-pair or route are taken from the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). My dataset of number of flights covers routes between 
the UK and the rest of the Europe, from June 2001 to March 2008. Time of policy change 
is again May 2004. 
I estimate the Equation (4.1) using data of number of flights.  Table A4.3 uses country-
pair level data of 24 country pairs (14 from the UK to the old EU members, 8 from UK 
to the 8 new EU members, excluding Malta and Cyprus) . 
 
Table A4.3. Difference-in-differences regression results based on country-pair level data 
of number of flights 
Dep. var.: ln(number of flights)   
 Coeff. Std. Error 
NewEUmember dummy -2.926*** (0.089) 
Policy dummy (i.e. NewEUMember*Post-2004May)A 0.936*** (0.11) 
Constant 7.841*** (0.232) 
Full set of time dummies  included Yes  
R2 0.563  
Prob>F 0.000  
No. of Observations 1778  
Notes: 24 country-pairs. Method: OLS. *** - significant at 1 per cent level. Estimated equation: 4.1. 
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 for routes to the new EU member countries for periods starting from May 
2004.  
 
It is clear that country-pairs going from UK to the new EU members have significantly 
lower level of traffic than these to the Western Europe (see the coefficient of 
NewEUmember dummy).  
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The average treatment effect of change in policy is given by the coefficient of the Policy 
dummy. The coefficient of this variable is positive, indicating strong positive treatment 
effect of EU enlargement on number of flights. In quantitative terms, it occurs from Table 
A.4.3 that the enlargement of the European Single Aviation Market and the EU resulted 
in 155 per cent
82
 increase in number of flights on country-pairs between the UK and 
Central and Eastern European new member countries. 
The analysis in Table A4.3 is based data of scheduled flights. When I used similar 
approach to look at the effects of EU enlargement on number of charter flights, then no 
significant effect on traffic was found.   
  

82 I.e. calculated as:  exp(0.936)  1. 
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Annex 4.3:  Difference-in-differences analysis based 
on yearly Swedish passenger traffic data 

I estimate a standard DID equation as given in Equation (4.1) to find out the effects of the 
EU enlargement on the passenger traffic to and from Sweden.  Table A4.4. below uses 
Swedish country-pair level data for that.  
Data: Swedish data of number of passengers on international flights on country-pairs 
originating from Sweden.  
Level of aggregation: country-pair level. 
Period: 1999-2007. 
Coverage: European destination countries from Sweden. 
Frequency of data: yearly. Source: SIKA-Institute, Sweden. 
 
Table A4.4. Difference-in-differences regression results based on Swedish country-pair 
level yearly data 
 (1) (2) 
Dep. var.: ln(number of passengers) Sweden to the rest of the 
EU25 
Sweden to the rest of  the 
EU, 
 (including Malta and 
Cyprus) 
excluding destinations 
Malta and Cyprus 
NewSEAMmember dummy -2.285*** 
(0.185) 
-2.266*** 
(0.203) 
Policy dummy (i.e. 
NewSEAMmember*Post-
2004May)A
0.468 
(0.291) 
0.551* 
(0.305) 
Constant 12.325*** 
(0.224) 
12.413*** 
(0.221) 
Full set of time dummies  included Yes Yes 
R2 0.554 0.547 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 189 171 
Notes:  OLS results. *** - significant at 1 per cent level, * - significant at 10 per cent level. Period 1999-
2007, yearly data. Estimated equation: 4.1. 
A. Policy dummy is equal to 1 in the case of routes to the new member countries of the Single European 
Aviation Market (SEAM) for periods starting from May 2004.  
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 Similarly to the previous results from UK and Norway, Column 1 and 2 in Table A4.4 
show that routes going from Sweden to the new member countries of the European Single 
Aviation Market have significantly lower number of passengers than routes to the 
Western Europe.  
We find significant treatment effect of enlargement of the Single Aviation Market and the 
EU on passenger numbers in Column 2, i.e. when both Malta and Cyprus are excluded 
from the sample. However, unlike the new members from the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), they Malta and Cyprus had large air traffic numbers from the EU15 already before 
2004. These two countries have been important holiday destinations with traditionally 
large number of (charter) flights from Western Europe. 
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Annex 4.4: Synthetic control methodeffects of 
enlargement of the EU on number of passengers 
flying between the CEE countries and the UK 
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Figure A4.1. Number of passengers: Estonia and its synthetic control 
Note that in the case of Estonia the SCM fails to find a suitable synthetic control, due to size difference with 
control units. The synthetic control found does not follow the pre-treatment trend of number of passengers 
from Estonia. 
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Figure A4.2. Number of passengers: Hungary and its synthetic control 
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Figure A4.3. Number of passengers: Czech Republic and its synthetic control 
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 Annex 4.5. Ratio of Post-treatment and Pre-treatment 
MSPE  
 
 
Figure A4.4. Ratio of Post-EU enlargement MSPE and Pre-EU enlargement MSPE. 
CEE8 to UK region-pair vs. 14 control country-pairs. (MSPE - mean square prediction 
error).  
 
 
Figure A4.5. Ratio of Post-SEAM enlargement MSPE and Pre-SEAM enlargement 
MSPE. CEE8 to Norway region-pair vs. 14 control country-pairs. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
5.1 Summary and discussion of findings 
This thesis contributes to the growing literature of microeconometric analyses of the 
effects of competition. My study has been motivated by the empirical evidence of 
persistent large productivity and output price dispersion across production units and 
spatial markets. The increased availability of rich micro level datasets enables to study 
the role of competition in these variations. Also, the new models in industrial organisation 
and trade theory outline how international competition affects heterogeneous firms, and 
how these firm level effects result in changes in productivity and output price 
distributions at more aggregate levels.  
This dissertation provides empirical evidence about different ways how changes in the 
intensity of international competition affect productivity, other performance measures, 
and output prices. My study contributes to the literature on empirical industrial 
organisation and FDI. It studies the within-firm and selection effects of market entry and 
changes in market structure, and aggregate level effects of entry liberalisation. Also, it 
endeavours to control for the endogeneity of measures of competition. Each chapter of 
this thesis has dealt with a particular aspect of change in the competitive environment of 
firms. Overall, my results underline the importance of building upon micro level evidence 
in order to find out the effects of international competition on national economies. 
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Chapter 2 provides, based on rich firm-level data from the manufacturing industry in 
Estonia, comprehensive empirical evidence how entry of multinational firms (MNE) 
affects incumbent firms in the host economy. The study concentrates on the effects on 
productivity growth, innovation and direct measures of knowledge-flows to incumbents. 
This chapter adds to the literature about the effects of MNE entry, firstly, by investigating 
the channels of productivity spillovers of FDI that have been either little studied (effects 
on innovation, effects on direct measures of knowledge flows) or have not been studied 
before (effects on innovation related co-operation). Secondly, Chapter 2 adds to the 
literature by trying to account for the endogeneity of MNE entry in the host economy. 
Identification of the effects is based on instrumental variables that predict the MNE entry 
in Estonia, but are (otherwise) unlikely to affect the outcome variables of incumbent 
firms.  
I find that the MNE entry in an industry or a region in Estonia has no short-term impact 
on incumbent firms TFP and labour productivity growth. However, the entry of 
multinational firms results in other important within-firm changes. MNE entry is 
positively associated with process innovation of incumbents and also with knowledge 
sourcing from firms suppliers.  It does not affect innovation-related co-operation with 
other firms.  
These results provide a relatively positive view about the FDI spillovers. MNE entry in 
Estonia facilitates both creation and diffusion of new technology, and therefore could 
have positive effects on incumbents performance and productivity in the long-term 
(despite the evidence of no short term or immediate effects on the total factor productivity 
growth). These findings show that much caution is needed in studies about FDI spillovers 
when considering the policy implications and especially when considering whether 
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special incentives for FDI were justified. A detailed study of channels of the spillovers 
may lead to different conclusions than a study of short-term effects on productivity only. 
Notably, the pattern of empirical results about the effects of MNE entry is significantly 
different from the evidence in Aghion et al. (2009) on the UK. Unlike in the UK, in 
Estonias case we cannot confirm the predictions from Schumpeterian competition 
models (Aghion et al. 2009, Aghion and Griffith 2005). These predictions were that 
technologically advanced entry spurs innovation incentives (and productivity) only for 
incumbent firms that are close to the productivity frontier, in whose case innovating 
allows to survive the entry. Instead, the results in Estonia are consistent with the view that 
FDI results in knowledge transfer and spillovers, and that there is more knowledge 
transfer to incumbent firms that have high absorptive capacity. 
A general conclusion from this study is that the effects on productivity of incumbents 
could take longer time to emerge than assumed in the standard estimation framework in 
the literature. This can be especially the case in countries like Estonia where the overall 
ability (absorptive capacity) of domestic owned firms to benefit from FDI spillovers is 
lower than in Western Europe. The country-level differences in absorptive capacity might 
explain why researchers are more likely to find positive productivity spillovers in 
Western Europe than in transition economies.  
Chapter 3 shows how entry and market structure affect output price distribution across 
firms within spatially differentiated markets of a single industrythe passenger aviation 
sector. This chapter tests some of the key implications of the heterogeneous-producer 
models from industrial organisation (Syverson 2004a) and trade theory (Melitz and 
Ottaviano 2008) based on services sector data.  In literature, it is well-known standard 
result that stronger competition is associated with lower average prices in a market.  
199 

Recent heterogeneous-producer models of competition and trade outline richer effects. 
These predict how tougher competition affects also other moments (dispersion) of the 
across-firm price, productivity and cost distributions in the same sector and market.  
To investigate these issues, Chapter 3 has used a case study of the Western European 
short-haul airline sector and a unique airfare dataset with 1.7 million airfare observations. 
So far, there are few papers that investigate the selection effects of competition outside 
the manufacturing industry, or ready-mixed concrete production (Syverson 2007, 2004a). 
One exception is by Foster et al. (2006) who look at the role of entry and exit in 
productivity dynamics of the US retail sector. Concentrating on a study of a single 
(transport services) sector with spatially differentiated markets (city-pairs), relatively 
similar technology and relatively easily substitutable products across firms within these 
separate markets, enables us to account to some extent for the usual product and 
technology heterogeneity problem of many of the earlier studies.  
I find that stronger competition in the form of entry, larger number of competitors or 
lower value of the Herfindahl index within a city-pair is associated with lower average 
airfares. But, I also find evidence that tougher competition on a city-pair is correlated 
with lower across-carrier price variation and upper-bound prices, as predicted by the 
heterogeneous-producer models.  These results based on price data can be due to similar 
cost-related selection effects among airlines in different spatial markets. 
These findings are economically significant. For example, an increase in the number of 
competitors on a city-pair is associated with 8-10 per cent fall in upper-bound price and 
average price and 6-7.5 per cent fall in median price on a city-pair.  
The main implication of these results is that competition and product substitutability may 
account for a significant share of the price dispersion across different producers. In 
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sectors where spatial competition is important, the effect of competition on average 
output prices is likely to include a more complex (selection) mechanism than described in 
the traditional homogeneous-producer models of competition. These conclusions are 
likely to hold not only in the aviation sector, or the ready mixed concrete production 
(Syverson 2007), but also in many other industries as well. For example, separate spatial 
markets are an important characteristic of retail industry and many services sectors. 
Chapter 4 investigates how one liberalisation event has affected the output of the aviation 
sector. It studies the May 2004 enlargement of the EU and the Single Aviation Market 
(SEAM), and its impact on performance and output of the passenger aviation sector in 
Europe. It employs difference-in-differences and a recently developed synthetic control 
method to estimate the effects of this liberalisation event on the volume of airline 
passengers.  
The synthetic control method (SCM) by Abadie et al. (2009) is an extension to the 
difference-in-differences approach. It enables us to account for the possibility of non-
parallel trends of the group of routes affected by the EU enlargement and the control 
group. This method accounts for the time-varying unobservable country-pair 
characteristics which are ignored by the standard difference-in differences approach. 
I find that already by the end of 2004 the number of scheduled passengers travelling 
between UK and the eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) new member states grew 
by 106 per cent, relative to what it would have been in the absence of the enlargement of 
the EU and SEAM. The corresponding growth on routes from Norway, a member of the 
SEAM but not a member of the EU, to the CEE was 80 per cent, relative to a comparable 
synthetic control without the change in policy. The majority of these effects are 
concentrated on routes connecting airports outside Oslo and London with CEE countries.   
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I find also results of similar magnitude from entry of Croatia into the Single Aviation 
Market in 2006. Croatia became a member of the SEAM in 2006 but did not enter the EU 
at the same time. That way the effects of the 2006 enlargement round are likely to be 
more about the liberalisation of the aviation sector, not the combination of this with the 
overall effects of the EU enlargement.    
 
5.2 Further research 
The most natural way how to extend studies in this thesis is to investigate production 
units in sector(s) that produce rather homogeneous goods and have faced exogenous 
changes in the competition environment. It pays to search for changes in competition (e.g. 
a change in competition induced by trade liberalisation) that can be, from the viewpoint 
of firms in the studied sector, treated as an exogenous shock or natural experiment. Of 
course, it is most difficult to find an event that can be considered a natural experiment. 
Policy changes, although sometimes called natural experiments, are very often 
endogenously determined.  
There are many potential connections between competition and productivity that have yet 
to be thoroughly studied in future research. An obvious, but difficult question that needs 
to be followed iswhich channel of the effects matters the most? Several studies 
compare the relative importance of the within-firm effects, the entry-exit effect and the 
between firm re-allocation effects (e.g. Baldwin and Gu 2006, Bartelsman et al. 2005).  
However, these effects are likely to vary in different sectors and markets. For example, 
Foster Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006) show that entry and exit account for almost all of 
the aggregate productivity growth in the US retail sector. It is not clear which sector and 
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market level characteristics determine the relative importance of each channel of the 
effects of competition. 
More generally, most of the empirical papers about the determinants of productivity 
concentrate on the role of one particular determinant: e.g. work practices, competition, 
innovation, skills, change in entry barriers or technology. The literature has so far been 
unable to determine the relative importance of these main determinants of productivity.  
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